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Abstract 
 
The reform of pay systems in China has received growing attention from 
scholars over the past two decades. However, despite the great attention given to 
the business sector in China, one significant category among the pay studies in 
the Chinese public sector has been missing. In recent years, the Chinese 
government has started to implement a new wave of reform in the national 
payment system: performance related pay in the public service units (PSU, 
“shiye danwei”), which form a cluster of public service providers operating 
alongside core government and separate from other state-owned or state-
sponsored organisations. Compared to the extensive discussion of public sector 
pay in Western countries, there has to date been no academic research on pay 
systems in the Chinese PSU sector, leaving a significant gap in our 
understanding of the key changes in and challenges to its human resource 
management in different organizations. This thesis conducted in-depth case 
studies on the pay system reforms in six state schools and in one publishing 
organization, exploring a range of research objectives which draw on the New 
Economics of Personnel (NEP) theory and such motivation theories as 
expectancy theory, goal-setting theory, agency theory, cognitive evaluation 
theory and equity theory. 
The case study results were found to be consistent with the NEP predictions. The 
two cases indicate that, although the principle of linking pay to individual 
performance has been well accepted by employees across PSUs, performance 
related pay was better implemented and more successful in the publishing 
organization than the state schools. The introduction of performance related pay 
in schools does not appear to have achieved the government’s objective of 
encouraging higher performance but did have other positive consequences such 
as retaining teachers in rural areas and possibly balancing the teaching resource 
in the longer run in addition to some unintended outcomes at the same time.  
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
1.1   Background 
In Western societies and to an increasing extent in enterprises in contemporary 
China, pay is considered to be of strategic importance in attracting and retaining 
employees, motivating them and encouraging good performance, which could in 
turn enhance organizational performance, although the existence of such a link 
and the effectiveness of pay as a management strategy have long been open to 
debate. The pay system in China has gone through different stages. In terms of 
changes in the pay system in contemporary China, the popularity of performance 
related pay has been a major trend in several different sectors (Chow, 1992; 
Child, 1995; DeCieri, Zhu, et al., 1998; Ding, Goodall and Warner, 2000; 
Bjorkman, 2002; Cooke 2002, 2004, 2005; Bozionelos and Wang, 2007), 
although the real impacts of linking pay to employees’ performances at the 
organizational level have rarely been investigated.  
The reform of the pay system in China has received growing attention from 
scholars over the past two decades (e.g. Jackson and Little, 1991; Peng, 1992; 
Takahara, 1992; Child, 1994; Warner, 1996, 1997; Yu, 1998; Cooke, 2004 etc.). 
However, compared to the attention researchers have given to investigating 
business sectors (eg., SOEs1 and FIEs2) in China, there has been very little 
discussion of human resource management and changes in the types of payment 
systems used in the Chinese public sector and government organizations, leaving 
a significant gap in our understanding of the key changes and challenges to 
human resource management in these organizations. 
In recent years, the Chinese government has started to introduce a new wave of 
pay system reforms, focusing on the sector of public service units (PSU, “shiye 
danwei”), which are a cluster of public service providers operating alongside the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 SOEs: State-owned enterprises 
2 FIEs: Foreign invested enterprises	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core government, and which are separate from other state-owned or state-
sponsored organizations. As one important part of the national PSU personnel 
reform, which started in 2000, a pay system reform was announced by the 
central government in 2006, aiming to introduce performance related pay in 
different groups of PSUs nationwide. This research will explore the process and 
outcomes of the pay system reform in a previously unanalyzed sector in China, 
the PSU sector, in which performance related pay has been the central theme in 
recent years.  
 
1.2   Research Objectives and Questions 
Despite the vast number of PSUs and the important role the sector plays in 
China, the process of the PSU pay system reform and its outcomes at an 
organizational level remain unexplored in the literature. Given the complexity 
and diversity of the organizations included in the Chinese PSU sector, it is 
crucial that the pay system reform be designed and implemented with full 
consideration of sectoral and regional circumstances (Cheng, 2000; World Bank, 
2005), especially regarding how such changes in pay systems would directly 
impact employees.  
In order to get an insight into the pay system reforms in different PSUs, this 
research conducted two in-depth case studies, using six state schools and one 
publishing organization. The main research question that this research aims to 
explore is: “How has performance related pay been implemented in different 
public service units (PSUs) in China during the pay system reform, and what 
has been its impact?” Based on the predictions of the New Economics of 
Personnel (NEP) theory and such motivation theories as expectancy theory, 
goal-setting theory, agency theory, cognitive evaluation theory and equity 
theory, a range of sub-questions are proposed, as follows:  
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• How does PRP fit into different PSUs in China? 
• Can the employees improve performance by working harder? 
• If the employee works harder, will he/she get higher pay? 
• Do the employees perceive the bonuses they can receive by working 
harder to be valuable?  
• How were the criteria for PRP decided upon in individual PSUs during 
the pay system reform? 
• Has the introduction of PRP helped to align the interests of different 
parties in PSUs in China? 
• What influence has the implementation of PRP had on employees’ 
intrinsic motivation in different PSUs in China? 
• Equity or equality which has had a more significant impact on the design 
of PRP systems in PSUs in China? 
 
1.3   Thesis Structure and Overview 
This thesis is structured into nine chapters (See Figure 1-1). Following the 
introduction given in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 identifies the development of pay 
systems in China through two main stages—the pre-reform stage prior to 1978, 
and the reform stage after 1978. In one part of the literature review, studies of 
pay systems in China are reviewed. This identifies pay system studies in the 
Chinese PSU sector as a gap in the existing literature. Chapter 3 introduces the 
Chinese PSU sector and the recent organizational and pay system reform 
different groups of PSUs in China have been going through. Due to the apparent 
popularity of performance related pay (PRP) in different PSUs in China, Chapter 
4 reviews different theories related to this pay system, with a specific discussion 
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of the debates in the literature, surrounding PRP in the public sector. The NEP 
theory and motivation theories such as expectancy theory, goal-setting theory, 
agency theory, cognitive evaluation theory and equity theory are discussed, 
leading to the development of the research objectives this thesis aims to 
investigate.  
Building upon the literature and theory reviews, Chapter 5 begins by identifying 
major research gaps and formulating the research questions. This is followed by 
the alignment of various elements of research design with the nature of the 
inquiry, which leads to the selection of the case study approach. The research 
design, covering data collection, data analysis procedures, and research quality 
assurance are also presented in this chapter, as well as a discussion of the 
challenges and efforts involved in conducting research in practice.  
Chapter 6 presents the case study of the performance related pay system reform 
for schoolteachers in the compulsory education system in County H, illustrating 
the reform process with regards to both government policy-making and the 
adjustment of the pay systems in six different schools, and also revealing the 
impacts the change in pay system has had on the schools. As a comparative case 
study, an organization-spontaneous pay system reform in one publishing 
organization in Beijing is discussed in Chapter 7. The whole process of pay 
system reform in the organization, which has shifted its pay system from a 
seniority based to a performance based pay system, is looked into.  
Based on the evidence observed in the two cases, a cross-case analysis is set 
forth in Chapter 8, discussing the research objectives this study has aimed to 
achieve. Beyond the findings related to the proposed research objectives, some 
further phenomena noticed during the empirical research are also presented, 
summarizing the diverse impacts the pay system reforms have had on the 
various PSUs examined in this research.  
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Finally, the concluding part, Chapter 9, draws together the key research findings 
and translates them into implications for both theory and practice. It also 
acknowledges the research limitations and indicates directions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2   Studies of pay systems in China 
 
The question of pay and its determination has exposed tensions in China 
between socially embedded values and the functional requirements for 
modernization (Child, 1995), because pay systems in China have been 
undergoing reforms in line with the country’s economic development. The 
changes in the pay systems used in China have demonstrated a number of unique 
characteristics, unlike those in other countries. Generally speaking, pay systems 
in China have gone through two main stages—the pre-reform stage before 1978 
and the reform stage after 1978, when China started its “open door” policy and 
shifted to “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”. In this chapter, first of all, a 
historical review of pay system reform in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
will provide the background for the thesis. Second, a review of existing studies 
of pay and payment systems in China will be presented. Third, research gaps in 
three major areas will be identified. 
 
2.1   The development of pay systems in China 
1949-78: the pre-reform stage 
A typical Chinese state compensation system before the national economy 
reform usually consisted of three types of wage: monetary wages, social wages 
and non-material incentives. Each type could include different components, as 
shown in the following table (Table 2-1). 
However, although these were the typical components of pay systems across 
China, a review of the development of the pay system in China during the pre-
reform stage, shows that there were in fact different phases with distinctive 
features. For example, the initial consolidation period (1949-1952) saw a 
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confusing application of various compensation systems, some inherited from the 
Nationalist regime and some from the Soviet system (Shenkar and Chow, 1989; 
Takahara, 1992).  
Table 2-1: Components of the Chinese state pay system (1949-1978) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monetary 
wages 
Basic (or 
standard) wage 
The wage earned by all PRC workers. Set to ensure that a 
worker’s basic needs were met; relatively stable over time 
except for adjustments to match the regional cost of living. 
Seniority wage Based on the number of years of experience. 
Position wage Determined by a worker’s position on the industry ladder as 
well as his current position (i.e., the amount of labour and 
quality of work the position requires, its importance, level of 
responsibility and the job-holder’s technical know-how). 
Floating (or 
flexible) wage 
The differential pay awarded according to the individual’s 
contribution to the enterprise’s economic performance. 
Time-rate wage Pay determined by the amount of time spent at work, measured 
in hourly, daily, or monthly units. 
Piece-rate wage Awarded on the basis of productivity efficiency. 
Bonuses Payments based on such criteria as above-quota output, superior 
product quality, cost reduction, waste elimination, on- or 
before-schedule completion, improved safety and technical 
innovation. 
Allowances  Workers were given various forms of allowances to make the 
compensation package more fully meet their needs—for 
example, allowances for overtime, shift work, difficult or 
hazardous working conditions, cost of living adjustments, and 
fuel in some cold regions. 
Social 
wages 
Labour 
insurance 
Included paid sick leave, disability pay, paid maternity leave, 
funeral allowance, relief pay for family dependents, retirement 
benefits, free annual medical check-up, paid vacation, leave for 
visiting immediate family members, hardship allowance, etc. 
Collective 
welfare 
Included subsidized housing, subsidies for grain, oil and non-
staple foods, subsidies for personal services (e.g., haircuts) and 
transportation, and various kinds of community services, such 
as nurseries, kindergartens, medical and recreational facilities.  
Non-
material 
incentives  
Model workers Form of recognition offered at various levels, from the work 
unit up to the national level. Model workers were publicly 
praised and presented as role models for other employees to 
follow. 
Participatory 
management 
Allowed employees to participate in decision-making but was 
frequently a ritual, orchestrated from above. 
Job enrichment Various job enrichment strategies, e.g. rotation. 
Election of 
directors 
Election of top workers to management positions. 
 
Source: Shenkar and Chow (1989) and Chow (1992) 
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In 1953, China launched its first Five Year Plan, marking the start of a central 
planning period (1953-1957). The first pay system reform in the public sector 
took place between 1953 and 1956. The purpose of the first wave in 1953 was to 
bring to an end the dual system of pay that was made up of both material 
supplies and salary. It aimed to make a transition to a salary-based pay system 
from one which was dominated by material supplies “gongjizhi”, a legacy from 
the revolutionary period before 1949 when the distribution system bore strong 
indications of military communism. This pay reform also introduced, for the first 
time, a grading system for classifying each employee’s level of pay on the 
principle of ‘distribution on the basis of labour’ (‘an lao fen pei’) (Cooke, 2004).  
The second wave of pay system reform was carried out in 1956, following the 
announcement of the “State Council’s Decision on Wage Reform”. This reform 
saw the formal implementation of a pay scale, using a nationwide Soviet-style 
wage grading system (Takahara, 1992; Cooke, 2004). At this time, the wages of 
employees in all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government organizations 
were divided into three major categories, as shown in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2: State industrial wage systems from 1956 onwards 
1. 8-grade Wage System 2. Occupational Wage 
System 
3. Cadre Wage System 
a) set up in 1956 a) set up in 1956 a) set up in 1956 
b) eight wage grades; skill-
based, to be linked to the 
bonus system 
b) one wage rate for each 
occupation; output based, to 
be linked to piecework 
b) 24 wage grades; 
responsibility-based, to be 
linked to the bonus system 
c) covered most production 
workers 
c) covered operatives in 
selected industries, e.g. 
textiles, chemicals, iron and 
steel, railways and other 
transport 
c) covered white-collar 
workers and staff 
  
Source: Jackson and Littler (1991: 11) 
 
According to Jackson and Littler (1991), after the 1956 national pay system 
reform, most workers in China were paid under the eight-grade system (seven-
grade in some industries), formulated as a unified scheme which initially 
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classified workers’ jobs into different types, mainly according to the level of 
technical complexity, labour intensity and responsibility. The occupational wage 
system (“gangwei gongzizhi”) consisted of as many as fifteen grades, and was 
mostly common in factories where division of labour was highly developed, 
skills were less complex and job differences were small. Piecework wages were 
common within this system because it was markedly output-based. At the same 
time, white-collar workers and staff in the public sector, including those in 
SOEs, were paid under the cadre wage system (also called the ‘position wage 
system’, or ‘zhiwu gongzizhi’). This system was responsibility-based and used a 
fixed schedule of standard salaries spanning 24 grades (initially thirty, when first 
established in 1956). At the top were senior officials of the State Council, etc., 
and at the bottom (the 24th grade) were office workers of the lowest level, such 
as messengers and cleaners.  
For example, according to this system, scientists in research institutes and 
teaching staff in higher education were divided into twelve pay grades, ranging 
from the lowest-paid at 62 yuan (about £5.60) per month to the highest-paid at 
345 yuan (about £31) per month (Cooke, 2004). During this time, wages were 
kept deliberately low in a bid to keep prices down (Takahara, 1992; Cooke, 
2004), but material incentives such as piece-rate bonuses were common in 
different industries in China, as the ideology of “distribution on the basis of 
labour” was highly supported at that time (Shenkar and Chow, 1989; Cooke, 
2004). 
As well as these material wage systems, a general policy of combining monetary 
with non-monetary incentives was adopted after the 1956 wage reform, in order 
to stimulate productivity. As an important element in the traditional Chinese pay 
system, non-material incentives were provided in the form of social recognition. 
Moral encouragement campaigns, with accompanying material rewards, on the 
basis, for example, of patriotism, or loyalty to the Communist Party were 
frequently used to improve productivity. During this era, workers were 
encouraged to emulate, learn from, catch up with and overtake the advanced 
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units in their organization, and outstanding workers were given wide publicity, 
with honorary titles, such as ‘model worker’, ‘advanced worker’, ‘labour hero’, 
as an example for others to follow (Chow, 1992).  
However, when the period of the Great Leap Forward began (1958-1960), more 
collectivist values came to the fore (Glover and Trivedi, 2007) and the bonus 
payments for cadres, which had helped to widen income differentials, were 
abolished (Child, 1994), mainly because Chairman Mao believed that the 
motivating force should come from non-material incentives, appealing to an 
individual’s need for identification with the Communist Party and group 
recognition (Chow, 1992). Due to the over-emphasis on expanding the 
manufacturing sector during the Great Leap Forward, there was a drop in 
agricultural output between 1959 and 1961, followed by a famine. Thus, a 
readjustment was needed between 1962 and 1965, with pay systems returning to 
the previous national system that was in place before the Great Leap Forward.  
Nevertheless, the Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966, led to a distinctive 
period (1966-1976), during which politics and ideology were the prevailing 
concerns (Glover and Trivedi, 2007). In terms of rewards, competitive, 
individual and material incentives were rejected in favour of cooperative, 
collective and moral incentives; material bonuses were denounced as part of the 
general attack against “bureaucracy”, and were criticized for causing inequality, 
which “invariably gives rise to class exploitation” (Child, 1994; Glover and 
Trivedi, 2007). During this period, bonuses were cancelled in most enterprises 
and “everyone was paid regardless of whether one did a good job or bad, did 
more or less, or even if one did not turn up for work” (Shenkar and Chow, 1989: 
69). The Cultural Revolution was seen to have dissipated incentives and 
responsibility for economic performance through egalitarianism, the weakening 
of management, the general devaluation of expertise and the claim that 
ideological fervour and inspired leadership could substitute for technical 
knowledge (Child, 1994; Cooke, 2004; Glover and Trivedi, 2007 et al.). 
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To sum up, from 1958 until 1978, in most organizations in China, the wage 
structure was essentially frozen and the distribution of wages between 
organizations was a direct function of employment allocation (Cooke, 2004). For 
example, earnings increases were virtually frozen from 1963 to 1977, and by 
1977 average real earnings were lower than in 1952 (Child, 1994). According to 
Shenkar and Chow (1989), one of the most important problems in pre-reform 
enterprises under Mao’s regime was that of low probabilities: performance was 
not perceived as being a product of effort, since the over-staffed enterprises 
assigned very low performance levels. At the same time, employees did not 
expect better performance to lead to such desirable outcomes as higher pay 
(especially when bonuses were cancelled) or promotion (which was based on 
either seniority or one’s political background and connections).  
1978 to date: Socialism with Chinese characteristics  
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, Deng Xiaoping assumed power in 
China. Under his leadership, China embarked on an economic reform 
programme, announced during the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee, in December 1978. Since then, China has entered a reform stage of 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics’, a title first used by Deng Xiaoping in 
1982 to describe the new approach to economic reform (Glover and Trivedi, 
2007).  
Post-1978, there was a gap between the carrying out of economic reform and 
wage reform. After the cultural revolution was terminated, the 1956 wage 
system was restored and bonuses and piecework rates returned as components of 
compensation. Annual income increased from an average of 605 yuan in 1976 to 
865 yuan in 1983, an increase in real wages of around twenty per cent if price 
inflation is taken into account (China Statistical Year Book, 1996). However, the 
basic schemes for industrial wages remained intact during the early stages of the 
economic reform (Chow, 1992).  
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The need for wage reform was officially confirmed by the Third Plenum of the 
Twelve Party Central Committee in 1984, when the Communist Party of China’s 
Central Committee adopted a major policy document on China’s Economic 
Structure Reform. This sought to build on the country’s economic reform 
programme and expounded that a ‘systematic’ and ‘all round’ policy be applied 
generally throughout the industrial sector (Jackson and Littler, 1991; Child, 
1994). The document articulated a clear expectation that industrial performance 
would benefit if personal contributions were reflected in the level of material 
reward: 
The well-spring of vitality of the enterprise lies in the initiative, wisdom and 
creativeness of its workers by hand and brain…when their labour is closely linked 
with their own material benefits, their initiative, wisdom and creativeness can be 
brought into full play. This has been vividly and convincingly proved by our 
experience in rural reform (Communist Party of China, 1984: 11). 
Since then, the ideology proposed by Deng Xiaoping, including for example 
“distribution according to the quantity and quality of an individual’s work” and 
“a person’s grade on the pay scale is determined mainly by his performance on 
the job, his technical level and his actual contribution”, has spread across China 
(Child, 1994). In 1984, China started its second pay system reform, which 
included three ‘basic principles’, namely, the ‘floating wage system’, the 
‘structured wage system’ and the ‘tax pay for profit system’. 
The floating wage system (fudong gongzizhi) was introduced to state enterprises 
as an output-based system, intended (at least in part) to replace bonuses, which 
were increasingly recognized as failing to link pay directly to performance. The 
first aspect of the floating wage system involved the enterprise’s wage fund, 
which could increase or decrease according to certain performance indicators, 
such as profits, sales or some measure of output. The second aspect introduced a 
variable element into the salary itself, allowing it to fluctuate according to the 
production volume of the worker or to the degree of responsibility, workload 
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and/or enterprise profit level, for managerial and non-production workers (Child, 
1994; Jackson and Littler, 1991; Cooke, 2005 etc.) 
The ‘structural wage system’ was mainly introduced to the state sectors, 
including civil servants and employees in the public sector (a point that will be 
discussed further in Chapter 3). Under the structural wage system, an individual 
wage package was divided into a number of components, such as basic pay, 
seniority pay, position and variable pay (in the form of bonuses or other 
allowances).  
Basic pay (jichu gongzi) was the same for everybody, irrespective of their 
hierarchical position, and was meant to cover basic living expenses, about thirty 
to forty per cent of the individual’s total pay. 
The positional pay (zhiwu gongzi) was based on a person’s managerial or 
technical position and responsibilities. Such position pay, or sometimes also 
called technical pay (jishu gongzi) for employees in technical positions, 
depended on the nature of the job, and usually made up a third of total wages. 
Seniority pay (gongling gongzi) was a relatively moderate subsidy, which 
accrued each year up to a maximum of forty years, and usually accounted for 
only a small portion of the employee’s total wage.  
Variable pay (huodong gongzi), including bonuses and other allowances, was 
linked to both the worker’s individual performance and the profitability of the 
whole enterprise. Around twenty to thirty per cent of a worker’s total wage came 
from this.  
The objectives of the structural wage system were both economic and political. 
Its introduction abolished the previous wage grading system, which was 
criticized for having too many wage standards, causing discrepancies between 
positions and wages, creating a great deal of irrationality in wage differentials, 
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and causing conflicts between members of staff. In theory, such pay system 
represented a marked shift from the earlier egalitarian pay principle, since it 
placed far greater emphasis on each employee’s responsibilities and performance 
(i.e. ‘to each according to his work’) (Jackson and Littler, 1991; Cooke, 2005 
etc.)  
Another important principle introduced in the pay system reform of 1984 was 
the implementation of the new tax-for-profit (ligaishui) taxation system, the aim 
of which was “leaving all enterprises to be responsible for their own profits and 
losses and to engage on an equal footing with each other in market competition’ 
(Huang, 2010: 93). This policy required that the enterprise wage bill should 
come out of profits, instead of being part of production costs (Jackson and 
Littler, 1991); this separated government intervention from enterprise 
management and gave managers more flexibility in their allocation of wages.  
In the 1980s, the growing emphasis on meritocracy and material incentives in 
China was the result of the leadership’s growing desire for economic efficiency 
and use of profit as a major indicator of enterprise performance (Jackson and 
Litter, 1991). For example, from 1978 to 1985, time-rate wages fell from 85 per 
cent to 59.5 per cent of overall wages, while piece-rate wages increased from 0.8 
per cent to 9.9 per cent. At the same time, bonuses rose from 2.3 per cent on 
average to 12.9 per cent (Shenkar and Chow, 1989). 
 
Table 2-3: Composition of the wages of employees of state-owned units (in 
percentages) in the 1980s 
 
Year 1978 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Time-rate wages 85.0 69.8 64.4 63.5 58.5 57.2 56.3 54.3 49.0 
Piece-rate 
wages 
0.8 3.2 7.6 8.5 9.5 9.5 8.7 9.2 9.4 
Various bonuses 2.3 9.1 10.9 11.1 14.4 12.4 12.8 14.7 17.2 
Various subsidy 
allowances 
6.5 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.5 18.5 18.8 18.9 21.4 
Overtime 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.9 
Other  3.4 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.6 0.8 1.6 1.0 1.1 
Note: 1985-1988 time-rate wages included both a base wage and a job responsibility component 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook (1987: 688; 1989: 130); cited in Jackson and Littler (1991: 
15) 
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This second pay system reform, which lasted for a period of eight years, played 
an important role in the development of the Chinese pay system. However, its 
success was limited. For example, although it introduced the floating wage 
system to SOEs, with the aim of linking pay more closely to performance, the 
fact was that, for many workers, a bonus payment was a necessary supplement to 
the basic wage, due to the rapid rises in retail prices and the availability of a 
larger range of consumer goods. Thus, there was social pressure for more 
compensation in the form of bonuses, in a situation where the wages of many 
people remained stagnant until the government made another ‘adjustment’. As a 
result, managers of many types of organizations in China were under pressure to 
pay equal bonuses to workers and resorted to various methods of finding more 
money to make these payments. This led to bonuses for meeting output or 
quality indicators being paid so routinely and extensively that they amounted to 
little more than an automatic wage supplement (Jackson and Littler, 1991). The 
implementation of the structural wage system in the state sectors during this 
national pay system reform also achieved relatively little because it tried to 
cover too broad a range of occupations, so that the state had great difficulty in 
establishing a uniform national scheme of positions and appropriate wages. In 
addition, position is not always a reliable indicator of competence and 
performance, since promotion in China’s state sector is usually based on 
seniority rather than performance evaluation. This reform also led to a relative 
wage reduction for public sector employees compared with the wages paid in 
enterprises, in part because SOEs were better able than other enterprises to 
increase the proportion of bonus wages paid (Cooke, 2004, 2005), while at the 
same time, some peasant incomes had more than tripled and some rural 
collectives and people in the private sector earned more than state workers did 
(Jackson and Littler, 1991). 
In the 1980s, when China sped up its ‘open door’ policy, more foreign 
investment entered China and this led to its having a much more competitive 
market for domestic enterprises (e.g. the first manufacturing joint venture was 
Beijing Jeep, established in 1984, followed by many other joint ventures and 
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multinational branches). At one time, SOEs had dominated industrial 
production, and their work-units (danwei, which will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 3) embodied the so-called ‘iron rice-bowl’ (tie fan wan), which 
ensured a ‘job for life’ and ‘cradle to grave’ welfare for most urban industrial 
SOE employees. However, this SOE employment system changed significantly 
with the traditional ‘iron rice bowl’ system began to be dismantled across China 
from that time (Ding, Goodall et al., 2000). As a result, a state legislated 
personnel reform was begun in 1992, with the introduction of labour contracts, 
performance related rewards and workers’ contributions to social insurance (Ng 
and Warner, 1998). At the same time, the State Council issued a circular, stating 
that enterprises were permitted to set their internal wage structures, within the 
confines of the overall wage budget established by the government (Yueh, 
2004).  
The third national pay system reform in the P.R.C. history was introduced in 
1993, when the Ministry of Labour ended the quota system for employment. 
After this, the numbers of new employees that could be hired, conditions of 
employment and forms of recruitment could all be decided independently by 
each firm independently (Ning, 2008). Subsequently, the 1994 Labour Law of 
the PRC, which came into effect on 1 January 1995, institutionalized a market-
oriented, extensive labour contract system, requiring all firms, regardless of 
ownership, to hire their employees using labour contracts (Ding, Goodall et al., 
2000). This decisively broke the traditional ‘iron rice bowl’ of the SOEs and was 
linked to huge waves of downsizing of SOE employees in the late 1990s.  
The third wave of pay system reform in the PRC started in 1993, after the Third 
Plenum of the 14th Central Party Committee, during which ‘productivity’ and 
‘equity’ in the national wage system were first proposed. Compared to the 
previous pay system reforms, the 1993 reform mainly focused on the state 
sector, with the important decision being made to separate the pay system in the 
public sector from that in governmental organizations. The 1993 pay system 
reform led to the establishment of five pay schemes divided into two parts, 
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reflecting the diverse range of jobs in the public sector. According to the new 
system, organizations in the sector were divided into five categories, each of 
which had a specific pay system, based on the nature of the jobs involved. The 
five pay systems were as follows: 
The first was the ‘pay system based on technical position levels’. The parts of 
the public sector that adopted this pay system mainly included education, 
research, health, publishing, agriculture, museums, and environmental 
protection. Within them, an employee’s responsibility and performance levels 
were indicated by his/her position level. For each individual, pay was made in 
two main parts: position pay (based on the employee’s specific technical 
position level) and subsidies (the flexible part of the wage, linked to 
performance). The state would control the overall budget allocated to wages, but 
the organization itself could decide how to allocate the subsidies. Each 
individual would receive a fixed amount based on his/her position level, plus a 
flexible, subsidized part, linked to performance.  
The second system was the ‘pay system based on technical positions’. This was 
mainly adopted by sectors such as geological, topographical, ocean research and 
other sectors that involved outdoor activities. Similarly to employees in the first 
category, employees under this pay system again received their pay in two parts: 
a fixed part based on their technical position and a subsidized part based on 
working conditions and the difficulty of their position. The main difference 
between the two was that in the second category, the subsidized part of wages 
was fixed. The subsidy was tied to position and only changed if the employee’s 
position changed (e.g. it would be withdrawn if the employee moved from an 
outdoor-based to an indoor-based position). 
The third category was the ‘pay system for employees working in the art 
performance sectors’. People working as professional performers in the public 
sector received three pay components: position pay, based on their official skill 
level, a performance-level subsidy, reflecting their actual performance/skill level 
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(e.g. main actor/actress; second actor/actress etc.), and a subsidy for their actual 
performance (based on number of concerts performed, etc.). 
The fourth category included employees working in the sports sector, such as 
professional athletes or coaches. Employees in this sector received a fixed 
amount according to their professional level, and bonuses, based in part on their 
competitive performance. The fifth category comprised employees working in 
financial firms such as national banks, who receive a fixed position pay plus 
performance pay reflecting their achievement of targets.  
Another important feature of the 1993 pay reform was to introduce a flexible 
wage alongside the traditional fixed wage. The Wage Reform for Employees in 
Government and Public Service Sectors by the State Council of the PRC (1993), 
set out that employees in those parts of the public sector fully-funded by the 
national budget should receive seventy per cent fixed pay and thirty per cent 
flexible pay, while those in partially-funded area should receive sixty per cent 
fixed and forty per cent flexible pay. No specific requirements were made for 
self-funded organisations. 
In order to recruit and retain workers in the state sector, especially in some less 
popular positions, the 1993 pay reform also increased wages for dirty, strenuous 
and high-risk jobs and those in remote areas. In theory, this pay system reform 
was the first step towards a differentiated management system for the public 
sector. This kind of non-egalitarian system was believed to motivate employees 
in each organization, by closely linking earnings to performance, at both the 
individual and organizational levels. However, like the previous reform, the 
1993 wage reform is considered by scholars in the field to have been 
insufficient. It was found to have little impact on motivating the workforce, 
rewarding good performers or improving public-sector pay in relation to that of 
other sectors (Warner, 1996; Yu, 1998; Cooke, 2004, 2005, etc.).  
Although the Chinese government made further adjustments between 1993 and 
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1999, the implementation of performance-related pay elements caused an 
undeclared but officially endorsed deviation from the principle of ‘to each 
according to his work’. For example, although the general pay level largely 
increased during the 1993 reform, seniority remained the most important 
determinant of pay in the Chinese public sector, and flexible bonuses/subsidies 
were still allocated in an egalitarian way in most organizations. Then, in 2006, 
the central government launched another wave of pay system reforms, focusing 
on the public sector, generally thought of as the fourth pay system reform in the 
PRC’s history which aimed to introduce performance related pay across the 
public sector in China. The details of this most recent pay system reform will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. Meanwhile, in the next section, the literature on pay in 
contemporary China will be reviewed, demonstrating the research gaps that this 
thesis seeks to address.  
 
2.2   Review of studies on pay in China  
Nowadays, an overwhelming collection of literature on human resource 
management (HRM) in China can be found in international journals, with more 
studies appearing on the horizon continually (Cooke, 2009). Among all the 
literature discussing management issues in China, the reform of the pay system 
is one subject that has received considerable attention from scholars in the past 
two decades (e.g. Jackson and Littler, 1991; Peng, 1992; Takahara, 1992; Child, 
1994; Warner, 1996, 1997; Yu, 1998; Cooke, 2004, etc.). In recent years, the 
issue of effective performance and reward management has been the topic of 
continuous research and discussion in international journals (Jiang, Yi and Liu, 
2006; Baruch, Wheeler et al, 2004; Liu and Mills, 2005; Tan and Liu, 2004; 
Zhang and Li). However, despite the increasing awareness of the introduction of 
effective pay systems in different types of organization in China, there has been 
a dearth of research in this area, as very few studies, and in particular little in-
depth research, have been conducted on the changes to and effectiveness of pay 
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systems at different organizational levels, using samples from China (Baruch, 
Wheeler et al, 2004; Wang, Nicholson, et al., 2009). In order to determine the 
existing pay studies that have been carried out in China and identify research 
gaps, all of the literature on pay in contemporary China was reviewed (by 
searching for the key words “pay/compensation/wage” and “China” in the 
electronic data base of the LSE library, by ‘title’, ‘key words’ and ‘abstract’, as 
well as through google and googlescholar). All of the pay studies based in 
China, from the 1990s onwards, are listed in Table 2-4 below.  
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Table 2-4: List of empirical pay studies in contemporary China 3 
Author(s)  Year of 
data 
Issues  Method  Major findings  
Peng (1992) 1986 Wage determination 
process for employees in 
the rural public sector, 
rural private sector, and 
urban state sector in China 
Survey (N1=1002, from 
urban state sector; N2= 770, 
with 541 from rural public 
sector, 229 from private 
sector) 
Wage determination in rural industry is similar for both public 
and private enterprises, but differs from wage stratification in 
the urban state sector. Occupation, gender, and various human 
capital factors differentiate wages much more effectively in 
the rural sectors than in the urban state sectors, where pay is 
more equal among employees.  
 
Takahara (1992) 1948-1986 Political aspects of pay 
determination and 
consequences 
Ethnography Pay policy and implementation determined by political forces 
and the interests of different parties. Increasing bargaining 
power of workers, higher rate of increase of pay level than 
productivity increases and egalitarian bonus distribution were 
observed.  
 
Chow (1992) 1989 Chinese workers’ attitudes 
towards compensation 
practices  
Survey (N=504, in Henan 
Province) 
Respondents preferred a performance-based compensation 
system to an egalitarian system; the least preferred options 
were equal distribution or that based on seniority.  
 
Chen (1995) 1991 Comparison of Chinese 
and US employees’ goal 
orientation and allocation 
preferences for various 
types of organizational 
rewards 
Survey 
 
Chinese respondents put emphasis on economic 
organizational goals, whereas the Americans put emphasis on 
humanistic ones; the Chinese expressed consistent support for 
the differential allocation of both material and socioemotional 
rewards, and the Americans supported the performance rule 
for material rewards but preferred equality rules for 
socioemotional rewards.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This table lists all articles/books on pay studies in China using empirical research/data, from the 1990s up until the time of final writing of this thesis. 
Review papers and literature on general HRM studies in China, with partial discussion of pay issues, were also reviewed during this research, but are 
not included in this table. 
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Child (1995) 1985-1990 Changes in the structure of 
earnings in a sample of 
Chinese enterprises over a 
period 
Two investigations with 
informal direct personal 
questioning conducted 
within the same six Beijing 
state manufacturing 
enterprises (1985 N=143; 
1990 N=144) 
In 1985, factors identified by the traditional model, especially 
age, were the most important predictors of earnings. By 1990, 
some movement towards the reform model had taken place, 
although age continued to have an important, albeit weaker, 
association with the level of earnings, and the link between 
pay and performance was still quite limited.  
De Cieri et al. 
(1998) 
1994-1995 Pay practices and 
consequences in Chinese 
firms with different 
ownership structures 
Survey (N=440, with 104 
SOEs, 45 COE4s, 16 POE5s 
and 53 foreign invested 
enterprises (FIEs) in 
Shanghai, Nanjing and 
Tianjin) 
Material incentives and pay-for-performance were valued by 
the employees; benefits were an important part of the 
compensation package; seniority-based pay was expected to 
be less important in the future; bonuses were mainly 
determined by inflation rate and attendance. 
Dong (1998) 1984-1990 Employment and wage 
behaviour of Chinese 
township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) 
Data analysis based on 
panel data from Chinese 
rural enterprises collected 
by the Research Center for 
Rural Development of 
China’s State Council and 
the World Bank 
TVEs valued both employment and income but emphasized 
income above employment, with TVEs employing fewer 
workers than an ideal firm would; the enterprise’s ability to 
create jobs for its own sake was constrained by its financial 
situation; workers and local government in underdeveloped 
noncoastal regions valued employment relative to income 
more than did those in economically advanced coastal 
regions.  
Zhou, and 
Martocchio 
(2001) 
N/A Differences between 
Chinese and American 
managers making 
compensation award 
decisions (bonus amounts 
and nonmonetary 
recognition)  
Survey (Chinese sample) of 
participants in an executive 
training programme at a 
large Midwestern university 
(N=71) 
Compared with their Amerian counterparts, Chinese managers 
(a) put less emphasis on work performance when making 
bonus decisions, (b) put more emphasis on relationships with 
coworkers when making nonmonetary decisions, (c) put more 
emphasis on relationships with managers when making 
nonmonetary award decisions, and (d) put more emphasis on 
personal needs when making bonus decisions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 COES: Cooperate owned enterprises 
5 POEs: Private owned enterprises	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Heneman, 
Tansky et al. 
(2002) 
N/A Comparison of 
compensation practices in 
small entrepreneurial and 
high-growth companies in 
the US and China 
Data analysis based on a 
validated survey of US pay 
practices (inadequate data 
for Chinese part) 
Seniority is still important, and internal equity determines pay 
rates far more than the external market for small Chinese 
companies. Incentive plans and bonuses based on 
organizational performance are extremely important in China. 
Thus, China mixed traditional HR practices with more 
cutting-edge US pay plans. 
 
Chiu, Luk et al. 
(2002) 
1996 Compensation preferences 
in Hong Kong and China 
Survey (Hong Kong N=583; 
China, questionnaires 
mailed from Hong Kong, 
completed by general 
manager (or HR manager) 
in Hong Kong-owned and 
foreign-owned companies 
with operations in PRC, 
N=233) 
In Hong Kong, the base salary, merit pay, year-end bonus, 
annual leave, mortgage loans, and profit sharing were the 
most important factors in retaining and motivating employees. 
In China, the base salary, merit pay, year-end bonus, housing 
provision, cash allowance, overtime allowance, and individual 
bonus were the most important.  
Chen, Choi et al. 
(2002). 
N/A How local employees of 
international joint ventures 
(IJVs) perceived the 
disparity between their 
compensation and that of 
foreign expatriates  
Questionnaires with local 
Chinese employees of IJVs 
who had worked with 
foreign expatriates (N=161) 
Chinese locals perceived less fairness when comparing their 
compensation with expatriates’ than when comparing it with 
other locals’. However, fairness vis-à-vis expatriates increased 
if the locals received more than their peers in other IJVs or 
where there were endorsed ideological explanations for the 
expatriates’ higher compensation.  
 
Giacobbe-
Miller, J., D. 
Miller et al. 
(2003) 
1996 
(Russia & 
US); 1997 
(China) 
A comparative study of 
distributive justice values 
in China, Russia and the 
US 
Survey (Russian managers 
N=87; Chinese managers 
N=113, from eighteen 
enterprises, including SOEs 
(72 per cent) and JVs/FOEs 
(28 per cent); university 
graduates in US, N=100) 
Country differences: China more collectivist than Russia and 
the US. Enterprise differences: no difference in allocations 
between Chinese SOEs and JVs/FOEs. Culture appears to 
dominate the Chinese results, in which there were no 
differences by enterprise type. 
Hickey (2003) 2001 MNC pharmaceutical 
compensation in China  
Survey (interviews of HR or 
compensation specialist of 
eleven pharmaceutical 
MNCs’ Chinese 
headquarters) 
Significant differences between the labour costs of Western 
pharmaceutical workers and their Chinese counterparts. It is 
recommended that human capital intensive MNCs examine 
their strategies for increasing the variable pay of compliance 
and QC employees, in order to aid ongoing organizational 
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learning, while conversely adjusting the variable pay mix 
appropriately for different types of either knowledge or 
volume intensive sales incumbents.  
Cooke (2004) 1949-2001 China’s public-sector pay 
from 1949 to 2001 
Review and analysis  
Data source: 1) secondary 
data; 2) informal interviews; 
3) author’s own experience 
The pay system in the public sector in China demonstrates a 
number of unique characteristics which differ from those in 
other societies, such as the egalitarian culture, the relatively 
large proportion made up by the bonus in the total pay 
package, and the significant role of workers in controlling 
their bonuses.  
He, Chen et al. 
(2004) 
2001 Effects of ownership 
reform and individuals’ 
collectivist values on the 
rewards-allocation 
preferences of employees 
of Chinese SOEs, and how 
these relationships are 
mediated by employees’ 
productivity goal 
orientation.  
Survey (N=297, employees 
from one public SOE and 
one subsidiary of an SOE 
for each of four holding 
companies) 
1) Employees of enterprises that had experienced a greater 
degree of ownership reform expressed stronger preferences 
for differential allocation rules (e.g., job position and 
performance) but weaker preferences for egalitarian allocation 
rules (e.g., group and individual equality).  
2) Vertical collectivism was positively related to preferences 
for differential allocation rules, but horizontal collectivism 
was positively related to preferences for egalitarian allocation 
rules.  
3) The effects of both ownership reform and vertical 
collectivism on differential allocation preferences were 
mediated by productivity goal orientation. Research and 
practical implications for ownership reform and vertical-
horizontal collectivism are discussed. 
Baruch, Wheeler 
et al. (2004) 
2001 Performance-related pay in 
Chinese professional 
sports 
Questionnaires to members 
of eight professional sports 
teams (N=50) 
The nature of competitive professional sports, with an 
emphasis on personal abilities, objective measures of 
performance and an emphasis on continuing short-term 
performance, is particularly suited to a PRP system of 
rewards, even in a collectivistic culture where PRP is less 
likely to be generally applicable.  
Yueh (2004) 1995 & 
1999 
Wage reforms in China 
during the 1990s for the 
working-aged urban 
population 
Statistic analysis with two 
cross-sectional data sets 
conducted by the National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS)  
The components of annual income have changed, reflecting 
fewer subsidies and more diverse sources of income, over the 
period from 1995 to 1999. By 1999, the wage structure 
reflects less seniority-based pay, allows for more discretion in 
rewarding non-productive characteristics, and also permits 
more productivity related pay.  
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Liu and Mills 
(2005) 
1978-97 The effect of PRP for 
hospital doctors on 
hospital behaviour  
Longitudinal data on 
revenue and productivity 
from six panel hospitals and 
a detailed record review of 
2,303 tracer disease patients 
There was an increase in unnecessary care and in the 
probability of admission when the bonus system switched 
from one with a weaker incentive to increase services to one 
with a stronger incentive, suggesting that the improvement in 
the financial health of public hospitals was achieved at least in 
part through the provision of more unnecessary care and drugs 
and through admitting more patients.  
 
Ding, Akhtar et 
al. (2006) 
N/A Organizational differences 
in managerial 
compensation and benefits 
in SOEs, PLFs6 and FIEs 
Survey (questionnaires by 
phone/fax in Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Nanjing; 
N=465) 
Not only industry sector, but also firm age, ownership and 
location impact the level of managerial compensation. 
Bozionelos and 
Wang (2007) ∗ 
N/A Workers’ attitude towards 
individual based 
performance-related 
rewards systems 
(IBPRRS) 
Survey (N=106, white-
collar workers employed in 
a new Chinese SOE) 
While the general attitude is positive, the respondents indicate 
that the fear of losing face (mianzi) and the concern that 
performance evaluation is affected by personal relationships 
(guanxi) make it hard to implement an IBPRRS. 
Li and Edwards 
(2008) 
2006 Work and pay in small 
Chinese clothing firms 
Case study; semi-structured 
face-to-face interviews and 
observations (owners and 
managers in 7 case firms 
and 63 employees in 12 
firms) 
Workers could negotiate relatively high wages, albeit at the 
cost of very long hours; work relations in small firms are 
more nuanced than the sweatshop image allows, and extreme 
exploitation is more likely in Taylorised workplaces run by 
large corporations.  
Ding, Akhtar et 
al. (2009) 
2005 Impact of inter- and intra-
hierarchy wage dispersions 
on company performance  
Questionnaire surveys:  
(1) HRM questionnaires 
filled in by HR director, (2) 
a company performance 
questionnaire filled in by 
general or deputy general 
manager (N=395) 
Inter-hierarchy wage dispersion between managers and 
workers is beneficial to firm performance. Whether intra-
hierarchy wage dispersion within manager or worker groups 
would have positive or negative effects on firm performance 
would depend on the nature of performance goals and the 
degree of task interdependence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 PLFs: publicly listed ﬁrms 
The studies listed in Table 2.4 are mainly papers published in international 
journals since the 1990s, when the topic of pay in China started to attract the 
awareness of academic researchers, both in China and abroad. The only 
exception is the work by Takahara (1992), which is a book reviewing the Wage 
Policy in Post-Revolutionary China. As well as the studies listed in Table 2.4, 
more general review papers and literature about HRM in China, with some 
discussion of pay issues, were also reviewed during this research. Three 
significant research gaps were identified after reviewing all the existing 
literature; these are discussed in the next section.  
  
2.3   Identification of research gaps 
There are many different issues influencing HRM and pay system development 
in China. As it is a big country in terms of both land mass and population, it is 
common to find differences in culture between employees from the north and the 
south (Beardwell and Claydon, 2007). It is also usual to see deep divisions 
according to sector, location, ownership type and employee numbers (Warner, 
2004). Based on an extensive review and analysis of 182 articles published in 
the field of HRM, focusing on China since its economic reform, Zhu, Thomson 
et al. (2008) suggest that ownership has emerged as an important facet of HRM 
research in China, and is included as a major category in the research protocol 
(Zhu, Thomson et al. 2008).  
When classifying pay studies according to the ownership of the sample 
organizations, three groups emerge. First, there are several studies that do not 
specify ownership style, especially among earlier studies. Representative studies 
in this group include those of Shenkar and Chow (1989), Jackson and Littler 
(1991), and Chow (1992), which discuss the pay development in China from a 
general point of view. Later on, as China deepened its economic reform, with 
diverse impacts on different sectors, more researchers started to pay attention to 
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the ownership type of their research targets, noticing the significant influence it 
had on outcomes. However, among those studies paying attention to the link 
between ownership and pay systems, there is a cluster of research using samples 
from SOEs, FIEs and IJVs. SOEs are the most commonly discussed form of 
ownership (Child, 1995; De Cieri et al., 1998; Giacobbe-Miller et al., 2003; He, 
Chen et al., 2004; Ding, Akhtar et al., 2006; Bozionelos and Wang, 2007), 
followed by FIEs (De Cieri et al., 1998; Chiu, Luk et al., 2002; Giacobbe-Miller 
et al., 2003; Hickey, 2003; Ding, Akhtar et al., 2006) and then IJVs (Chen, Choi 
et al., 2002; Giacobbe-Miller et al., 2003). Such studies make up the second 
group of current literature on pay in China. The final group includes a few pieces 
of research looking into the pay systems applied in organizations with other 
types of ownership. These have their own specific features but are not as well 
explored.  
The third, smaller group includes the work of Dong (1998), who analyzed the 
employment and wage behaviour of Chinese TVEs, showing that they valued 
both employment and income, but emphasized income, and tended to employ 
fewer workers than would be ideal. Baruch, Wheeler et al. (2004), meanwhile, 
conducted a survey of fifty professional players of eight different sports in 
China, and found that the nature of competitive professional sports, with its 
emphasis on personal abilities, objective measures of performance and 
continuing short-term goals was particularly suited to a PRP system of reward. 
Liu and Mills (2005) also analyzed the effect of PRP in China, and found an 
increase in unnecessary care and the probability of admission when the bonus 
system in public hospitals switched from one with a weaker incentive to increase 
services to one with a stronger incentive. This suggested that the improvement in 
the financial health of public hospitals was achieved at least in part through the 
provision of more unnecessary care and drugs, and through admitting more 
patients. Another study in this category is by Cooke (2004), who reviewed and 
analyzed the pay system in the Chinese public sector, showing that it 
demonstrates a number of unique characteristics compared to pay systems in 
other societies.  
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In terms of such an unequal distribution of pay studies across different types of 
ownership in China, a recent review by Cooke (2009) points out that one 
noticeable missing category is the public sector and government organizations, 
which is in sharp contrast to the continuing attention that the public sector has 
attracted from management research in western countries, such as the UK, the 
US, Australia and Canada, since the 1990s. In China, public sector organizations 
are traditionally called PSUs, or shiye danwei (Cooke, 2005). This usually refers 
to public sector organizations providing public goods and services to citizens, 
which are non-profit making, maintained by state fiscal expenditure and under 
the control of government departments (Cheng, 2000). While it is 
understandable that changes in the business sector in China have captured much 
of researchers’ attention in the last decade, Chinese public sector and 
government organizations have also undergone significant changes as a result of 
changing expectations of their function and performance―necessary for 
transforming the economy (Cooke, 2009).  
Table 2-5: Number of Staff at Year-end (2008), by Registration Status and Sector  
Item  Total (million persons) 
Total National Employment 774.800 
Total Employees in Institutions (shiye)7 29.149 
Total Employees in Agencies & Organizations8 11.568 
Source: China Statistic Year Book (2009) 
In China, over half of all state sector employees work in PSUs and government 
organizations (Cooke, 2009). By the end of 2002, there were over 26 million 
employees working in PSUs, accounting for a quarter of total national 
employment (China Statistic Year Book, 2003). However, compared to the 
extensive discussion of public sector pay in western countries, there is almost a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Employees in institutions (“shiye”) are those with official “shiye” (PSU) status, which is 
the definition of the public sector used by Cooke (2005, 2009). Further details will be 
introduced in Chapter 3.  
8 Employees in “agencies and organizations” here refers to those with official civil servant 
status.   
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vacuum of in-depth research on pay in PSUs in China9, leaving a significant gap 
in our understanding of the key changes to HRM and the challenges it faces 
across the country as a whole (Cooke, 2009). Therefore, the first research gap 
identified in the current literature on pay in China is as follows:  
Research gap 1: There is a significant lack of empirical studies of the pay 
systems in the public service units (shiye danwei) in China.  
  
The other important gap observed when reviewing the literature on pay in China 
is that very few studies have conducted in-depth research in China covering 
changes in pay systems, at the organizational level. Several works provide very 
good reviews of the changes in the pay system, covering the different stages of 
pay reform in China, such as the studies of Shenkar and Chow (1989), Jackson 
and Littler (1991), Takahara (1992) and Cooke (2004), among others. However, 
most of these focus on changes in pay system policies and only use macro-level 
data, rather than carrying out in-depth investigations of specific organizations.  
A few studies of pay systems at the organizational level do include longitudinal 
data, such as Liu and Mills’ (2005) study, which used longitudinal data on 
revenue and productivity from six hospitals and a detailed record review of 
2,303 tracer disease patients during 1978 and 1997. Also, Dong (1998) used 
panel data between 1984 and 1990 to analyze the employment and wage 
behaviour of Chinese TVEs. Finally, Yueh (2004) analyzed the effects of wage 
reform in China during the 1990s on the working-aged urban population, using 
two cross-sectional data sets between 1995 and 1999. However, the longitudinal 
data used by these researchers were based on statistical data or panel data. 
Perhaps the only exception is Child (1995), who collected data on 144 job-
holders in six Beijing SOEs, at two points in time, October 1985 and March 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The only pay study to include PSUs is that by Liu and Mills (2005), listed in Table 2-4 
above.	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1990. The results indicated that, in 1985, the “traditional model”, which predicts 
that earnings will be higher for people who are older, loyal to their unit and 
male, was most prevalent, with age the most important predictor of earnings. In 
1990, age continued to have an important, albeit weaker, association with the 
level of earnings, and the link between performance and pay was still quite 
limited. From the above, the second gap observed in the current literature on pay 
in China is as follows:  
Research gap 2: There is a great lack of in-depth research on pay systems at an 
organizational level in China. In particular, there is a lack of studies covering 
changes in pay systems through reforms at the organizational level. 
 
When discussing changes in pay systems in contemporary China, the popularity 
of PRP in various organizations has been noted by many researchers (Chow, 
1992; Child, 1995; DeCieri, Zhu et al., 1998; Ding, Goodall and Warner, 2000; 
Bjorkman, 2002; Cooke 2002, 2004, 2005; Bozionelos and Wang, 2007, etc.). 
However, compared to the large amount of literature on PRP in western 
countries, only three papers were found in international journals on the same 
topic in relation to China. The first two are the studies by Baruch, Wheeler et al. 
(2004) and Liu and Mills (2005), mentioned earlier. In the third, Bozinelos and 
Wang (2007) conducted a survey of 106 white-collar workers in a Chinese SOE 
and found that, while the general attitude was positive, respondents indicated a 
fear of losing face10 (“mianzi”) and were concerned that performance evaluation 
was affected by personal relationships (“guanxi11”), making it hard to implement 
an IBPRRS.  
Therefore, when looking at the development of pay systems in China, it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Face, or “mianzi” in Chinese, means that a person is perceived by others as decent 
and reputable (Bond and Hwang, 1986). 
11 The literal meaning “guanxi” is “interpersonal relationships” which signifies the 
connections or relationship ties that exist within a Chinese social group (Bozionelos and 
Wang, 2007, pp289).     
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significant that not much has been written on the link between pay and 
performance at an organizational level, and especially the theory behind the 
improvement of performance. Due to the great shortage of empirical evidence on 
the application of PRP at the organizational level in China, a contribution to the 
PRP literature, using a sample from China, will address this third gap in the 
literature. 
Research gap 3: There is a great shortage of research on performance related 
pay in different organizations in China.  
 
To sum up, this chapter first provided a chronicled review of changes in the pay 
systems used in China, introducing the four waves of pay reform that have taken 
place over PRC history. Then, a review of existing research into pay in China 
was conducted, which identified three major gaps in the literature that this study 
aims to address. The purpose of this thesis is to present an in-depth study of pay 
system reforms in a previously unexplored sector, Chinese PSUs (or shiye 
danwei), aiming to explore the question of “How has performance related pay 
been implemented in different PSUs in China during the pay system reform, 
and what has been its impact?” In order to answer this question, more 
background information regarding the Chinese PSU sector and the recent pay 
system reform undergoing will be introduced in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, a 
review of different theories concerning the implementation of PRP will be 
presented which generates the specific research objectives this research aims to 
explore.  
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Chapter 3   Chinese PSUs and their Pay System Reform 
 
In this Chapter, an overview of the public service units in China will first be 
presented, followed by a review of the changes in the pay systems used in this 
sector, including the recent pay system reform.  
3.1   An Introduction to Public Service Units (shiye danwei) in China  
There are four categories of public sector institutions in China: Communist Party 
or government departments (dangzheng jiguan), state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
(including state-owned financial institutions), state-sponsored social 
organizations (shetuan), and public service units (shiye danwei12) (World Bank, 
2005). Public service units (PSUs) in China include a galaxy of public service 
providers, operating alongside the core government, and separate from other 
state-owned or state-sponsored organizations (OECD, 2005a). In China, 
discussion of public sector organizations usually means PSUs (Cooke, 2004; 
2005), which traditionally have the role of providing public goods and services 
to citizens, and are non-profit making, maintained by state fiscal expenditure, 
and under the control of government departments (Cheng, 2000). According to a 
decree by the State Council of the PRC (1998), PSUs are defined as 
organizations aimed at “the provision of social services ..., established by 
governmental agencies or other organizations with state-owned assets, and 
working for the public good”.  
Generally speaking, the PSUs mainly include “organizations of science, 
education, civilization, hygiene, news, publishing, athletic sports, environmental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 There are several different translations of “shiye danwei” in English, including “public service 
unit”, “public institutions”, “institutional units” and “non-profit organizations”. In this thesis, we 
translate the term as “public service unit” (PSU), which is the English name used in both the 
World Bank’s and the OECD’s reports. 	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inspection, urban construction, labour employment, some governmental 
accessorial organizations and law-serving organizations, etc.” (State Council of 
the PRC, 1998). The PSU sector is large and diverse, comprising over one 
million organizations with a total employment of nearly 30 million, accounting 
for 41 per cent of Chinese public institution employment and 4 percent of the 
total national labour force (World Bank, 2005; China Statistical Year Book, 
2009). According to a World Bank (2005) report, a substantial portion of 
China’s economic resources is devoted to PSUs, including sixty per cent of its 
well-educated professionals (zhuanye jishu renyuan13), a large amount of state-
owned land, around two-thirds of “noncommercial (fei jingying xing)” state-
owned assets, and one-third of the recurrent expenditure in the consolidated 
budget of the whole government. 
PSUs in China are highly concentrated in a few key sectors, such as education 
and health, which together account for seventy per cent of PSU employment 
(China Statistical Year Book, 2002), with scientific and technological research, 
cultural services and agriculture extension services the three next largest sectors 
(World Bank, 2005). However, despite this high degree of concentration, there is 
also extreme diversity in terms of the services provided. For example, consumers 
of PSU services include the general public, individuals, farmers, other business 
firms, government departments and the Communist Party (World Bank, 2005), 
and PSUs in China also show some specific characteristics that make them 
different from public service providers in many other countries.  
Within the OECD, for example, there are public service providers in each 
country, which are referred to and organized in different ways, but play similar 
roles in their respective economies. According to a World Bank report (World 
Bank, 2005), public service providers in OECD countries have a wide variety of 
organizational forms, including different budgetary regulations, funding sources 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13According to the definition of the Ministry of Personnel, professionals in the PSU sector 
include intellectuals such as teachers, doctors, scientists, engineers, actors, writers, etc. 
(World Bank, 2005). 
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and governance. In particular, there is considerable involvement from non-state 
organizations in the production of public services in OECD countries, even if 
they are financed from the government budget. However, the situation is 
different in China, as traditionally all PSUs have been run by the government, 
and are affiliated with, and supervised by, authorities at any of the following six 
levels: (i) the State Council; (ii) a central ministry; (iii) a provincial (or 
municipal) government; (iv) a prefecture (or municipal) government; (v) a 
county (or municipal, or district) government; (vi) a township government. 
These affiliations and supervisors are determined when the PSUs are created. 
Organs of the Communist Party of China (CPC) are involved directly in the 
supervision of some PSUs, such as those involved in the mass media and 
publishing. According to Chinese regulations, when a PSU is created at a 
particular level of government, one government department, the “approving 
authority”, approves its establishment. Then, the PSU must register with the 
Offices for Posts and Establishments at the appropriate level of government, and 
one government department will act as the PSU’s “supervisory department 
(zhuguan bumen)”. The latter often holds the power to appoint the management 
of the PSU, review and approve its budgetary, financial and staffing plans, and 
evaluate its performance (World Bank, 2005).  
Another major difference between public services in China and OECD countries 
is that, in the latter, few public agencies are involved in predominantly 
commercial activities, and within their public sectors, the legal forms that a 
public service provider can take are more diverse than in the PSU system in 
China. Meanwhile, it is common for PSUs in China, although controlled by the 
government, to have their own business entities, which may include listed 
companies controlled by universities and research institutes, as well as other less 
visible business operations (World Bank, 2005).  
Besides this, the boundary between the government and PSUs in China is fluid. 
For example, PSU staff have the same personnel system as civil servants in most 
aspects, such as recruitment, basic remuneration, and the traditional life-long 
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employment (“iron rice bowl”). The two also share the same pension and 
medical insurance schemes, which differ from those applied to SOE employees. 
It is only the greater flexibility of informal salaries and bonuses that differentiate 
PSU staff from their civil servant counterparts (World Bank, 2005). In other 
instances, when government recruitment is constrained by post and 
establishment controls, PSUs are sometimes created to circumvent restrictions. 
The relatively weak financial discipline of PSUs has also created incentives for 
some government departments to use them as vehicles for revenue-generating 
activities (World Bank, 2005). 
To sum up, PSUs in China are characterized by their “diversity in terms of 
services provided, governance structure, financing arrangements and relationship 
with the government” (OECD, 2005a: 81), which makes them different from the 
public sector organizations of many other countries. Thus, due to the specific 
features of the traditional PSU system in China, improving PSU service delivery 
requires a far-reaching reform process, which needs to include “a 
reconsideration of the role of the state and the divestment from commercial 
activities, revamping public finance for public services, allowing for more non-
state supplies of public goods, improving accountability relationships within the 
PSU sector, and stepping up performance management and monitoring” (World 
Bank, 2005: 11).  
 
3.2   The Chinese PSU Reform 
"The PSU reform is as important as SOE reform, but is much more complex. 
This is largely because of the high degree of diversity and complexity of PSUs. It 
is therefore crucial for any major reform action to be designed with full 
consideration of sector- and region-specific circumstances."  
---- Bert Hofman, World Bank's Lead Economist for China (World Bank, 2005). 
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PSUs in China have been undergoing reform for almost twenty years aimed at 
improving their efficiency. Since the mid-1980s, a wide range of measures have 
been taken, representing an important part of China’s overall reform programme 
(World Bank, 2005). Early in the 1980s, reform of the PSUs started in a 
piecemeal fashion, focusing on granting additional autonomy to managers and 
employees, while encouraging them to find non-budget subsidy revenues and 
increase labour market competition. As part of the transition from a centrally 
planned economy to a market economy, the reform of the PSUs is at the core of 
re-defining the size and role of government in the Chinese economy, as well as 
defining its modes of operating and funding mechanisms (OECD, 2005a). 
While China has made great achievements in its transition to a socialist market 
economy, a reconsideration of the role of the PSUs is warranted, as all are under 
the control of government. Many of the activities performed by current PSUs 
could be considered the commercial production of private goods or services 
which may be best left to the market, because according to the experiences of 
many developed countries, it is only in the case of market failure that 
government intervention should be considered (World Bank, 2005). Therefore, 
following on from the reform of the SOEs and core government, PSU reforms 
represent another major stage of reform that aims at transforming the 
organizational structure of the public sector into one that will assist the socialist 
market economy (OECD, 2005a). 
Since the very beginning of PSU reform, there has been a strong emphasis on 
classification, reflecting the government’s awareness of the high degree of 
diversity and complexity among PSUs, and the implications of this for the 
government’s role (World Bank, 2005). According to the OECD (2005a), at the 
sectoral and local levels, there are mainly three steps that need to be taken in the 
current PSU reforms in China. First, given the diversity and complexity 
involved, all PSUs should be classified according to the service they provide, 
into three major categories: administrative and law enforcement units, public 
benefit units and business-related units. Second, those PSUs which are 
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considered to be performing commercial activities should be transformed into 
public enterprises or fully private companies. Finally, the remaining PSUs that 
are considered to provide public benefit, must be restructured, in terms of 
financing and personnel, and reduce their staff expenditure and numbers.  
For instance, some PSUs with important administration functions should be 
amalgamated into the government, forming the Stock Admission Department, 
say; PSUs with a close link to public welfare (“gongyi”), such as hospitals and 
schools, should be appropriately funded from the national budget, reduce their 
profit-making activities, and made to serve the public better; finally, the many 
PSUs which resemble production units, and have little connection to public 
welfare, should be made to compete in the market, where market mechanisms 
would make them work more efficiently (Li, 2004; Wu, 2004). The aim of such 
reform is to improve PSU efficiency, which would secure an optimal return on 
the resource allocation made to the sector. At the same time, the national 
financial burden would be lightened, through a reduction in the budget allocated 
to PSUs, made possible as a result of the restructuring. 
According to a World Bank (2005) report, past PSU reform efforts, aiming to 
“push PSUs into the market”, have achieved much, but at the same time 
introduced undesirable incentives into service delivery. For example, nearly half 
of the PSUs’ funding is raised through charging fees, which often cross-
subsidizes the public service delivery of the unit, and also allows for bonuses 
and welfare for staff on top of their formal salaries. This gives a strong incentive 
for PSUs and their supervisory departments to distort the market in which the 
PSUs are operating. Thus, with the rise in income inequality, the reliance on user 
fees to finance service delivery is increasingly becoming a barrier to access for 
the poor. Furthermore, greater autonomy in revenue generation has not often led 
to better performance management or stronger financial accountability, and the 
efficiency of the PSUs has also suffered from overstaffing (World Bank, 2005).  
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To sum up, the establishment of Chinese PSUs is a very complicated business, 
and their reform throughout China is a broad topic that requires long-term study 
(World Bank, 2005; OECD, 2005a; Fan, 2004, etc.). There is consensus among 
policy-makers and advisors that past PSU reform efforts have suffered greatly 
from the lack of a well-developed overall strategy, and coordination. Thus, in 
2002, the 16th National People’s Representative Conference put PSU reform on 
its agenda, and in recent years the reform has been referred to as crucial for 
improving service delivery in the public sector, raising it to a level 
commensurate with China’s stated goals of a “xiaokang” society (well-off) and 
“people-centred” development (World Bank, 2005). At the same time, it is 
generally agreed that there are two main routes which the reform must take: one 
concerns its financial sourcing and the other its employment system (Wu, 2004; 
Fan, 2004, etc.). According to the OECD (2005a), how to better improve human 
resource management among the PSUs is becoming a more and more important 
issue. Increasing the incentives for good performance is one of the key aspects 
of the current reforms. As an important issue of human resource management, 
the changes in the pay systems in different PSUs in China have played a critical 
role in the reform. In the next section, the development of the pay system used in 
Chinese PSUs will be reviewed, providing background to this research.  
 
3.3   Changes in the pay systems used in the Chinese PSU sector 
As mentioned earlier, traditionally in China, PSU staff have shared the same 
personnel system as civil servants in most aspects: for example, recruitment, 
pensions, and basic remuneration. Most PSU employees in China hold a ‘shiye 
bianzhi14’, under which they enjoy the same welfare rights as civil servants in 
the government. People with ‘shiye bianzhi’ do not need to join the national 
welfare system, and medical treatments and their pension are paid directly from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14Bianzhi, loosely translated as ‘establishment of posts”, refers to the authorized number of 
personnel (the number of established posts) in a Party or government administrative organ 
(jiguan), a service organization (shiye danwei) or a working unit (qiye) (Brødsgaard, 2002).	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the national financial system. Traditionally, life-long employment is also 
attached to such a system. The situation is different for those with “qiye 
(enterprise) bianzhi”, such as employees of SOEs and people in other sectors. 
However, as the national economic reforms grew deeper, the rigid pay system in 
the PSUs began to hinder attempts to improve efficiency. The hidebound system 
failed to encourage innovation or improve productivity (Guo, Zhang et al., 
2004). There have been many debates about the problems with the traditional 
pay system applied in the PSUs; common problems included opaque and 
insufficiently differentiated pay distribution, and an inadequate link between 
performance and pay (Guo, Zhang et al., 2004; Su, 2004).  
In an attempt to introduce market-like incentives, over the past two decades, the 
PSU reform in China has restructured the remuneration system in various 
complicated ways (World Bank, 2005). Four major pay system reforms have 
been carried out in the PSU sector through PRC history: the 1953-6 national pay 
system reform, the 1985 national pay system reform, the 1993 national pay 
system reforms, and the recent national PSU pay system reform, which started in 
2006 and aimed to implement performance-related pay in various PSUs, 
nationwide. The first three pay system reforms in the PSU sector were consistent 
with the Chinese national pay system reforms, as described in the previous 
chapter (Chapter 2). However, it is felt that these previous reforms were simply 
“growing out of” the old system (World Bank, 2005), and did not really change 
the traditional basis on seniority. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1993 pay reform was introduced to 
separate the pay system for public-sector employees from that of government 
organizations (civil service). During this reform, both fixed and flexible wages 
were introduced to the wage packages of PSU employees, which was the first 
step towards a differentiated management system for the PSU sector (Cooke, 
2004; Hu, 2007). It was hoped that such a non-egalitarian system would 
motivate PSU employees, as their earnings would be more strongly related to 
their performance, both at an individual and an organizational level (Cooke, 
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2004). However, the performance-related pay introduced in 1993 had a very 
limited impact (Cooke, 2005; Li, 2009; Yang, 2009, etc.). Due to the diverse set 
of services provided by PSUs, significant pay inequalities emerged between 
different PSUs and between PSUs in different locations, due to the increased 
opportunities for gaining extra income (Ge, 2003; Hu, 2007). For example, 
significant income differences emerged between teachers working in different 
schools, due to the extra fees charged by good schools15  in urban areas. 
Therefore, in 2001, a national PSU personnel reform was launched, which aimed 
at transforming guaranteed lifelong employment into fixed-term contracts, and at 
giving more flexibility for compensation, hiring and firing. Due to the 
limitations of the 1993 pay reform, one of the most important features of this 
latest PSU reform in China was to promote the application of a performance-
related pay system nationally (OECD, 2005). Therefore, along with the 
implementation of “yangguang gongzi” (a pay system as clear and transparent as 
sunshine after the civil servant reform in 2005) for the national civil servants’ 
pay system reform, a wave of PSU pay system restructuring, starting from July 
2006 was introduced, especially for PSUs involved in the delivery of public 
goods. The main purposes were the standardization of the national PSU pay 
system and the promotion of better performance, through performance related 
pay. 
 
3.4   The recent PRP reform in Chinese PSUs 
The most recent wave of PSU personnel reforms started in 2000, when a 
contract of employment was implemented in all PSUs, nationwide. The new 
contract system broke the traditional ‘iron rice bowl’, as all new employees 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In China, students are supposed to fulfill their compulsory education in their local school, 
which is allocated by community location. If parents want to choose another school outside 
of their local community, a ‘sponsorship fee’ (zanzhufei) is usually needed, with the amount 
decided by the school. The better the school, the higher this charge will be. Further details 
will be discussed in the later case study chapter. 
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recruited to the PSU sector were required to sign a labour contract, and the 
previous life-long employment was abolished. As an important part of the 
national PSU personnel reform, a pay system reform was introduced in 2006 by 
the central government, with a new positional performance-related pay (PRP) 
system introduced to all PSUs across China. Under the positional PRP system, 
an individual wage package would be divided into four components: pay based 
on position in the organization (gangwei gongzi), benchmark pay (xinji gongzi), 
performance-related pay (jixiao gongzi) and a subsidy (jintie butie). 
Similarly to the previous pay system, position pay (gangwei gongzi) was fixed 
and set according to one’s position. Three different types of position exist: 
technical, management, and skilled. Each position is assigned to a specific 
category, and has a corresponding level linked to their pay. This part of the pay 
is decided according to the responsibility, working stress, working conditions 
and complexity of the position. Under this system, therefore, each employee of a 
PSU receives a fixed amount of position pay each month, and if his/her position 
changes, this part of the pay will change accordingly.  
Another fixed component of the pay received is the benchmark pay (xinji 
gongzi), which is linked to an individual’s working performance and seniority. 
Each employee has their own corresponding benchmark pay level. If they pass 
their annual appraisal successfully, their benchmark pay could be moved to a 
higher scale in the next year, thus increasing the fixed part of their monthly 
wage.   
The subsidy (jintie butie) is an extra allowance allocated to individuals working 
in remote areas, in tough working environments or under strong stress. Similarly 
to position pay, this is allocated by the state and tied to one’s job position. If 
one’s position changes, the subsidy changes. 
The most important part of the 2006 pay system reform was to reinforce PRP in 
different PSUs, as the previous pay system reforms had failed to achieve this, as 
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discussed in Chapter 2 (Guo and Chen, 2007; Li, 2009; Yang, 2009, etc.). Thus 
PRP (jixiao gongzi) was emphasized, with the aim of linking pay to the 
performance of both the organization and the individual employee. According to 
the current PSU distribution system, the total pay an organization can give is 
controlled by the state, but its distribution among the employees is decided by 
the PSU itself. It is highly recommended by the central government that 
performance should be an important criterion when making this decision. 
However, despite the implementation of this new pay system in the PSU sector, 
limited changes have been observed. For example, although the fixed part of the 
pay was adjusted almost immediately, PRP was far behind this. Therefore, in 
2008, the General Office of the State Council of the PRC announced a new 
project, aiming to introduce PRP into PSUs through three steps: a national pay 
system split into seventy per cent fixed wage and thirty per cent PRP was 
launched in all schools within the Chinese compulsory education16 system, from 
January 1st 2009; secondly, a similar PRP system would be introduced into 
hospitals and other PSUs within the national medical care system; finally, PRP 
would be implemented in all remaining PSUs in China. Within this project, in 
December 2008, “The guide for the implementation of performance related pay 
in all schools in compulsory education” was passed at a State Council executive 
meeting hosted by Primer Wen, and, since 1st January 2010, all public primary 
schools and junior high schools have been required to implement PRP, with the 
average total income (including both fixed pay and PRP) of school teachers to be 
no less than the average pay of civil servants in the local area (further details of 
this will be discussed in Chapter 6).  
Establishing a performance-based organization requires the establishment of 
performance-based financial and human resources management. This controls 
how resource allocations are made, and how accountability mechanisms for 
good performance are established that will improve the incentives for good 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The nine-year compulsory education in China includes all public primary schools and 
public junior high schools, which is called “yiwu jiaoyu xuexiao” in Chinese. 	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performance. A robust institutional framework is key to ensuring performance, 
but in itself is not sufficient to guarantee it. When exploring the PRP reform in 
Chinese PSUs, although a national guide policy has been established to achieve 
these objectives, the gap between the objectives and what is happening on the 
ground remains relatively large, especially at local and organizational levels. 
This gap between the policy orientation and its true impact in practice may be 
explained by “a lack of resources in poorer communities and the widespread 
expectation in these communities that the bureaucracy will act as an employer of 
last resort” (OECD, 2005a: 65).  
Given the complexity and diversity of PSUs, it is crucial that the PSU reform be 
designed and implemented with full consideration of sectoral and regional 
circumstances, as well as the impact of the reforms on employees (Cheng, 2000; 
World Bank, 2005). Especially when implementing a pay system reform that 
will impact employees directly, serious consideration and evaluation is needed. 
According to the aforementioned World Bank report (2005), despite the vast 
number of PSUs and the important role they play in the economy, data on them 
are very limited. There has been no in-depth study in the literature about the 
implementation of the PRP system in the Chinese PSU sector, from an 
organizational point of view. Therefore, this research aims to contribute to this 
field. An integrated theoretical framework of the application and influence of the 
recent pay system reform at an organizational level in Chinese PSUs is presented 
in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 4   Theories of Performance Related Pay (PRP) 
 
This chapter constructs an integrated theoretical framework to explore the 
application and influence of the performance related pay (PRP) that has been 
introduced into the Chinese PSU sector during the recent pay system reform. 
There are two parts to the chapter. First, the popularity of PRP is discussed and 
the debates surrounding it are introduced, including a specific discussion of the 
literature on PRP within the public sector. Second, different pay theories are 
discussed, including the  “new economics of personnel” (NEP) theory and a 
range of motivational theories―expectancy, goal setting, agency, cognitive 
evaluation and equity theory. Each of these theories generates specific research 
question(s) that this study aims to explore.  
 
4.1   Studies of PRP in the literature 
The philosophy of linking pay to performance is not a new concept, but can be 
traced back to the third century in ancient China, when the emperor of the Wei 
Dynasty promoted and rewarded government officials according to evaluations 
of their performance (Murphy and Cleveland, 1991; Coens and Jenkins, 2000). 
Over recent decades, PRP has acted as a standard element in the management 
toolkit, helping many organizations to achieve competitiveness (Belfield and 
Marsden, 2003, etc.). Proponents of PRP usually advocate that traditional time-
based compensation, which does not link individual pay to actual performance, 
could be detrimental to an organization. For example, it may make 
organization’s more hierarchical and less competitive (Baker, Jensen et al., 
1988). The relationship between pay and performance has long been a focus of 
managerial thought (Belfield and Marsden, 2003; Beer and Cannon, 2004, etc.). 
However, despite the wide application of PRP in different organizations, 
empirical evidence regarding its superiority is still ambiguous.  
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4.1.1   Debates surrounding PRP 
Among the various research efforts discussing the impacts of PRP, one robust 
finding supporting the effectiveness of PRP comes from a study by Lazear 
(2000), who analyses the responses of 3,000 employees of the Safelite Glass 
Corporation, a large auto windscreen installation firm in the US. The results 
show that the switch from hourly wages to output-based (piece-rate) pay resulted 
in a 44 per cent gain in output per worker on average. Approximately half of the 
increase in productivity is found to be due to the average worker producing more 
because of incentive effects; the remainder is attributed to a selection effect, due 
to a reduction of employee turnover among existing high-performing employees, 
and the recruitment of more able workers, attracted by the potential to earn 
higher wages. A slight improvement in quality after the introduction of the new 
incentive scheme is also identified.  
Another solid piece of empirical evidence that confirms the effectiveness of PRP 
is produced by Fernie and Metcalf (1998), who investigate the links between pay 
and performance among different groups of jockeys based on the theoretical 
framework of agency theory. Compared to those paid by non-contingent 
payment systems, superior performance can be noticed among jockeys paid by 
PRP, suggesting that incentive contracts are more likely to lead to better 
performance. 
Other empirical studies confirm the success of PRP. For example, conducting an 
investigation of 984 employees in two large high-technology companies, Zenger 
(1992) finds that merit-based PRP schemes that reward the efforts of employees 
can differentially induce higher performance. Investigating the application of 
PRP in professional sports teams in China, Baruch, Wheerler et al. (2004) 
suggest that the nature of competitive professional sports, with its emphasis on 
personal abilities, objective measures of performance and continuing short-term 
performance, is particularly suited to a PRP system, even in collectivistic 
cultures where PRP is less likely to be generally applicable.   
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However, despite the wide application of PRP in different sectors, there has been 
much debate addressing its pitfalls, due to various negative feedback it has 
received. For example, it is argued that PRP systems can have a destructive 
effect on intrinsic motivation, teamwork and creativity (Deci, 1971; Ryan and 
Deci, 2000, etc.), and that incentives may work too well, motivating employees 
to focus excessively on doing what they need to gain rewards, sometimes at the 
expense of other tasks the organization values (Beer and Cannon, 2004). 
Furthermore, although PRP plans appear to represent a powerful and intuitively-
appealing enticement, for a substantial number of firms, the reality is much 
different from the appearance (Campbell, Campbell et al., 1998).  
For example, examining the effects of the implementation of a performance 
contingent pay programme for managers of different organizations in Hungary 
and America, Pearce, Stevenson et al. (1985) find that PRP has no effect on 
organizational performance. A later study by Pearce, Branyiczki et al. (1994) 
finds that personal reward systems even lead to employee perceptions that their 
organizations are unfair, to negative evaluations of others at work, to anxiety, 
and to the feeling that they, their colleagues and their organization are 
inefficacious. Further empirical evidence comes from Beer and Cannon (2004), 
who look at five case studies across thirteen cities, of Hewlett-Packard (HP)’s 
implementation of a PRP programme. The trials of the PRP scheme indicated 
that, overall, the implementation costs and risks were higher in some branches of 
HP, mainly because both the managers and the workers focused on the possible 
gains they could make under the PRP system, which had a negative impact on 
trust. The company discontinued the PRP programme after the trial, mainly due 
to the negative affect PRP had on the high commitment culture valued by HP.  
As well as the outright positive or negative results regarding PRP systems 
mentioned above, there are other studies which observe mixed results in 
different situations. One sector in which the impact of PRP has tended to be 
most controversial is the public sector. 
	   59 
4.1.2   The application of PRP in the public sector 
The adoption of PRP in the public sector reflects the influence of the private 
sector culture of incentives and individual accountability on public 
administration, which has been one of the most significant challenges for public 
institutions in many countries over the last decade (OECD, 2005b; Swiss, 2005; 
Weibel, Rost et al., 2009, etc.). Nowadays, it is common to find pay systems 
linked to performance in the public sector in many countries, including more 
than two-thirds of OECD countries and a number of developing ones (OECD, 
2005c; Cardona, 2006; Weibel, Rost et al., 2009). 
One important rationale behind promoting PRP in the public sector is that, with 
compensation linked to performance, employees are expected to expend more 
effort, and lift the quality and/or quantity of their output, thus improving the 
internal performance of the organization and delivering a superior public service. 
In addition, introducing PRP may motivate public sector employees to pursue 
professional development opportunities that previously offered little in the way 
of additional benefits. Thus, with a PRP system, productivity is likely to improve 
both in the short and long run, because employees will work harder in the short 
run, and professional development will generate further gains in productivity in 
the long run (Lavy, 2007; Prentice, 2007, etc.).  
However, an investigation of the implementation and effectiveness of PRP in the 
public sector in practice, shows that the situation is in fact more complicated. 
For example, when evaluating the benefits and hidden costs of PRP in the public 
sector, Weibel, Rost et al. (2009) find that motivation is likely to be a key 
determinant of the effect of PRP on performance, leading to only modest success 
in some cases. Based on a meta-analysis of different experimental studies, 
Weibel, Rost et al. (2009) notice that PRP has a strong, positive effect on 
performance in the case of non-interesting tasks, but actually tends to have a 
negative effect for interesting tasks. Thus, Weibel, Rost et al. (2009) recommend 
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careful consideration of both benefits and costs when implementing PRP 
systems in the public sector.  
Prentice’s (2007) study of the application of PRP in the UK public sector also 
gives mixed results. On the one hand, public sector workers are found to respond 
to financial schemes, particularly in the field of education, and possibly also 
health. Such responses may be small, but this is deemed to be mainly due to the 
small proportion of PRP introduced. On other hand, a ‘gaming’ situation is also 
detected, involving the manipulation of behaviour that uses resources and does 
not increase productivity. Prentice (2007) also find that there have been very few 
calculations of the overall benefits of PRP in the public sector. Although in some 
cases public sector workers have responded to the schemes, the overall benefits 
for society have not been assessed, partially because such assessments are 
intrinsically hard to make.  
Marsden, French et al. (1998) find that, in general, performance pay in the public 
services in Britain have not motivated staff, and have instead led to widespread 
feelings of divisiveness and demotivation. Although they find no evidence of a 
fall in productivity in the two civil service departments studied―in fact they 
find a distinct possibility that PRP has helped to raise it―serious questions are 
found over whether such effects can be sustained over the long run, given the 
effects on employee motivation. For example, in the Inland Revenue, they find 
that productivity and performance seem to have increased with the development 
of performance pay, even though the staff feel that the system is divisive and un-
motivating. A later study by Marsden, French et al. (2001) confirms that PRP in 
the British public services has had a positive incentive effect for significant 
numbers of employees, but that this is dependent on them getting an above-
average additional financial reward, as well as the quality of the goal-setting and 
appraisal process.  
Another study by Dahlstrom and Lapuente (2009), involving a quantitative 
analysis of the implementation of PRP in the public sector in 25 OECD 
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countries, indicates that the main assumptions about incentives are more difficult 
to uphold in the public sector than the private, due to the relative lack of 
objective measures of output, and the complexities of the tasks at hand. As a 
result, incentives in the public sector are more likely to be implemented in 
administrations where there is a clear separation of interests, between those who 
benefit from the incentives and those who manage the incentive system. If the 
interests of the two groups overlap, the incentives will be less credible. Thus, 
PRP requires a suitable institutional design, with an organizational structure of 
“relative separations of interests at the top” (Dahlstrom and Lapuente, 2009). 
Although implementation of PRP in the public sector is controversial, it has been 
said that PRP could be “a window of opportunity for the introduction of many 
other significant new public management reforms” (OECD, 2005b), which 
means that, if PRP incentives work, other public management reforms may also 
be feasible (Dahlstrom and Lapuente, 2009). However, the experience of OECD 
countries suggests that, despite great variations in the size of payments across 
countries, the maximum performance-based rewards usually represent less than 
ten per cent of base salary for the average civil servant. The percentage is higher 
for managers, but still only reaches a maximum of twenty per cent on average 
(OECD, 2005c). It is also noted by many researchers that there is often a gap in 
the public sector, between the formal PRP system and how it works in practice 
(Ingraham, 1996; Thompson, 2007; Dahlstrom and Lapuente, 2009), as many 
government organisations claim to have PRP, but the schemes are often barely 
linked to performance in reality (OECD, 2005c). 
Therefore, in the case of China, where the central government has recently 
begun to promote PRP in the PSU sector, nationwide, it is crucial to investigate 
the true impacts these reforms have had on different PSUs and their employees 
(details of the national pay system reform in the PSU sector were discussed in 
Chapter 3). Since this study hopes to contribute to the existing research gap, by 
exploring the implementation and influence of PRP in various PSUs in China, 
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we now review different theories about the PRP system, which lead to the 
specific research objectives this study aims to address.  
 
4.2   The theoretical framework: the implementation and impact of PRP 
One of the controversial issues regarding PRP has been explaining the manner 
and magnitude with which pay influences employee motivation and 
performance. In order to explore the implementation and impact of PRP on 
different PSUs in China, a range of theories are discussed in this section, with 
the aim of constructing a proper theoretical framework for the research topic. 
First, the NEP is introduced, raising questions regarding the suitability of PRP 
for different organizations in the Chinese PSU sector. Second, different 
motivational theories in the human resources management (HRM) field are 
presented, including expectancy theory, goal-setting theory, agency theory, 
cognitive evaluation theory and equity theory, each of which generates specific 
question(s) that need to be explored in terms of Chinese PSUs.  
 
4.2.1   The NEP theory 
The NEP, pioneered by Edward P. Lazear (1986), analyses the choice of pay 
system in a cost-benefit framework. As a powerful theory for explaining why 
some workers are paid on the basis of their output, while others are paid salaries 
relating to their input (Huang, 2009), NEP yields numerous testable predictions 
concerning the choice and incidence of pay systems (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998). 
Focusing on the role of workplace context, also known as the ‘monitoring 
environment’, NEP acts as a critical determinant of the performance effect 
achieved by PRP systems (Belfield and Marsden, 2003). According to NEP, 
employers need to link pay to performance when jobs involve a lot of discretion, 
and effort is hard to monitor, based on the assumption that employees will take 
the easy option if they are paid the same amount no matter how hard they work 
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(Lazear, 1998; Marsden, French, et al., 2000). The principal factor that affects 
the choice to use input-based (basic) or performance-based pay is the 
measurement costs. The NEP indicates that, given perfect knowledge of a 
worker’s performance, PRP will produce better results for the firm, because it 
creates an explicit connection between individual and organizational interests 
(Belfield and Marsden, 2003). Fernie and Metcalf (1998) provide an excellent 
review of NEP, with regard to the choice of payment system, showing that 
measuring output, monitoring input and the nature of the job itself, are the 
fundamental factors determining the choice of PRP or pay based on input. 
According to the NEP, PRP tends to be superior when it is easier to measure 
output, job tasks are more repetitive, and team production is not that important. 
In terms of the labour market and the product market, PRP is more suitable when 
market competition is high, workers are more heterogeneous and have low risk 
aversion, and their elasticity of effort is high. In contrast, when 
performance/output is difficult to measure, jobs include a variety of tasks, and it 
is difficult to measure the contribution of an individual to the output of the 
whole organization, basic pay is a better choice and individual PRP is 
inappropriate. Also, pay based on input is more common when the production 
market is not very competitive, and the average tenure of employees is long. A 
summary of the NEP’s predictions about PRP and basic pay is shown in  Table 
4-1. 
Table 4-1: Alternative payment systems: summary of NEP predictions 
PRP Characteristic  Basic Pay  Studies, e.g. 
MEASURING OUTPUT, MONITORING INPUT AND NATURE OF THE JOB 
Low Output measurement costs High Lazear (1986) 
High Cost of monitoring input/effort Low Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992) 
Low Supervision intensity, 
programmability 
High Eisenhardt (1988) 
High Span of control Low Eisenhardt (1988) 
Large Workplace size Small Brown and Medoff 
(1989) 
Repetitive Job task Wide range Rebitzer et al. (1996) 
Unimportant Team production Important Beach (1975) 
High Labour intensity Low  Parsons (1986) 
 Role of technical change   
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No i if technical change is rapid Yes Stiglitz (1975) 
Yes ii whether skill-based No  Brown (1990) 
 
LABOUR MARKET AND PRODUCT MARKET 
High Worker heterogeneity Low Lazear (1986) 
High Wage in alternative firm Low Lazear (1986) 
High Elasticity of effort wrt wage Low Stiglitz (1975) 
Low Risk aversion (worker) High Bloom and 
Milkovich (1995) 
No Union recognition Yes  Brown and Philips 
(1986) 
Short Tenure Long Goldin (1986) 
Few No. of occupations Many Carlson (1982) 
Low  Cost of monitoring quality of 
output 
High Lazear (1986) 
High Competition Low Drago and Heywood 
(1995) 
Source: Fernie and Metcalf (1998: 22) 
 
When studying PSUs in China, one immediately notices the great diversity that 
exists within them, for example in terms of the types of job, and the external 
labour and product markets that exist. PSUs that receive full funding from the 
government may not need to compete in an external market, say, while other 
commerce-related PSUs, pushed to compete in the market due to their less 
generous financial budgets, face fiercer competition in both the labour and 
product markets. Given the great diversity of jobs that exist in different PSUs, 
PRP may not be the best approach for all. Therefore, it is necessary to look at 
how the NEP’s theories fit the case of the Chinese PSU sector, especially 
following the introduction of PRP. This will provide us with a general picture of 
the suitability of PRP for this sector, and is the central question this research 
aims to explore.  
Question 1: How does PRP fit into different PSUs in China? (Q1) 
 
When evaluating the benefits and hidden costs of PRP in the public sector, 
motivation is likely to be a key factor influencing the effect of PRP on 
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employees’ performance (Weibel, Rost et al., 2009). Theories of motivation 
provide the guiding principles behind different reward systems (Chiang and 
Birtch, 2007), and it has been common to analyse how PRP works, in recent 
years, through the lenses of different motivational theories, such as expectancy, 
goal-setting and agency theory (Marsden, 2004c).  
 
4.2.2   Expectancy theory 
Expectancy theory, first proposed by Vroom (1964), stresses the importance of a 
series of links between behaviour and the rewards accruing to that behaviour 
(Lawler, 1971). According to expectancy theory, motivation, or the force to act, 
results from a conscious decision-making process, undertaken by an individual. 
Such a decision to act depends upon three sets of perceptions―expectancy, 
instrumentality and valence (Heneman and Werner, 2005, pp52)―which are 
shown in Figure 4-2.  
 
         Expectancy                      Instrumentality                                             Valence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4-1: Expectancy theory model  
 
In expectancy theory, expectancy refers to the individual’s perception that a 
certain level of effort is required to achieve a certain level of performance. 
Instrumentality is the strength of the belief that a certain level of performance 
will be associated with various outcomes. Valence is the attractiveness of these 
outcomes to the individual (Heneman and Werner, 2005). According to this 
Pay 	  
Promotion Effort Performance 
Other Outcomes 
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model, expectancy theory means that a person must feel able to change his or her 
behaviour, must feel confident that a change in behaviour will produce the 
expected rewards, and must value those rewards sufficiently to justify the 
change in behaviour (Marsden and Richardson, 1994). In other words, 
individuals will engage in behaviours likely to lead to valued outcomes, as long 
as they perceive that they can successfully produce such behaviours. Employees 
will respond to performance incentives if they value the reward, if they believe 
extra effort will generate sufficient additional performance, and if they believe 
that management will reward this (Marsden, 2004a). Thus, provided that a 
financial incentive is perceived as valuable, and the increased performance is 
expected to lead to outcomes that are expected to result in the financial reward, 
such a payment system would enhance performance through increased extrinsic 
motivation and effort (Kuvaas, 2006). 
Expectancy theory has a number of important implications for the PRP system, 
as it suggests that PRP is likely to motivate employees when the following 
conditions are met (Heneman and Werner, 2005): First, the performance must be 
accurately measured. If it cannot be, then employees cannot perceive a link 
between effort and performance (expectancy) or performance and reward 
(instrumentality). Second, the increased pay must be a valued outcome, in other 
words, the end result of an increase in performance must be attractive or have 
positive valence. If a pay increase is less attractive than leisure, then an 
employee will feel less motivated to perform when promised a pay increase 
rather than additional time off. Third, the relationship between performance on 
the job and pay associated with performance must be clearly defined, in order to 
ensure that employees perceive performance as instrumental in attaining a pay 
increase. Finally, opportunities to improve performance must exist. Employees 
should have the time, equipment, ability or supervision required to perform a 
task, if they are expected to improve performance. If such opportunity is absent, 
PRP will be a futile system. 
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Thus, performance pay systems will not work unless employees regard them as 
fairly designed and operated, and corresponding to their own preferences for 
incentives provided (Lawler, 1971; Marsden and Belfield, 2004). If employees 
do not believe they will be rewarded for extra effort, they are less likely to 
respond to the incentive scheme (Marsden, 2004a). In practice, flaws in PRP 
design can be found in some cases, when the assumptions required under 
expectancy theory are not fully accomplished. For example, OECD (2005b) 
surveys, looking at the failure of incentive systems in the public sector in several 
countries, suggest that it is common to see ‘disappointed expectations of 
employees who have been promised money for improved performance and then 
find it is funded by means of smaller increases in base pay’ (Dahlstrom and 
Lapuente, 2009: 581). In light of the above, it is important that we investigate 
whether the assumptions of expectancy theory have been fulfilled in different 
PSUs in China during the recent pay system reforms. Therefore, the following 
questions will be explored in the coming fieldwork, with empirical findings 
presented in Chapter 6 and 7.  
Question 2a (Expectancy): Can the employees improve performance by 
working harder? 
Question 2b (Instrumentality): If the employee works harder, will he/she get 
higher pay? 
Question 2c (Valence): Will the employees perceive the bonuses they can 
receive by working harder to be valuable to them? 
 
4.2.3   Goal-setting theory 
Goal-setting theory, first established by Locke (1968), is based on a simple 
premise: performance is produced by an employee’s intention to perform 
(Beardwell and Claydon, 2007). Goal-setting theory proposes that employees 
will be more motivated if they have goals that they see as specific, challenging, 
	   68 
and acceptable (Heneman and Werner, 2005). According to the theory of goal-
setting, when setting individual objectives for employees, these must not be too 
easy to achieve, nor too complex or unrealistic (OECD, 2005c). If employees see 
the criteria as inappropriate or inapplicable, they will not adopt them voluntarily, 
and are only likely to apply them if their work is closely monitored (Marsden 
and Belfield, 2004).  
One key reason for implementing PRP is that performance pay may enable 
management to attach rewards to some discretionary activities and not to others 
(Marsden, 2000). By rewarding particular aspects of a job, PRP sends out 
messages about what the firm values, and the sort of behaviour that is desirable 
(Chamberlin, Wragg et al., 2002). According to Marsden, French et al. (2001), 
who study PRP in the UK public sector, goal-setting theory plays a critical role 
in the decision process of PRP. They say that improving goal-setting may raise 
performance in two ways: clarifying work goals and enabling management to 
negotiate higher levels of performance, which may not always be given 
voluntarily.  
However, the process of goal-setting in the public sector tends to be more 
challenging than in the private sectors, mainly because many public services are 
multifaceted, which can make it difficult to define the specific objectives of an 
organization. For example, the objective of a school might be to provide a “good 
education”, but such a goal is much more complicated than defining the 
production of cars (Propper, 2006) or the number of windows to be installed. 
Compared to some other sectors, jobs in the public service may be more 
complex, involving several dimensions, some of which may be relatively easy to 
measure, while others may be much harder. For example, students’ test results 
would be easy to measure but the education of a country’s future citizens would 
be very difficult (Marsden and Belfield, 2006).  
Such differences in the measurability of different goals may mean that incentives 
can only be linked to the easy-to-measure outcomes, which may lead to an 
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excessive focus on these at the expense of other tasks (Propper, 2006). Thus, 
employers must be very careful when choosing the criteria to be evaluated, any 
may have to “weaken the incentives on more accurately measured tasks” 
(Prentice, 2007). For many OECD countries (OECD, 2005c), whether or not 
PRP has a positive impact on staff in the public sector is strongly dependent on 
how well the appraisal process is carried out, and particularly, on how well 
individual and team objectives are identified, and to what extent they are based 
on performance. 
In China, although the link between pay and performance in PSUs is addressed 
in government policy, no specific instructions about the setting of performance 
measures is included. Thus, it is mainly the responsibility of the individual PSUs 
to decide on the criteria they use. As this research seeks to carry out a pioneer 
study of the pay system reform at the organizational level in Chinese PSUs, how 
these individual PSU performance criteria were decided upon will be an 
important question herein.  
Question 3: How were the criteria for PRP decided upon in individual PSUs 
during the pay system reform? 
 
4.2.4   Moral hazard and agency theory 
The goals set during the pay system decision process are recognized as being an 
objective of PRP. However, such goal-setting may in fact be counter-productive: 
one of the main criticisms of PRP is that employees may become so firmly fixed 
on hitting their measurable targets that other important elements of their jobs 
could be ignored. This is one of the most commonly cited difficulties with PRP; 
individuals focus on the specified objectives so as to receive higher payments, 
and neglect other features of the job; this is known as ‘moral hazard’ (Kessler 
and Purcell, 1991).  
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Moral hazard, also called “dysfunctional behavioral responses’ (Prendergast, 
1999) or “opportunistic behavior” (Murnane and Cohen, 1986), is behaviour 
under a contract, that is inefficient and arises from the differing interests of the 
contracting parties (Fernie and Metcalf, 1999). It arises frequently in principal-
agent relationships, where the agent is called upon to act on behalf of the 
principal, but there is some uncertainty regarding the relationship between the 
agent’s effort and his/her output (Levacic, 2009).  
Principal-agent theory, or agency theory, was initially developed for analysing 
differences in behaviour between owner-management firms and public 
companies, due to the separation between shareholders’ ownership and 
managers’ control (Fama, 1980). According to agency theory, the moral hazard 
problem occurs when the agent’s interests differ from those of the principal, and 
the principal cannot easily evaluate how well the agent has performed or 
whether he or she has been honest (Fernie and Metcalf, 1999). Based on the 
assumptions of agency theory, there are two main approaches to controlling 
moral hazard problems: monitoring and incentive contracts (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). Monitoring can lessen the asymmetric information problem, 
which is a fundamental component of moral hazard. Its limitation, however, is 
that obtaining information about the agent’s truthfulness and performance by 
monitoring him or her, can sometimes be very costly (Fernie and Metcalf, 1999). 
The second option is to use appropriate incentive contracts; agency theory 
assumes that agents act to maximize their utility, thus determing what aspects of 
the agent’s work for the principal increase his or her utility is crucial (Levacic, 
2009).  
Thus in the case of employees and work goals, according to agency theory, in 
order to avoid the problem of moral hazard, it is important to align the 
individual’s goals with those of the organization. When designing an appropriate 
incentive scheme, agency theory explains the importance of monitoring 
performance and gaining agreement for a mutually satisfactory arrangement 
between the employer and the employees, during the decision process (Marsden 
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and Belfield, 2006); performance incentives are needed when the principal (the 
employer) cannot easily monitor the agent’s (the employee’s) work effort 
(OECD, 2005b).  
As an important theory of motivation, agency theory relates just as much to non-
marketed services as marketed ones, so it is believed to be valid in different 
sectors, both private and public (Levacic, 2009). However, the situation might be 
different for different occupations. For example, the classic example of jockeys’ 
pay shows that an appropriate PRP scheme can generate superior performance to 
a non-contingent pay system, due to the fact that the former overcomes the 
moral hazard problem within the principal-agent relationship (Fernie and 
Metcalf, 1999). However, in other occupations, PRP may encourage unethical 
behaviour if employees are over-keen on carrying out behaviours that will lead 
to pay increases. Chiu, Luk et al. (2002) address this issue. They compare the 
compensation preferences between employees in Hong Kong and China and find 
that performance-based programmes may lead to unethical behaviour, and 
produce the risk of moral hazard, due to asymmetric information in performance 
evaluations.  
In public services where multiple principal-agent situations may exist, the 
implementation of PRP could be even more complicated. For instance, in the 
UK, the Minister of Education is the principal in relation to local authorities, as 
it sets the national education policy and provides a proportion of school funding; 
local schools are agents of the local government, and held accountable by them; 
parents are principals of the school governing body, as they elect representatives 
to them, but the governing body is also an agent of the local authority (Levacici, 
2009). In such situations, it is critical to determine how the interests of these 
multiple principals and agents can be properly aligned, when considering 
different financial incentive schemes. Therefore, given the possible multiple 
principal-agent situations, as well as the multi-tasking that goes on in the 
Chinese PSU sector, as discussed in the previous section, it is necessary to 
	   72 
investigate whether introducing PRP helps to reduce moral hazard. We do this 
by looking at the relationships between principals and agents in PSUs.  
Question 4: Has the introduction of PRP helped to align the interests of 
different parties in PSUs in China?  
 
4.2.5   The cognitive evaluation theory  
In the field of HRM, most incentives to work and/or heighten performance can 
be classified into one of two general categories: intrinsic and extrinsic (Tung and 
Baumann, 2009). Intrinsic motivation is defined as the motivation to perform a 
task or activity when no apparent reward is received except that directly 
involved with the task itself. Extrinsic motivation is defined as the motivation to 
perform an activity strictly for the external rewards that are received (Daniel and 
Esser, 1980). While intrinsic motivation refers to doing something because it is 
inherently interesting or enjoyable, extrinsic motivation denotes doing 
something because it leads to a separate outcome, such as monetary 
compensation (Ryan and Deci, 2000).  
When discussing motivation in the public sector, intrinsic compensation is 
usually felt to play an important role, as public sector workers may care about 
the outcomes or mission of the public organization they work for and thus gain 
satisfaction. For example, having internalized the goals of their organization, 
nurses and doctors may care about the health of their patients, and teachers about 
the achievements of their pupils, to the extent that they obtain welfare from 
seeing their users’ needs being met (Prentice, 2007). Thus, it is proposed that 
intrinsically motivated employees could actually work best when incentives are 
small or even absent, and their employers commit to not diverting any surpluses 
or public sector “profits” away from the organization’s mission (Francois, 2000). 
In other words, setting financial rewards based on performance in the public 
sector may actually be counterproductive, in that it may send the signal that the 
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relationship between the workers and the organization is a purely market-based 
one (Burgess and Ratto, 2003), which may dilute the workers’ intrinsic 
motivation, so that they develop a ‘distaste for the required effort’ (Kreps, 1997).  
In terms of the effects of external rewards on intrinsic motivation, cognitive 
evaluation theory (CET) specifies the factors in social contexts that produce 
variability in intrinsic motivation, suggesting that it is adversely affected by 
rewards when reward recipients perceive the rewards as controlling or as a 
challenge to their competence (Deci, 1975; Ryan and Dec, 2000; Boxall, Purcell 
et al., 2007). In other words, CET implies that, under certain conditions, intrinsic 
motivation will be undermined by PRP. An example of this is giving someone a 
performance-contingent monetary incentive to do something they already enjoy; 
their motivation to do it decreases, as they then view their actions as externally-
driven rather than internally appealing (Weibel, Rost, et al., 2009). A substantial 
body of experimental and field evidence indicates that extrinsic motivation 
(contingent rewards) can sometimes conflict with intrinsic (the individual’s 
desire to perform the task for its own sake) (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). One 
classic experiment which supports this argument was carried out by Deci (1971), 
who found that subjects who received a contingent monetary reward for 
performing a puzzle task demonstrated significantly less intrinsic motivation 
towards the task than those who received no reward. Based on a meta-analysis of 
128 studies examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation, 
Deci, Koestner et al. (1999) find that unexpected tangible rewards, introduced 
after task performance, tend not to affect the intrinsic motivation towards the 
activity, but expected tangible rewards significantly undermine the free-choice 
intrinsic motivation in most situations. This is supported by Weibel, Rost, et al. 
(2009), who find that PRP has a strong, positive effect on performance in the 
case of non-interesting tasks, but a negative one in the case of interesting tasks.  
CET plays a critical role when introducing PRP into public service jobs where 
intrinsic motivations are valued, for example, educating children and dealing 
with public goods (Marsden and French, 1998). In some occupations, such as 
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teaching, money, though motivating, is not the only reward the employees 
receive (Chamberlin, Wragg et al., 2002). CET shows that external financial 
incentives, such as the PRP scheme, could decrease motivation in this case, if 
the employees think their employer recognizes no association between output 
and effort, other than a purely market-based one (Prentice, 2007).  
In the case of the application of PRP in the PSU sector in China, CET could be 
highly relevant, mainly because intrinsic and extrinsic motivation seem to be 
more controversial in China. For instance, the Chinese word for incentive, “ji li”, 
has a connotation of inner, non-material motivation, and material incentives 
have always been considered somewhat ‘suspicious’ in the Chinese tradition 
(Shenkar and Chow, 1989). Traditionally, especially during the period of Mao, it 
was generally believed that the motivating force should come from non-material 
incentives (Chow, 1992). However, since China started its economic reform, 
there has been a considerable and growing emphasis on meritocracy, and 
material incentives (Jackson and Littler, 1991; Warner, 1996; Cooke, 2004; 
Beardwell and Claydon, 2007, etc.), and it seems to be widely accepted now in 
Chinese society, that money represents one’s success and achievement in life 
(Tang, 1992). For example, a study by Chiu, Luk et al. (2001) finds that cash 
appears to be the most effective element in attracting, retaining and motivating 
local Chinese employees; this is referred to as “the cash mentality”. According 
to a recent study by the OECD (2005a), public employees in China, like other 
workers, are motivated by the expectation that, if they perform well, they will 
receive commensurate rewards that they value. However, at the same time, one 
distinctive feature in China that has been given particular importance in the 
public sector, is the morality norm in motivation. For example, one’s political 
loyalty to the Communist Party, integrity of personality, diligence at work and 
the quest for knowledge to improve one’s intellectual horizons, may all be 
sources of motivation (Cooke, 2004). Therefore, it is likely that employees in the 
PSU sector in China are motivated by the expectation of receiving both intrinsic 
and extrinsic rewards. Thus, the impact of the PRP reform on the intrinsic 
motivation of employees in PSUs forms the basis of the next research question.  
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Question 5: What influence has the implementation of PRP had on employees’ 
intrinsic motivation in different PSUs in China? 
 
4.2.6   Equity vs. Equality 
When designing a pay system, equity (to each according to contribution) and 
equality (to each equally) are two central principles of reward allocation that 
need to be considered. The equity principle maintains that rewards should be 
based on individual contributions, while the equality principle suggests giving 
equal rewards to all individuals regardless of their contributions (Chiang and 
Birtch, 2007; Bozionelos and Wang, 2007, etc). It is suggested that the 
maintenance of social harmony is promoted by equal reward allocations, 
whereas the maximization of performance is achieved by systems, such as PRP, 
which allocate outcomes equitably in proportion to relative performance 
(Deutsch, 1985; Greenberg, 1990; Leventhal et al., 1980; Chen, 1995, etc.). 
When introducing PRP into an organization, the theory of equity usually plays a 
fundamental role, because rewarding employees according to their personal 
performance basically implies a differential allocation of available rewards 
according to individual contributions (Erez, 1997). According to the equity 
theory, people compare the ratio of their own perceived work outcomes (i.e., 
rewards) to their own perceived work inputs (i.e., contributions) with the 
corresponding ratios of others (e.g., coworkers) (Greenberg, 1990). The theory is 
based on the principle that, since there are no absolute criteria for fairness, 
employees generally assess fairness by making comparisons between themselves 
and others in a similar situation (Beardwell and Claydon, 2007). For example, 
employees will expect to be given convincing reasons why some employees get 
more than others, as well as clear guidance as to how they could earn more 
money (Murnane and Cohen, 1986).  
According to Erez (1997), people usually use two sources of evaluation to 
determine whether or not their self-motives have been satisfied. The first is 
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personal standards, which are guided by internal criteria of the differences 
between one individual and another. The second is the standards and norms that 
people acquire from their social environment, which are shaped by cultural 
values. Such standards may be shared by all members of the same culture, and 
may differ from one culture to another. Therefore, motivational practices that 
have a positive meaning in one culture may not have the same effect on 
employee motivation in another. For instance, compared to people from Anglo-
Saxon nations, who are generally guided more by individualistic values (Bond, 
Leung and Wan, 1982; Leung and Bond, 1984), Chinese employees’ preferences 
towards equity and equality are noted to be different in the literature. Earlier 
studies about pay systems in China showed that the Chinese prefer equality to 
equity in allocation decisions (Bond, Leung and Wan, 1982; Leung and Bond, 
1984), which is in line with the traditional image of collectivism and 
Confucianism in the Chinese culture. However, when the Chinese economic 
reform started, the principle of equity began to play a more important role in 
China. Chen (1995) finds that the Chinese are now more likely to report a 
preference for equity than equality-based reward distribution. A recent study by 
Bozionelos and Wang (2007) also finds that Chinese employees are more 
positive towards the principle of equity-based rewards than equality-based 
rewards. Such findings show that the collectivistic and Confucianist elements of 
the Chinese culture no longer have such a strong influence on Chinese 
employees’ preferences. 
However, it may be the case that the new emphasis of Chinese employees on 
economic logic and the rejection of equality-based rules is more a product of 
recent environmental pressure and institutional practices, than any shift in the 
underlying cultural values (Sparrow, 2000). Consistent evidence in the literature 
shows that collectivism, harmony goals, and socioemotional resources are linked 
to egalitarian preferences, and that individualism, economic goals, and material 
resources are linked to differential preferences (Chen, 1995). It is argued that 
Chinese people are still very sensitive to, and have a low tolerance towards, 
income gaps between people, implying that the most prevalent aspect of the 
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Chinese perspective on distributive fairness is still egalitarianism (Cooke, 2004). 
Many researchers suggest that Chinese employees regard large pay gaps as 
potentially disruptive to collective social systems, and still place group harmony 
and social adhesion as the top priority (Yu, 1998; Cooke, 2004; Farh, Zhong et 
al., 2004). Moreover, it is believed that, when there is a possibility for a long-
term relationship, the Chinese will adopt a more egalitarian solution, for 
example, than the less collectivistic Americans. When dividing resources with a 
stranger in an instrumental relationship, in contrast, the Chinese will be more 
equitable, as their motives will include a higher need for affiliation and 
sociability (Bond and Hwang, 1986).  
Therefore, we also investigate whether, in Chinese PSUs, where interpersonal 
harmony is favoured and traditional long-term employment is common, attempts 
from the top to enhance equity by encouraging wage differentials according to 
performance are preferred, or the traditional equality principle continues to 
dominate.  
Question 6: Equity or equality, which has had a more significant impact on 
the design of PRP systems in PSUs in China?  
 
4.3   Chapter summary  
This chapter provides the theoretical background to this research, giving an 
overview of the debates surrounding PRP, with a specific focus on the literature 
regarding the public sector. In order to construct a research framework to 
explore the application and influence of PRP in different PSUs in China during 
the recent pay system reforms, NEP theory and a range of motivational theories 
are reviewed, leading to a list of specific research objectives. Based on the 
literature and theory review, the research framework and methodology of this 
study are presented in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5   Research Methodology 
 
The objectives of this chapter are three-fold. Building upon the literature and 
theory review, it first identifies major research gaps, formulates research 
questions, and develops a conceptual framework. Second, it presents the theory 
foundation and philosophical stance from which the research design and are 
derived, leading to the selection of the case study approach. Third, methods of 
analysing data are elucidated, concluding with a discussion of the validity and 
reliability of the chosen method and approach.  
 
5.1   Research Questions and Conceptual Framework 
5.1.1   Research Gap Identification 
During the literature and theory review, three major research gaps were 
identified. First, it was noticed that one significant missing category among 
HRM studies in China is the public sector and governmental organizations, 
which is in contrast to the continuing attention that the public sector has attracted 
from management research in western countries (Cooke, 2009). Also compared 
to the extensive attention that the business sector (eg., SOEs and FIEs) in China 
have received from researchers, there has been very little discussion regarding 
HRM and pay systems in the Chinese public sector, also called the public 
service unit sector (PSU, shiye danwei) in China. Considering PSUs’ significant 
academic and practical value (discussed in Section 3.1), there is a great need to 
explore the pay systems used in them, a topic that has rarely been studied in the 
HRM field.  
Second, although many researchers acknowledge the fact that pay system 
reforms introducing PRP have been introduced in many organizations in China 
(Chow, 1992; Child, 1995; DeCieri, Zhu et al., 1998; Ding, Goodall and Warner, 
2000; Bjorkman, 2002; Cooke 2002; 2004; 2005; Bozionelos and Wang, 2007, 
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etc.), very few attempts have been made to explore the application and 
effectiveness of such changes to a pay system, within the Chinese cultural and 
institutional environment. In contrast to the broad discussion of pay systems in 
western societies, there is a great shortage of studies about pay systems at an 
organizational level in China, and especially of those using longitudinal data, 
covering different changes to the pay system.  
Third, despite the apparent popularity mentioned in the literature of PRP in 
different organizations, the empirical evidence for the superiority of PRP is still 
ambiguous, especially in the public sector, where a gap between the theoretical 
and actual PRP systems can often be seen (Ingraham, 1996; Thompson, 2007; 
Dahlstrom and Lapuente, 2009). Thus, given the recent pay system reform in 
China, which aimed to implement PRP in the PSU sector nationwide, its true 
impacts on different PSUs and their employees is an important question for 
investigation.  
 
5.1.2   Research Questions and Research Objectives 
In sum, the research gaps indicate that the existing literature has failed to answer 
the following question:   
How has performance related pay been implemented in different PSUs in 
China during the pay system reform, and what has been its impact?  
In order to answer this question, different theories about PRP have been 
reviewed, with the aim of exploring the impact the pay system reform has had on 
different PSUs in China. Based on the assumptions of the ‘new economics of 
personnel’ (NEP) and a range of motivational theories, six research objectives 
have been formulated, as follows:   
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Table 5-1: Summary of the proposed research objectives 
Theory 
Category  Theory Research objective proposed 
Economic 
Theory  
The New 
Economics of 
Personnel (NEP)  
Q1: How does PRP fit into different PSUs in 
China?  
Motivational 
Theory 
Expectancy Theory 
Q (2a): Can the employees improve 
performance by working harder? 
Q (2b):  If the employee works harder, will 
he/she get higher pay? 
Q (2c): Do the employees perceive the 
bonuses they can receive by working harder to 
be valuable? 
Goal-setting Theory 
Q3: How were the criteria for PRP decided 
upon in individual PSUs during the pay 
system reform? 
Agency Theory 
Q4: Has the introduction of PRP helped to 
align the interests of different parties in PSUs 
in China? 
Cognitive 
Evaluation Theory 
(CET) 
Q5: What influence has the implementation of 
PRP had on employees’ intrinsic motivation in 
different PSUs in China? 
Equity Theory 
Q6: Equity or equality, which has had a more 
significant impact on the design of PRP 
systems in PSUs in China?  
 
5.2   Philosophical Stances and Theoretical Foundation  
For centuries, the relationship between data, knowledge and theory has been 
intensely debated among philosophers. When designing management research, it 
is crucial to think through such philosophical issues, otherwise, the quality of the 
research could be seriously affected (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, et al., 2008). 
There are two contrasting views of how social science research should be 
conducted, known as positivism and social constructionism. The positivist 
position argues that the social world exists externally, and its properties should 
be measured through objective methods, rather than being inferred subjectively 
through sensation, reflection or intuition (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008: 57). 
Social constructionism, on the other hand, states that ‘reality’ is not objective 
and exterior, but is socially constructed and given meaning by people (Easterby-
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Smith, Thorpe, et al., 2008: 58). Given its implied objectivity and detachment, 
positivist research favours quantitative methodologies to describe or explain 
phenomena (Meredith, 1998). As one of a group of approaches often termed as 
interpretive methods, social constructionism usually relies more on qualitative 
data analysis, to better understand and explain the human action that arises from 
the sense that people make of different situations (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, et al., 
2008). Table 5-2 show the key features of the positivist and social 
constructionist paradigms.  
 
Table 5-2: Contrasting Positivism and Social Constructionism 
 
 Positivism Social Constructionism 
The observer Must be independent Is part of what is being observed 
Human interests Should be irrelevant Are the main drivers of science 
Explanations Must demonstrate causality Aim to increase general understanding of the situation 
Research 
progresses 
through 
Hypotheses and deductions Gathering rich data from which ideas are induced 
Concepts Need to be defined so that they can be measured  
Should incorporate stakeholders’ 
perspectives 
Units of analysis Should be reduced to their simplest terms 
May include the complexity of 
‘whole’ situations 
Generalization 
through Statistical probability Theoretical abstraction 
Sampling 
requires 
Large numbers selected 
randomly 
Small numbers of cases chosen for 
specific reasons 
 
Source: Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, et al. (2008:59) 
 
Although the above philosophical positions seem to be incompatible, some 
management researchers suggest that a middle ground can be adopted by using 
mixed methods, and that this can provide different perspectives on the 
phenomena being investigated (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, et al., 2008). Despite 
the already-developed theories in the PRP literature, this research aims to 
explore the true impacts of the recent PRP reform in PSUs in China, a sector 
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whose pay system has been so rarely explored. The research goal is concerned 
with increasing understanding and insight through gathering rich, contextual 
data from a small sample of carefully selected cases: PSUs that have gone 
through the recent pay system reform. Therefore, the philosophical stance 
adopted in this research leans towards the social constructionist position, though 
some positivist notions are also integrated into parts of the research design. 
Based on the philosophical position discussed above, and the aims of the study, 
the research design and methodology will be proposed in the following sections.  
 
5.3   Selection of the Research Method  
There are several ways of carrying out social science research, including 
experiments, surveys, histories, case studies, and the analysis of archival 
information. Each of these choices has advantages and disadvantages. When 
choosing a particular method, three main points need to be considered: “the type 
of research question posed, the extent of control an investigator has over actual 
behavioral events, and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to 
historical phenomena” (Yin, 2003: 5). Table 5-3 below shows the differences 
between the five main research methods, based on these three points. 
Table 5-3: Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies  
 
Strategy Form of Research Question 
Requires Control of 
Behavioural Events? 
Focus on 
Contemporary 
Events? 
Experiment how, why? Yes Yes 
Survey who, what, where, how many, how much? No Yes 
Archival 
analysis 
who, what, where, how 
many, how much? No Yes/No 
History how, why? No No 
Case study how, why? No Yes 
 
Source: COSMOS Corporation. Cited in Yin (2003:5) 
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When choosing the research method for this study, then, we consider all three 
points. First, the form of the research question is predominantly ‘how’: “How is 
performance related pay performing in different PSUs in China, since the recent 
pay system reform?” Second, within this research, there is no need to control 
behavioural events. Finally, this research focuses on contemporary events, in 
investigating how employees in different PSUs have reacted to the pay system 
reform. Therefore, given the exploratory nature of the study, the case-study 
based approach is found to be appropriate, as it is suitable when “how” or “why” 
questions are being proposed, when the investigator has little control over 
events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-
life context (Yin, 2003: 1). Further reasons for choosing the case study over 
other suitable methods, such as surveys, are given in the following paragraph. 
A case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003: 13). The case 
study research strategy is particularly suited to providing an analysis of the 
context in which behaviour and/or processes are affected by and in turn impact 
on context (Hartley, 2004: 323). Compared to the large amount of quantitative 
research involving contextual variables, there has been much less research using 
qualitative contextual data, despite the fact that it can provide insights into how 
context directly constrains particular outcomes or governs particular 
relationships (Bamberger, 2008). In recent decades, there have been calls for 
more case studies in the field of payment research, as many researchers believe 
that the field would benefit from in-depth descriptions of different compensation 
strategies, obtained through qualitative methods such as interviews and 
participant observations (Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne, 1988; Heneman and 
Judge, 2000; Werner and Ward, 2004). For example, on-site visits are necessary 
to gain a deep understanding of the choice and design of payment systems in 
companies. Researchers ‘must enter the field, rather than merely survey it, if we 
are fully to understand and appreciate its content and changes’ (Heneman and 
Judge, 2000: 82-83). Besides, in the field of HRM research in China, an 
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“extensive use of snapshots and pragmatic approach to data collection” can be 
observed, indicating that “more longitudinal studies and in-depth case studies at 
the organizational level are needed to narrate the nuances and delineate the 
trajectory of development of HRM in China” (Cooke, 2009: 16). Therefore, a 
case-study approach is adopted in this research. The details of the research 
design are presented in the following section.  
 
5.4   Research Design 
Every piece of empirical research must have a research design, which is “the 
logic that links the data to be collected (and the conclusions to be drawn) to the 
initial questions of study” (Yin, 2003: 19). For case studies, five components of 
a research design are especially important: (1) the study’s questions, (2) its 
propositions, if any, (3) its unit(s) of analysis, (4) the logic linking the data to the 
propositions, and (5) the criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin, 2003: 21). 
The research question and research objectives have already been presented in 
Section 4.1.2. In the following sections, the detailed research process, including 
sampling strategy and data collection methods, how the data will be analysed 
and research quality assurance, will be illustrated.  
 
5.4.1   Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis within a case study is related to the fundamental problem of 
defining what the “case” is―it could be an individual, an event or an entity 
defined by the researcher (Yin, 2003; 2009). According to Yin (2003), the unit 
of analysis (and therefore the case) is related to the way the researcher(s) have 
defined the initial research question(s). The research question in this study 
involves exploring how new pay systems were implemented and how PRP is 
performing in different PSUs in China. Therefore, the unit of analysis in this 
research is the “public service unit in China”, and it will be the different changes 
and adjustments in their pay systems that will be observed.  
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5.4.2   Number of Cases  
The ‘optimal’ number of cases in research design has been a matter of long-term 
debate. For example, single-case designs are particularly appropriate for 
completely new, exploratory investigations (Meredith, 1998). For a given set of 
available resources, the fewer the case studies, the greater the opportunity for 
depth of observation and richness of data collected (Voss et al., 2002). On the 
other hand, multiple-case study designs are preferred when there is already some 
knowledge about the phenomenon but much is still unknown (Meredith, 1998). 
Although no conclusion exists regarding the ideal number of cases, given the 
choice (and resources), multiple-case designs are usually recommended, since 
“single-case designs are vulnerable if only because you will have put all eggs in 
one basket” (Yin, 2003: 53). According to Eisenhardt (1991: 622), the 
appropriate number of cases will depend on how much is already known and 
how much new information is likely to be learned from incremental cases. 
Generally speaking, multiple-case designs with four to ten cases are considered 
adequate; after this, it can be difficult to cope with the volume and complexity of 
the data (Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, given the research question and 
objectives, this research conducted two in-depth case studies, the first looking at 
pay system reform in six state schools, and the second, pay system reform in one 
publishing organization. The sampling strategy chosen, which determines the 
characteristics of the selected cases, will be presented in the following section.  
 
5.4.3   Choice of Cases  
As described in Chapter 3, there are mainly three categories of PSUs: those with 
semi-government characteristic (e.g., the Stock Admission Department), those 
with a close link to public welfare (e.g., state schools and hospitals), and those 
that resemble production units and have little connection to public welfare (e.g., 
publishing organizations). During the national PSU restructuring process, PSUs 
belonging to the first category were incorporated into the government, and 
	   86 
automatically adopted the national civil servant personnel and pay system. 
Therefore, this research will concentrate on the other two categories.  
The first case study looks at the PRP reform in six state schools within the 
compulsory education system in one county in Southeast China. We selected 
Chinese state schools because they are one of the most important components of 
the PSU sector in China, because they were the first group of PSUs belonging to 
the public welfare category to go through the PRP reform, and also because the 
implementation of PRP for schoolteachers has been very controversial across 
various countries, and its true impact in China remains unexplored. We now 
look at each of these three reasons in more detail. 
First of all, it should be noted that improving the quality and outcomes of 
education is a key priority for all governments around the world (Atkinson et al., 
2009). In China, a system of nine years of compulsory education has been in 
place since 1986, when the Compulsory Education Law of the PRC was enacted. 
According to this law, compulsory education was divided into two stages: 
primary school education and junior high school education. Once primary 
education had been made universal, junior high school education followed 
(Compulsory Education Law of the PRC, 1986: Article 7). Since then, the 
number of state schools and schoolteachers employed has increased 
significantly. According to the Ministry of Education (2008), in 2006 there were 
341,600 primary schools and 60,600 junior high schools in China, with 5.59 
million primary schoolteachers and 3.46 million junior high schoolteachers, 
representing nearly one third of the total employment in the PSU sector. Given 
the significant role that state schools play as public service providers, 
investigating how the payment system reforms have worked in them is crucial to 
this research.  
Secondly, when the General Office of the State Council of the PRC announced a 
three-step project of PRP reform recently, targeting the major category of PSUs 
that provide public welfare nationwide, state schools within the compulsory 
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education system were chosen to be involved in the first tier of this reform. 
According to the General Office of the State Council of the PRC, from January 
1st 2009, in the first step of the reform, a payment system comprising seventy per 
cent fixed-wage and thirty per cent PRP would first be launched into all state 
schools within the Chinese compulsory education system. The second step 
aimed to introduce the PRP system into all public hospitals and other PSUs 
within the national medical care system, from January 1st 2010. Finally, the 
ultimate goal would be to implement PRP in all PSUs providing public services, 
nationwide. Therefore, exploring the impacts of the reform on state schools 
could provide guidelines to be used when introducing PRP into other PSUs.  
Thirdly, the effectiveness of PRP among schoolteachers has long been debated 
in the literature. In theory, schoolteachers should be among the least suitable 
employees for pay to be linked to performance (Marsden and Belfield, 2006: 1), 
mainly because the nature of their work is imprecise and characterized by 
multiple tasks, which makes their performance difficult to monitor and control 
(Murnane and Cohen, 1986; Marsden, 2006). Nevertheless, teachers are 
expected to respond to incentives inherent in the compensation structure (Lazear, 
2003), and in recent decades, it has been common to find pay systems linked to 
performance for schoolteachers in many countries, although the effectiveness of 
such PRP schemes is still controversial. For instance, a recent review by Neal 
(2011: 14) shows that most assessment-based performance pay schemes do 
generate a remarkable increase in student performance on the particular 
assessment used to determine the incentive, confirming that teachers do respond 
to incentives. The study does note a few exceptions, such as the experience from 
England, the recent pay scale reform in Portugal, and two recent experiments in 
the US. Generally speaking, schoolteachers belong to a group of employees who 
exercise a high level of expertise in their work, particularly with regard to their 
subject and its teaching methods. As a result, there is an asymmetry of 
knowledge between the staff and the management (Marsden, 2006: 5). 
According to Eberts, Hollenbeck et al. (2002), PRP can motivate agents to 
pursue outcomes that are directly rewarded, but when it comes to schools, which 
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are characterized by multiple tasks and outcomes, team production, and multiple 
stakeholders, PRP schemes may produce unintended and, at times, misdirected 
results, unless the schemes are carefully constructed and implemented. However, 
among these controversial findings regarding PRP in schools in different 
countries, none of the samples include schoolteachers from China. Therefore, 
with the Chinese national pay reform introducing thirty per cent PRP into 
schoolteachers’ wages in all state schools within the compulsory education 
system, it will be extremely interesting to investigate the impact this has.  
To sum up, state schools within the Chinese compulsory education system 
represent the best sample through which to explore the influence of the recent 
national PRP reform among PSUs in the public welfare category. Therefore, we 
chose six state schools within the compulsory education system, from one 
county in southeast China, as the sample organizations, including primary and 
junior high schools in both urban and rural areas. Table 5-4 presents the selected 
case studies. The names of the schools have been omitted to preserve anonymity. 
All case selections were guided by the following criteria:  
(1) state schools belong to the category of PSUs that provide a public 
welfare service; 
(2) state schools within the national compulsory education system in China; 
(3) state schools involved in the national pay system reform, which 
implemented PRP. 
Table 5-4: List of selected schools  
Case Primary/Junior High  Urban/Rural  Official start of PRP system 
School A Primary school Urban  1st January, 2009 
School B Primary school Urban 1st January, 2009 
School C Primary school Rural 1st January, 2009 
School D Junior high school Urban 1st January, 2009 
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School E Junior high school Rural 1st January, 2009 
School F Junior high school Rural 1st January, 2009 
As opposed to the category of PSUs with a public welfare function, where a 
national PRP policy was implemented, for those PSUs of a commercial nature, 
with little connection to public welfare, a national strategy of “pushing towards 
market” (tuixiang shichang) has been adopted. Its main purpose is to transfer 
such organizations from the traditional PSU system to the enterprise system. 
Thus, this latter category of PSUs have been required to engage in market 
competition, using a self-funding system. They have also been given flexibility 
in deciding on their own personnel systems, including pay systems. The change 
of pay systems in PSUs of a commercial nature started a bit earlier than it did for 
state schools and other PSUs providing public services. National financial and 
ownership reforms were introduced in 2000, requiring all PSUs of a commercial 
nature to transfer into enterprises with self-funded pay schemes.  
One example is that of publishing organizations, an important part of the 
Chinese cultural sector, whose reform started in 2004, when the General 
Administration of Press Publications of the PRC announced that all PSUs in the 
publishing industry (except the People’s Publishing House, which would retain 
its PSU system due to it carries out the Party and state’s propaganda mission 
(“houshe”) and the public welfare nature of its publications) would be 
transformed into enterprises and no longer receive funding from the national 
budget. In contrast to the pay system reform among PSUs providing public 
welfare, it was mainly the responsibility of the commercial PSUs themselves to 
decide on the changes they would make to their pay systems when they became 
enterprises. Therefore, the pay system reform in a publishing organization was 
selected as the second case study. This acts as a comparative study to the study 
of the pay system reform in state schools. The sample publishing organization 
was chosen according to the following criteria:  
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(1) a publishing organization belong to the category of PSUs which resemble 
production units and have little connection to public welfare; 
(2) a PSU which was pushed into the market, transferring from the 
traditional PSU system to one of an enterprise nature; 
(3) a PSU which conducted a spontaneous pay system reform, moving 
towards a PRP system. 
A brief introduction to the two case studies included in this research is shown in 
Table 5-5. Due to the agreement of confidentiality between the researcher and 
the case organizations, the names of all sample PSUs are omitted throughout this 
thesis. 
Table 5-5:  Case Studies and Sampling Logic 
 
Case study A: 
Pay system reform for 
schoolteachers in state schools  
Case study B: 
The pay system reform in a 
publishing organization  
Sample PSU(s) Six state schools in the Chinese compulsory education system One publishing organization 
PSU Category PSUs with a close link to public welfare 
PSUs with commercial 
characteristics 
PSU Reform 
Orientation 
Remain at the centre of the 
Chinese PSU sector, providing 
services for public welfare 
Pushed into the market by 
transferring towards an enterprise-
based system 
Source of Finance Fully-funded by government budget Self-funded 
Start of the pay 
system reform 
Promoted by policy from central 
government 
Spontaneous pay system reform 
proposed by the organization itself  
Pay system 
reform start date  January 2009 January 2005 
Location One county in southeast China Beijing 
 
 
5.4.4   Data Collection Methods 
A number of different sources of evidence are commonly used in case studies, 
including documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant-observation, and physical artifacts (Yin, 2003: 85). Each has 
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strengths and weaknesses, an overview of which is given in the following Table 
5-6. 
Table 5-6: Six Sources of Evidence: Strengths and Weaknesses  
 
Source of 
Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation 
• Stable – can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
• Unobtrusive – not created as a 
result of the case study 
• Exact – contains exact names, 
references and details of an 
event 
• Broad coverage – long span of 
time, many events and many 
settings 
• Retrievability – can be low 
• Biased selectivity, if collection is 
incomplete 
• Reporting bias – reflects 
(unknown) bias of author 
• Access – may be deliberately 
blocked 
Archival 
Records 
• [As for documentation] 
• Precise and quantitative 
• [As for documentation] 
• Accessibility – can be low for 
reasons of privacy  
Interviews 
• Targeted – focuses directly on 
case study topic 
• Insightful – provides perceived 
causal inferences 
• Bias due to poorly constructed 
questions 
• Response bias 
• Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
• Reflexivity – interviewee says 
what interviewer wants to hear 
Direct 
Observations 
• Reality – covers events in real 
time 
• Contextual – covers context of 
event 
• Time-consuming 
• Selectivity – unless broad 
coverage 
• Reflexivity – event may proceed 
differently because it is being 
observed 
• Cost – hours needed by human 
observers 
Participant 
observation 
• [As for direct observations] 
• Insight into interpersonal 
behaviour and motives 
• [As for direct observations] 
• Bias due to investigator’s 
manipulation of events 
Physical 
Artifacts 
• Insight into cultural features 
• Insight into technical 
operations 
• Selectivity 
• Availability 
 
Source: adapted from Yin (2003: 86) 
 
As one of the main tools used in social science research (Snow and Thomas, 
1994), interviews provide an opportunity for researchers to probe deeply to 
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undercover new clues, open up new dimensions of a problem and secure vivid, 
accurate and inclusive accounts that are based on personal experience (Burgess, 
1984). According to Easter-Smith et al. (2008), the interview method is 
particularly useful when the research topic is highly confidential or 
commercially sensitive, because it allows interviewees to be relatively relaxed 
about sharing confidential information. Given that this research aims to explore 
changes in payment systems, which is one of the most sensitive and confidential 
topics in most organizations in China, the interview approach seems most 
appropriate. Semi-structured interviews were adopted because they allow the 
flexibility to ask questions about issues that emerge during the interview, while 
keeping the researcher focused within the research boundary (Bernard, 1995). 
The research method of back-translation for cross-cultural research by means of 
all interview questions (Brislin, 1970; 1980) was conducted, with the original 
questions in English, first translated into Chinese by the author and given to 
another translator who is also fluent in both Chinese and English to translate 
back into English. This new English version was then compared to the original 
English version and the items retranslated until the new English version, came to 
be grammatically and semantically equivalent to the original Chinese version.  
 
 
Interviews in the state schools 
For the case study involving state schools, before entering the field, a pilot study 
was conducted, by interviewing two teachers separately. Each of the two 
teachers had been teaching at the same school for over ten years, one a primary 
school and the other a junior high school17. Each interview in the pilot study 
lasted around two hours, and mainly used open-ended questions around the 
broad theme of “what do you think of the pay system reform and the 
introduction of performance related pay in your school?” A more structured 
interview format and a list of interview questions were developed after these two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Although excluded from the sample schools used in the case study, both of these schools 
fulfilled all of the sampling criteria. 	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pilot interviews, providing a clear guideline for the semi-structured interviews 
that followed.  
After the pilot research, interviewees were selected from the different sample 
state schools, on the basis of their knowledge and experience of the pay system 
reform. In general, the headteacher or a senior teacher with over ten years of 
teaching experience in the school was chosen. They were believed to have the 
most knowledge regarding the changes to the pay system at their school. All 
interviews were arranged through personal relationships, usually through 
introductions by close friends who had good relationships with the interviewees. 
The nature and purpose of the research was explained to the interviewees by the 
person making the introduction, before an appointment for an interview was 
made. An appointment was always made before each site visit to a school, to 
ensure that the interviewee(s) had enough time to complete the interview. In 
each interview, the interviewee was briefed about the nature and purpose of the 
research, by the researcher, and a confidentiality agreement was made verbally 
at the start of each interview.  
All interview data were recorded by taking notes during the interview. Digital 
recorders were not used because it was decided that some respondents might feel 
less able to talk freely and candidly, especially given that the change of pay 
system has been one of the most sensitive topics for organizations in China. 
Moreover, writing down the interviewees answers gave the researcher time to 
reflect on them and pursue items of interest by formulating tailored questions.  
As well as the key informant(s) in each sample school, government officials in 
the local personnel bureau and education bureau were also interviewed. This 
enabled the researcher to obtain adequate information regarding the 
implementation of the pay system reform in state schools across the local area. A 
similar approach was adopted for these interviews: a pre-interview appointment 
made through an appropriate referee, a confidentiality agreement, and a semi-
structure interview recorded by hand. This helped the researcher to gain access 
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to confidential internal government reports as well as to obtain feedback from 
the government officials who were involved in the policy making behind the pay 
system reforms for schoolteachers in the county.  
Interviews in the publishing organization 
In the case of the publishing organization, thanks to the very good relationship 
between the researcher and the head of the HR department of the organization, 
the researcher was able to visit it four times between 2005 and 2010 (site visits 
were made in 2005, 2006, 2009 and 2010). The researcher interviewed all staff 
within the HR department who had full knowledge of the changes made to the 
organization’s pay system. The researcher also gained access to all confidential 
data regarding the pay system, and individual payment sheets from different 
stages of the pay system reform. A confidentiality agreement was put in place 
before the first visit. The four separate visits enabled the researcher to conduct a 
longitudinal case study and gain a deep insight into the development of the 
organization’s pay system. During each visit, the researcher spent a week within 
the HR department, interviewing staff and reviewing all related internal 
documents, with the full support of the HR team.  
 
Secondary Sources 
A major strength of case study data collection is the opportunity it gives to use 
many different sources of evidence (Yin, 2003: 97). In this research, data were 
collected from multiple sources and using different methods, so as to achieve 
better results from converging lines of inquiry. For example, as well as the semi-
structured interviews mentioned above, secondary sources such as organizational 
internal reports, policies and regulations, and organizational and individual 
payment sheets, were also used. Multiple data collection methods provide a 
stronger substantiation of constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989), and such triangulation 
of data sources is believed to be necessary in order to avoid respondent and 
interview bias, to clarify details, and to cross-check responses.  
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Table 5-7: Data Sources in each case 
Case 
Category Case Interviews  Documentation 
St
at
e 
sc
ho
ol
s i
n 
th
e 
N
at
io
na
l C
om
pu
ls
or
y 
Sy
st
em
 
School A • Head teacher (2.5 hours) N/A 
School B 
• Head teacher (2 hours) 
• Deputy head teacher 
(1.5 hours) 
• 2 senior teachers (1.5 
hours each) 
N/A 
School C 
• Head teacher (2 hours) 
• 1 senior teacher (2 
hours)  
• Details of school PRP 
regulation (see Appendix 5 
Sample A) 
School D 
• Head teacher (1.5 
hours) 
• 2 Senior teachers (1.5 
hours each) 
• Details of school PRP 
regulations (see Appendix 5 
Sample B) 
School E • Head teacher (3 hours) 
• Details of school PRP 
regulations  
• Pay sheets for all 
schoolteachers (before vs. 
after) 
School F • Head teacher (3 hours) 
• Details of school PRP 
regulations 
• Individual pay sheets of the 
head teacher 
Local 
Government 
• Head of personnel 
bureau (2.5 hours) 
• Head of education 
bureau (3 hours) 
• Official of education 
bureau (2 hours) 
• Government policy 
regarding the 
schoolteachers’ PRP reform 
(national, provincial, and 
local government 
policies/guidelines) 
• Government annual report 
(from city education 
bureau) 
National 
Government 
• Department head, 
Employment and Wage 
Research Centre, 
Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social 
Security of the PRC 
N/A 
PSU of a 
commercial 
nature 
Publishing 
organization 
• Vice director, HR 
director and 3 staff of 
the HR department 
(four site visits in 2005, 
2006, 2009 and 201; 
each visit lasted for a 
whole week) 
• Internal pay system 
regulations (2005-2010) 
• Pay sheets for all employees 
(before vs. after) 
• Performance records of 
editors (2005-2010) 
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5.5   Data Analysis 
This research uses both within-case analysis and cross-case analysis to provide a 
detailed investigation; a combination of the two approaches can help to 
counteract information-processing biases and keep research away from 
“premature and even false conclusions” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 540).  
Within-case analysis 
Within-case analysis usually involves detailed case study write-ups for each site 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). For each case in this research, all semi-structured interviews 
were recorded by the researcher, who took detailed notes during the interviews. 
The transcripts along with secondary data were the main sources used to obtain 
the case study findings. The data collected from the interviews were analyzed 
through a coding process with different levels. First, the individual interview text 
was read to gain a sense of the entire system of meaning constructed in the 
conversation. Second, each interview text was divided into broad categories 
(e.g., the decision making during the pay system reform, the implementation of 
the pay system reform, the influence of the new pay system etc.), and these 
categories were analysed in accordance to their relationships to each other, so as 
to clarify the pay system reform process as well as the impacts of PRP in each 
organization. Then, these broad categories were subdivided into finer categories, 
following the research objectives proposed in the research framework (findings 
identified, that went beyond the original research objectives, were also 
categorized). This process clarified the specific research questions to be explored 
in each sample organization. As there were several interviewees from each 
organization, a comparison across different respondents from the same 
organization was conducted, which helped the researcher to better understand 
the implementation and influence of the pay system reforms in each organization 
investigated. Thus, targeting the central research question and the research 
objectives (Section 4.1.2), the within-case analysis focused on how the sample 
PSUs had implemented the pay system reform, and how the new PRP system 
had affected the employees, in terms of motivation and performance. This not 
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only reflected the focus of this research, but also provided a foundation for the 
cross-case analysis that followed. 
Cross-case analysis 
According to Eisenhardt (1989: 540), one tactic in cross-case analysis is to 
“select pairs of cases and then to list the similarities and differences between 
each pair”. Therefore, after reviewing each case individually, a second phase of 
data analysis was carried out, allocating cases into groups and then comparing 
the findings for the different groups. Such a juxtaposition of seemingly similar 
cases by a researcher looking for differences can break simplistic frames, while 
the search for similarity in a seemingly different pair of cases may also lead to a 
more sophisticated understanding of the research question (Eisenhardt, 1989: 
541). The grouping of the presented cases is indicated in Figure 5-1.  
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Case Analysis Frameworks 
 
PSU Category A 
(Public welfare) 
PSU Category B 
(Commercial Nature) 
Urban 
(School A & B) 
Rural 
(School C) 
Primary Schools 
State schools in Compulsory 
Education System 
Urban 
(School D) 
Rural 
(School E & F) 
Junior High Schools 
Publishing Organization 
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5.6   Research Quality 
When evaluating the quality of any empirical social research, including case 
studies, four aspects need to be maximized: construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity, and reliability (Yin, 2003). Since this research leans toward 
exploratory and descriptive enquiry, and does not intend to investigate casual 
relationships, internal validity referring to the “causal relationships between 
variables and results” (Gibbert et al., 2008: 1466) will not be discussed in this 
section. The other three criteria, and how this research fulfilled them, are 
described below.  
Construct validity regards the establishment of “correct operational measures for 
the concepts being studied” (Yin, 2003: 34). According to Gibbert et al. (2008: 
1466), construct validity “refers to the extent to which a study investigates what 
it clams to investigate, that is, to the extent to which a procedure leads to an 
accurate observation of reality”. Therefore, when conducting case studies, 
construct validity needs to be considered during the data collection and 
composition phases (Yin, 2003). In order to establish construct validity, two 
tactics were applied to the process of data collection. First, multiple sources of 
evidence were used. Besides interviews with key informants, confidential 
document, such as the internal payment regulations and employees’ payment 
sheets, were also collected from the sample PSUs, under a confidentiality 
agreement. Second, after obtaining data from the individual PSUs, government 
officials from different departments who were involved in the PSU PRP reform 
were also interviewed. Some more obscure issues were confirmed through these 
discussions.  
External validity, also called ‘generalizability’, requires that a study’s findings 
should be generalizable beyond the immediate case study (Yin, 2003: 37). 
According to Gibber et al. (2008: 1468), neither single nor multiple-case studies 
allow for statistical generalization, but this does not mean that case studies are 
devoid of generalizability. It is usually understood that a cross-case analysis 
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involving four to ten case studies can provide a good basis for analytical 
generalizations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gibbert et al., 2008), and thus a multiple-case 
study method was adopted in this research to strength external validity. Seven 
sample PSUs were selected, based on clear rationales (see Section 4.4.3).  
Finally, the goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and bias in a study (Yin, 
2003); the establishment of the reliability of a piece of research depends upon its 
transparency and replication (Gibbert et al., 2008). In order to accomplish 
reliability, transparency should be assured “through measures such as careful 
documentation and clarification of the research procedures” (Gibbert et al., 
2008: 1468). In this research, each case study was carefully recorded and 
presented. Although the names of the case organizations cannot be revealed 
because of the confidentiality agreements, organization names have been shared 
with the academic supervisor and will be available in confidence to the 
examiners. Also, it is suggested that replication can be achieved by putting 
together a case study database, which is established in this research through 
triangulation of the data collected, including case study notes, case study 
documents, and the narratives collected during the study (Gibbert et al., 2008: 
1468).  
Table 5-8: Case Study Tactics for Research Design Tests  
 
Tests Case Study Tactic 
Phase of 
research in 
which tactic 
occurs 
How these criteria were followed 
in the study 
Construct 
Validity 
• Use multiple 
sources of 
evidence 
• Establish chain of 
evidence 
• Have key 
informants review 
draft case study 
report 
• Data 
collection 
 
• Data 
collection 
 
• Composition 
• Multiple sources of evidence:  
interviews; organizational 
internal documents (e.g., 
internal payment regulations, 
employees’ payment sheets etc.)  
• Interviews with government 
officials (supplemented with 
government policies and 
reports) 
External 
Validity 
• Use replication 
logic in multiple-
case studies 
• Research 
Design 
 
• Research 
Design 
• Multiple-case study method 
adopted, with seven cases 
selected according to a clear 
rationale of case sampling 
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Reliability 
• Use case study 
protocol 
 
• Develop case 
study database 
• Data 
collection 
 
• Data 
collection 
• Careful documentation and 
clarification of the research 
procedures, following the case 
study protocol established 
• Case study database, including 
case study notes, interview 
transcripts, case study 
documents (government policy, 
organizations’ internal 
regulations, payment sheets etc.)  
 
Source: adapted from Yin (2003: 34) 
 
5.7   Challenges when conducting the case studies, and how they were 
overcome 
As this is a pioneer study about the pay system reform and its impacts on the 
PSU sector in China, the difficulty of obtaining key informants’ trust was a 
serious challenge. According to Cooke (2009: 17), one of the most important 
reasons for the lack of studies on public sector and government organizations in 
China is the difficulty of gaining access, and many of those conducting research 
in China have noted that access to research informants and organizations is often 
the biggest hurdle. Most companies in China are unwilling to cooperate with 
academic research, and those from the public sector and government 
organizations are even more sensitive to external investigation (Cooke, 2009). 
Due to this research barrier, when conducting research on HRM issues, 
especially exploring pay systems, which is the most sensitive and confidential 
topic for most organizations in China, a researcher must employ “good personal 
networks, additional resources and skills, and the adoption of an informal 
approach including interviews and observations instead of large scale survey”, 
and whether they can urge the “gatekeepers to these organizations to adopt a 
more open-minded approach to their people management and invite external 
scrutiny” also plays a critical role in whether or not they can obtain research data 
(Cooke, 2009: 17). In this research, all sample organizations were accessed 
through personal networking, and the researcher always put in place 
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confidentiality agreements at the very beginning of each piece of field research. 
Given the sensitivity and confidentiality of pay system issues, all of the key 
informants interviewed in each organization were senior employees with no 
threat to their jobs or other risks. This meant there were likely to be the most 
willing to participate and to express their true opinions. Usually, a request for 
supporting documentation was proposed after finishing a successful interview, 
but in two cases (school A and school B, shown in Table 4-7), the head teachers 
refused to provide any detailed documents.  
Compared to the individual PSUs, carrying out research within the government 
was even more difficult, especially given that the local government officials 
were very cautious about releasing any detailed documents regarding the 
schoolteachers’ PRP reform in their local area. For example, after a very 
successful three-hour interview with the head of the Education Bureau, the 
researcher was told to come back the next day to pick up a relevant document, 
because the official in charge of documentation was out of the office that day. 
When the researcher returned the next day and went to see the official in charge 
of documentation, he initially refused to release any information to the 
researcher. Not only did he call the head of the bureau to verify the researcher’s 
identity, he also asked the head whether he (the head) would bear the risk of 
releasing the document. It was only after he had confirmed everything in detail 
with his supervisor that he released part of the document the researcher had 
requested.  
Another similar experience involved the failed proposed research with the local 
financial bureau. Since that bureau was also partially involved in the budget 
allocation, the researcher had intended to interview officials their, in order to 
explore the influence the PRP reform had had on the local budget. However, 
since the research topic was related to local financial issues, which are treated as 
highly confidential, the research request was turned down firmly, despite 
introductions from several senior government officials who had very close 
relationships with both the targeted interviewee and the researcher.  
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In sum, when conducting research into a pay system which has been a most 
sensitive and confidential topic in PSUs in China and involved a great deal of 
government intervention, it was extremely challenging to gain access to 
individual organizations and an insight into their internal pay systems. The 
researcher has tried her best to broaden the research scope, including the views 
of a wide range of stakeholders, such as decision-makers, employees, and 
government officials involved in the PSU pay reform. Although some data were 
not available in certain cases, it is believed that the two case studies, involving 
six state schools and one publishing organization, presented in the following two 
chapters, provide a thorough insight into the topic under study.  
 
5.8   Chapter Summary  
This chapter defines the framework and methodology of the research. Given the 
research question and objectives identified from the literature and theory review, 
this research leans towards the philosophical position of social constructionism, 
and thus a two-case study approach was adopted, including a sample of seven 
PSUs, aiming to explore the pay system reforms undergone by different Chinese 
PSUs. A detailed exposition of the entire research design, its case study 
methodology, the rationale behind the case selection, and the challenges 
involved, are also presented. To sum up, this chapter has established the 
complete research framework and methodology appropriate for this research, 
and it is expected that they will provide results that are valid and reliable. The 
case description, the findings from each case, and the cross-case analysis will be 
presented in the following chapters.  
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Chapter 6   Case Study A:  
Pay reform in state schools in the compulsory education 
system in County H  
 
 
In December 2008, the General Office of the State Council of the PRC 
announced a three-step project to implement a new PRP scheme in the PSU 
sector in China. According to this national PSU pay system reform project, from 
January 1st 2009, all employees of state schools in the Chinese compulsory 
education system would be paid according to a new PRP system, which would 
be made up of two parts: fixed pay (termed “basic performance related pay 
under the national project), accounting for 70 per cent of the individual’s pay, 
and flexible pay (termed “encouraging performance related pay”), which would 
be linked to the individual’s performance and would account for 30 per cent of 
their pay. Following the first step of pay system reform in state schools, the 
scheme would also be introduced to all public hospitals and other PSUs within 
the national medical service (the second step of the reform). According to the 
central government, the ultimate goal of the reform was to implement a PRP 
system in all PSUs across China, with the focus on those providing public 
welfare. In this chapter, a case study of how the pay system reform was carried 
out in six state schools within the Chinese compulsory education system in 
County H will be presented, providing an insight into the implementation of PRP 
and the impact the reform has had on the schoolteachers in the schools 
investigated.  
 
6.1   A review of the national policy  
The first step in the national PSU pay reform involved the release, on December 
23rd 2008 of “The guide for the implementation of performance related pay in all 
schools in compulsory education” (hereafter “the guide”) in a State Council 
executive meeting, which officially announced the launch of the pay system 
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reform for all state schools within the compulsory education system in China. 
According to the guide, the reason for introducing PRP in state schools was to 
address the need to better reward teachers for excellence, especially those 
working in remote rural areas who had previously been paid much less than 
those in urban areas. Since the reform would cover all PSU employees within 
the Chinese compulsory education sector, the guide specified key principles that 
all local governments and individual schools should follow when implementing 
the new PRP system. A brief summary of these principles is given below.   
First, all public primary and junior high schools belonging to the national PSU 
system were required to adopt a performance pay system from January 1st 2009, 
making the average wage of schoolteachers in the local county/city equivalent to 
the average wage across all levels of civil servants in the local area. 
Second, a schoolteacher’s pay would be divided into two parts, “basic 
performance pay” (jichuxing jixiao gongzi) and “encouraging performance pay” 
(jianglixing jixiao gongzi), as described above. “Basic performance pay” would 
be fixed, allocated by local government, and linked to the individual’s job level 
and responsibility, and the local price index which reflects the state of the local 
economy. This would account for 70 per cent of the employees’ total pay, and 
would be paid monthly. Although the whole pay system was referred to as PRP, 
it would be the remaining 30 per cent, “encouraging performance pay” that 
would be linked to employees’ actual performance. Unlike “basic performance 
pay” which would be allocated by the government, it would be mainly the 
responsibility of the individual school to decide how to allocate “encouraging 
performance pay” within the school. Furthermore, it was stated that it should be 
flexible and allocated according to the individual’s performance. However, even 
though the individual schools were supposed to make the final decision 
regarding the allocation, the guide also specified some allowances that should be 
included in this part of the pay. For example, there was an allowance for class 
teachers (“ban zhuren”) an allowance for teachers in rural areas, and an 
allowance for overtime teaching, which both the local government and the 
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schools were supposed to take into consideration. The main components of an 
individual employee’s pay, according to the new system described in the guide, 
is shown below: 
An individual’s pay = “basic performance pay” + “encouraging performance pay” 
(100 per cent) (70 per cent, fixed, allocated 
according to the criteria set by local 
government) 
(30 per cent, flexible, decided by 
individual school with partial 
allowances required by 
government) 
Third, the implementation of proper performance appraisals was also 
emphasized in the guide. For instance, it was recommended that schools should 
categorize different positions and responsibilities internally, such as teaching 
positions, management positions and back office positions. Then, individual 
employees should be evaluated according to their position and responsibility, 
and the results of the evaluation should be linked to their “encouraging 
performance pay”. The purpose of this was to make sure those with higher 
performance get better pay. Although it would be the responsibility of the school 
to conduct internal performance appraisals, according to the guide, the local 
bureau of education was also required to review the appraisals and the setting of 
pay in each school. 
Fourth, employee participation was also emphasized in the guide, especially 
regarding the decision-making process for the “encouraging performance pay”. 
For example, it was stated that, after the PRP system had been proposed by the 
school reform committee―which should include representatives of different 
groups of employees―details of the new pay system should be published, and 
passed by a staff meeting vote. In order to ensure a fair reform, the “encouraging 
performance pay” of the head teachers, who would be in charge of the pay 
reform within the school, would be separate from that of the other employees. In 
other words, the whole package of pay for the head teacher would be decided by 
local government, with performance evaluated directly by the local bureau of 
education and “encouraging performance pay” allocated accordingly.  
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Last but not least, the guide addressed the issue of the allocation of extra 
bonuses that had previously occurred in some schools. According to the guide, 
once the new PRP system was launched, no extra allowances or bonus would be 
allowed, other than the subsidies included in the official PRP system approved 
by the local government. This was one of the most substantial changes the 
reform brought about in state schools, especially affecting those schools in 
leading positions in their local areas. Due to the large student population and the 
fierce competition of the college entry examination system in China, although 
students were supposed to attend school in their local district, every year some 
schools with better facilities and teaching quality would have many more 
applications than they could accept. Popular schools with a good reputation for 
teaching would often charge students from other school districts a “sponsor fee”. 
This would vary, depending on the local economy, the competition for places, 
and sometimes even the social status of the student’s referee. Generally 
speaking, the more popular the school, the higher the “sponsor fee” would be. 
Traditionally, part of the fee would be handed to the local government 
responsible for education, but usually the majority would be kept by the school, 
and used as a construction fund and to provide extra bonuses for employees. 
This system widened the pay gaps between teachers from different schools, and 
also drove good teachers to teach in schools with higher reputations and thus 
higher pay. The ban on all extra subsidies in state schools, specified in the guide, 
thus sought to balance the teaching quality among schools, by reducing turnover 
rates for teachers, especially in poorer areas where teachers’ pay was usually 
lower. In other words, once the new PRP system was introduced, schools may 
still have been able to charge a “sponsor fee” for students from other school 
districts, but this could no longer be allocated to employees in the form of pay or 
allowances, as all employees in state schools would receive their pay from 
government funding only. Hence, there would be only very minor pay 
differences between teachers from different schools within an area, as no extra 
bonuses would be permitted, even for those teaching in top schools.  
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In sum, according to the guide, a national PRP system would be launched in all 
schools in the compulsory education system in China at the beginning of 2009. 
In the next section, the effect of the reform on six state schools belonging to the 
compulsory education system in one county in southeast China (“County H” 
hereafter) will be discussed, providing an insight into the changes made to the 
pay system at the school level, as well as the impacts on different groups of 
employees.  
 
6.2   The PRP reform for schoolteachers in County H 
After the release of the guide, the new pay system began to be implemented for 
all employees within the compulsory education system, from January 1st 2009. 
However, the guide was released only one week before the actual starting date of 
the new system, which gave very short notice to the parties involved. The 
question of how to implement the reform was a very challenging task for local 
government, which was required to act as supervisor for the local area. 
According to the guide, the average pay level of all schoolteachers should be 
equivalent to that of all civil servants in the local county, and should be fully 
funded by the local government (county level or above). It was the local 
government that had to determine the “basic performance related pay”, 
accounting for 70 per cent of the total wage. Also, although the schools would 
decide on the distribution of the “encouraging performance pay” internally, the 
local government would also be involved as a supervisor (i.e., the final pay 
system in each school would need to be approved by the local bureau of 
education). Therefore, the regulations or instructions produced by local 
government played a critical role, acting as a more specific guide for all schools 
within the area.  
In order to get an insight into how the pay reform was implemented, and explore 
its impact on different schools, an in-depth case study was conducted. It 
included six state schools within the compulsory education system, from County 
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H, a medium-sized county located in Southeast China, whose economy is one of 
the best in the country. When the reform started, the government of County H 
was in charge of its implementation in all of the schools involved―25 primary 
schools and 15 junior high schools. According to data from the Education 
Bureau of County H (2010), a total of 3,182 employees were affected, including 
41 head teachers, 369 employees in management positions, and 2,772 
schoolteachers. When the system was introduced in January 2009, the average 
pay across all employees of public primary and junior high schools was adjusted 
to the average pay for civil servants in County H, bringing about a significant 
increase in the average wage in the county’s compulsory education system 
(Table 6-1).  
Table 6-1: Average pay for PSU employees in the compulsory education system in 
County H18 (unit: yuan/year) 
 Before the PRP reform 
After the PRP 
reform Change 
Percentage 
Change ( per 
cent) 
Average wage of all 
employees 44,712 61,095 16,383 36.6 
Average wage of head 
teachers 48,716 69,301 20,585 42.2 
Average wage of 
employees in 
management positions 
46,793 62,078 15,285 32.7 
Average wage of 
schoolteachers 44,336 60,806 16,470 37.1 
Allowance for 
schoolteachers in rural 
areas 
2,550 2,550 0 0 
Allowance for class 
teachers 1,440 3,600 2,160 150 
Source: Internal report from Education Bureau of County H, 2010 
Besides the adjustment of the level of pay, there were also notable amendments 
in the components of pay that the teachers received. Before the PRP reform, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Based on the official statistical report from the local Education Bureau of County H. 
However, employees in popular schools may have received extra bonuses outside of 
government funding before the pay system reform. This tended to be a grey area and would 
never have been calculated in government statistical reports.  
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various allowances were included in teachers’ pay, which usually differed across 
schools. Since a standardization of allowances was required by the national 
guide, when the new PRP system was introduced some of the previous 
allowances were removed; only five remained and were included in the “basic 
performance related pay” allocated by the local government (see Tables 6-2 and 
Table 6-3).   
Table 6-2: Components of individuals’ fixed pay in the compulsory education 
system before and after the PRP reform in County H. 
Components of 
individuals’ fixed pay Before PRP reform After PRP reform  
Basic pay 
• Position pay 
• Benchmark pay 
• 10 per cent of basic pay 
• Position pay 
• Benchmark pay 
• 10 per cent of basic pay 
• Adjustment for teachers 
in rural areas 
Seniority pay for 
teachers 
• Allowance based on 
teaching experience and 
ranking of teaching 
certificate 
• Allowance based on 
teaching experience and 
ranking of teaching 
certificate  
Allowances  
• Province-standard 
allowance 
• Welfare allowance 
• Price-index allowance 
• Meal-delay allowance 
• Cost of living allowance 
• Head teacher allowance 
• Rural teacher allowance 
• Position allowance 
• Appraisal allowance 
• Attendance allowance 
 
• Position allowance  
• Cost of living allowance 
• Seniority allowance 
• Class teacher allowance 
• Rural teacher allowance 
Source: Internal report from Education Bureau of County H, 2010 
Table 6-3: Sample pay slip showing the monthly fixed pay after the reform for a 
head teacher in a junior high school in County H (unit: yuan)  
Name *** 
Position pay 930 
Benchmark pay 555 
10 per cent of basic pay 148.5 
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Seniority pay for teachers 10 
Position allowance 1,854 
Cost of living allowance 1,750 
Seniority allowance 300 
Class teacher allowance 0 
Rural teacher allowance 340 
Total pay 5,887.5 
Deduction of 
pay 
Housing fund 557 
Unemployment insurance 12.96 
Medical insurance 48.2 
Individual income tax 365.4 
Actual pay 4,903.94 
Signature (Bank transfer) 
Source: Confidential pay slip of head teacher of School F in County H, 2010 
Compared to the standardization of “basic performance pay” in the new system, 
the distribution of “encouraging performance pay” was much more complicated, 
as it was supposed to be flexible and linked to the actual performance of the 
individual. According to the national guide, the “encouraging performance pay” 
of all employees within the compulsory education system would be decided by 
the individual schools themselves, except for the “encouraging performance 
pay” of head teachers, whose pay would be allocated by the local education 
bureau. In County H, the total amount of “encouraging performance pay” 
allocated to each school was decided by the education bureau, mainly based on 
the number of full-time employees within the school. According to “The guide 
for the allocation of encouraging performance related pay in compulsory 
education schools in County H” (2009), the amount allocated to each school was 
to be calculated as follows: 
Σ  (Encouraging performance related pay of each school) =  
[ Σ  (All teachers’ pay in the county) ×30 per cent  
– Σ  (Encouraging performance related pay of all head teachers in the county)  
– Σ  (Bonus for all award-winning schoolteachers in the county)   
– Σ  (Bonus for schools that fulfill the annual appraisal target) ]  
÷ [ Total number of employees involved in the PRP reform in the county 
        – Total number of head teachers in the county] 
× [Total number of employees involved in the PRP reform in the school – 1]  
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According to County H’s policy, the sum of head teachers’ “encouraging 
performance pay”, bonuses for award-winning teachers (teachers who achieved 
outstanding performance in various competitions at either the county level or 
above), and bonuses for schools that fulfilled the annual appraisal target (these 
included, for example, health and safety standards, the tidiness of the campus 
and others) should count for 5 per cent of the total “encouraging performance 
pay” allocated by the county (with head teachers’ pay accounting for 0.75per 
cent). Although it was up to the school to decide how to allocate the 
“encouraging performance pay” internally, four categories were recommended 
by the county government: “bonus for performance appraisal”, “bonus for 
attendance”, “bonus for overtime working” and “bonus for teaching 
achievement”. According to the County H guide (see Table 6.4), the “bonus for 
performance appraisal” should account for 40per cent of the school’s total 
allocation of “encouraging performance pay”, and the “bonus for attendance” 
should account for 10per cent. The amounts allocated to the remaining two 
categories could be decided by the schools themselves. Besides the four 
categories specified by the county government, schools were able to add up to 
three further categories. 
Table 6-4: Components of the “encouraging performance pay” of individual 
employees, as indicated in the government policy of County H 
Category  Appraisal frequency Percentage of school’s 
total “encouraging” PRP  
Bonus for individual 
performance appraisal 
Once per academic year 40 per cent 
Bonus for attendance Once per academic term 10 per cent 
Bonus for overtime working19 Once per academic term Specified by school 
Bonus for teaching 
achievement  
Once per academic term Specified by school  
Other school-specific 
categories (no more than three) 
Once per academic term Specified by school 
Source: The guide for the allocation of encouraging performance related pay in schools 
in compulsory education in County H, 2009 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  The working hours of staff in management positions would be transferred into teaching 
hours based on an index set by the school (for further details, see the sample pay systems in 
Appendix 5).	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For the allocation of the bonus for individual performance, four evaluation 
benchmarks were indicated in the county guide: “excellence”, “eligibility”, “just 
qualified”, and “fail”. There was no quota for the employees’ evaluation results, 
except for the number of employees awarded the level of “excellence”, which 
could be no more than 15 per cent of the school’s employees. Bonuses for 
individual performance would be allocated according to these four levels and a 
benchmark bonus. Employees belonging to the management team would receive 
150 per cent of the benchmark bonus if they were awarded the level 
“excellence”, while those awarded “eligibility” would receive 130 per cent of the 
benchmark bonus. Employees outside of the management team who were 
awarded “excellence” would receive 120 per cent of the benchmark bonus, and 
those who were awarded “eligibility” would receive 100 per cent of the 
benchmark bonus. Employees evaluated as “just qualified” would receive no 
bonus, while those who failed the evaluation, would have their whole package of 
“encouraging performance” pay canceled. To sum up, the part of the pay linked 
to the result of the individual performance evaluation would be calculated as 
follows (according to “The guide for the allocation of encouraging performance 
related pay in compulsory education schools in County H”, 2009):  
Actual bonus for individual performance appraisal  
      = A (benchmark bonus for individual performance)  
      × B (index benchmark of the school)  
      × C (individual index according to his/her performance evaluation result) 
      – D (deduction of bonus due to sick/personal leave)  
where A = (total encouraging PRP allocated to the school) × 40 per cent  
       ÷ (total number of employees involved in the PRP reform in the school) 
and B = (total number of employees involved in the PRP reform in the school)  
       ÷ [(number of employees in management position ranked “excellence”)× 150 
per cent  
       + (number of employees in management position ranked “eligibility”) × 130 per 
cent 
       + (number of other employees ranked “excellence”) × 120 per cent  
       + (number of other employees ranked “eligibility”) × 100 per cent] 
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Since “encouraging performance pay” was to be flexible and linked to the 
individual’s performance, pay differences would occur among employees in 
different positions or those achieving different performance levels. An overview 
of the distribution of “encouraging performance pay” across employees within 
the compulsory education system in County H is shown in Table 6-5.  
Table 6-5: “Encouraging performance related pay” in schools within the 
compulsory education system in County H in 2009 (unit: yuan/year) 
 Highest Lowest  Average  
Head teachers 30,395 24,025 25,667 
Vice head teachers  26,001 20,731 21,979 
Employees (including teachers) in 
management positions  
25,179 18,423 19,381 
Schoolteachers  29,608 17,321 18,181 
Source: Internal report from Education Bureau of County H, 2010 
 
6.3   The pay system reform in six sample schools in County H    
This section will discuss the pay system reform as it was applied in six state 
schools belonging to the compulsory education system in County H. This 
includes three primary schools (two in urban areas and one in a rural area) and 
three junior high schools (one in an urban area and two in rural areas). 
According to the policy of County H, the head teacher of each school would be 
in charge of implementing the system, while their own pay would be decided by 
the local education bureau in order to separate it from the distribution of 
“encouraging PRP” among the other employees of their school. Therefore, it was 
decided that head teachers would provide the best feedback, and allow the most 
effective investigation of how the pay system reform was implemented in 
different schools. Firstly, they were in charge of the reform in the school. 
Secondly, since their pay was separate from the internal distribution within the 
school, they could provide a more objective opinion. A semi-structured 
interview was conducted with each interviewee, based on a series of questions 
that the researcher prepared in advance (see Appendix 1). At the same time, a 
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small number of teachers were also interviewed, with similar semi-structured 
interviews conducted in the sample schools investigated.  
 
6.3.1   The case of School A  
School A is a primary school with 186 employees and 2,632 students divided 
into 46 classes, located in the “downtown” area of County H. As the school with 
the longest history in the county, School A is the most popular primary school in 
the local area because of its good reputation for teaching quality. Every year, 
many students from other school districts apply to the school. They would be 
charged varying amounts of “sponsor fee”, used to provide extra bonuses to 
employees of the school. 
According to the national guide, all school-specific bonuses would have to be 
discontinued once the new pay system was launched in January 2009. Although 
the average pay for schoolteachers across the whole county increased 
significantly, for employees of School A who had previously received much 
higher bonuses than those given by other state schools, the average pay did not 
change very much. There was even a slight decrease in pay for employees in 
management positions and senior teachers who had received the highest 
bonuses.  
According to the policies of both the national government and the county 
government, 70 per cent of each individual’s pay, the “basic performance pay”, 
was allocated monthly by the county government. A lump sum for the 
remainder, “encouraging performance pay”, was allocated to the school, based 
on its total number of full-time employees. In County H, this amount was 
calculated at the start of the reform (according to the formula presented in 
Section 5.1.3), and each school was told how much “encouraging performance 
pay” they would have available. However, this was kept by the local 
government, and only allocated to individual employees once the school’s new 
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PRP system had been officially confirmed by both the employees and the local 
education bureau.  
As required by the education bureau in the county, a “PRP reform committee”, 
which included the head teacher, the deputy head teacher, and representatives of  
teachers, middle managers, and employees from the back office, was in charge 
of designing the new pay system used to distribute the “encouraging 
performance pay” among the school’s employees. Once the school’s new pay 
system had been proposed, it had to be discussed at a staff meeting of all 
employees, and agreed by over two-thirds of them. The main responsibility of 
the reform committee was to draft a pay system, linking pay to performance 
appropriately, which would satisfy the majority of employees within the school. 
Therefore, in the case of School A, although the initial intention of the pay 
reform was to motivate employees to perform better, due to the fixed amount the 
school received from the government, an egalitarian distribution system was 
chosen as the final solution, in order to gain the approval of the majority of 
employees in the school.  
Moreover, due to the requirement of compulsory education in China from 
central government, the schools were discouraged from using students’ exam 
results as evaluation criteria for schoolteachers. Therefore, mainly teaching 
hours and other objective criteria (e.g., attendance and absenteeism, publishing 
of papers, achievements in competitions, etc.) were adopted. In the case of 
School A, there had previously been a large extra budget that the school could 
use to provide bonuses for teachers who performed better (e.g, publishing papers 
in journals or achieving awards in external teaching competitions) or who made 
specific contributions to the school (eg., working over-time, or supervising 
students who won public awards, etc.). However, once the total pay to be 
allocated within the school was fixed, although it was generally agreed that those 
who worked harder should receive higher pay, when it came to the distribution 
of a fixed pool, most of the teachers in School A preferred an equal distribution 
rather than a differential pay system. According to the head teacher of School A, 
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smaller pay differences among employees tended to minimize conflicts among 
different groups of employees, who objected to the idea that higher performing 
employees should receive bonuses, paid for by cutting the pay of other teachers.  
It took three months for School A’s reform committee to determine an 
appropriate system for the distribution of “encouraging performance pay”; the 
proposed system was modified three times before being officially announced 
and voted upon in the staff meeting. According to the head teacher, the internal 
pay gaps were narrowed after each modification of the proposed pay system, and 
the final version confirmed at the staff meeting was a more egalitarian system 
compared to the pay system adopted in the school before the reform, with a 
much smaller bonus for high performers and prize-winners (e.g., the bonus for 
teachers of  students who win province-level awards was cut from 1,000 to 100 
yuan in the new system). In November 2009, the final version of the new PRP 
system in School A was passed at the first staff meeting with the agreement of 
90 per cent of the employees. “Encouraging performance pay” was allocated to 
individual employees in December 2009, after the pay system had been 
validated by the local education bureau. A brief summary of the pay reform and 
new PRP system introduced in School A is presented in Table 6-6, based on the 
information collected during a three-hour interview with the head teacher of the 
school.  
 
Table 6-6: Summary of interview feedback in School A (interviewee: the head 
teacher) 
 
Research 
objective 
Summary of interview 
question 
Summary of feedback 
Change of pay  Q1: What changes were made 
to the pay system in your 
school, compared to the 
system before the PRP 
reform?   
Slight decrease in average pay, with 
a greater decrease in the pay of 
middle management and senior 
teachers. New system more 
egalitarian, with smaller pay 
differences between employees.  
Questions 
regarding 
expectancy 
theory 
Q2: Do you think employees 
in your school could improve 
their performance by working 
harder? 
Yes 
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Q3: If an employee works 
harder, will (s)he receive 
higher pay under the new PRP 
system? 
There were higher bonuses for 
better performing employees in the 
previous pay system; very small 
bonuses are available in the new 
PRP system.  
Q4: How large is the pay 
difference between high-
performing employees and 
others? 
Very little difference between 
employees in the new PRP system. 
Questions 
regarding goal-
setting theory 
Q5: How were the criteria for 
PRP chosen in your school? 
Proposed by the PRP reform 
committee, which involved different 
groups of employees; most criteria 
were adapted from the previous pay 
system, but with cut-down bonuses; 
mainly objective criteria for 
evaluation; egalitarian orientation.  
Q6: Do the criteria included in 
the performance evaluation 
help to clarify the goals of the 
school? 
Not much. 
Q7: Do the criteria included in 
the performance evaluation 
help to clarify the goals for 
individual teachers? 
Not much.  
Questions 
regarding 
agency theory 
Q8: Has the implementation of 
the new PRP system reduced 
unwanted actions in the 
school? 
No.  
Questions 
regarding 
cognitive 
evaluation 
theory 
Q9: What impact has the new 
PRP system had on 
employees’ intrinsic 
motivation?  
Negative impact with reduced 
motivation observed for most 
employees. 
Questions 
regarding 
equity theory 
Q10: What do you think of the 
idea of linking pay to 
performance in schools? 
Agree with it. 
Q11: Do you think the current 
distribution of pay in your 
school is fair?  
Hard to say. More equality than 
equity. 
Q12: Has the new PRP system 
caused any jealousy among 
the teachers? 
Yes. Has had a negative impact on 
cooperation among teachers.  
Q13: Equity or equality, 
which do you think is more 
important in your school?  
Equality. Only an equalitarian 
distribution system could be passed, 
due to the voting system required by 
the government.  
Further 
comments 
Q14: What do you think of the 
PRP reform for 
schoolteachers? 
Good intentions by the national 
government, but the result has 
turned out to be more equalitarian 
with less pay linked to actual 
performance.  
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The new pay system does help to 
keep good teachers in rural areas, 
but at the same time discourages 
good teachers in urban areas.  
Q15: How do you think the 
current PRP system in your 
school could be improved? 
 
Certain differences in the average 
pay among teachers in different 
schools should be allowed, which 
could give the head teacher a bit 
more flexibility in motivating 
teachers to perform well.  
However, this idea will also be in 
conflict with the aims of the reform, 
which are to balance the teaching 
among different schools.  
The guide from the government 
could be more specific, which 
would reduce the conflict within the 
school when attempting to 
implement the reform.  
 
 
6.3.2   The case of School B  
School B is a primary school with 64 employees and 1,430 students divided into 
24 classes. As a modern primary school, located in an urban area of County H, 
School B is also popular among students and parents in the local area. Again, 
every year many students from other school districts apply to School B, and a 
similar “sponsor fee” charging system to that adopted by School A was used 
before the reform, which again gave the school extra income.  
Like in School A, a “PRP reform committee”, made up of the head teacher and 
representatives from different groups of employees, was in charge of allocating 
the “encouraging performance pay” in School B. According to the head teacher 
of School B, the biggest problem with the government-led pay reform for 
schoolteachers was that the 70:30 split between fixed and flexible pay was 
announced too early, leaving very little flexibility over the distribution of 
“encouraging performance pay” by the school. At the beginning of the reform, 
each employee received their fixed pay and was told that this would account for 
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70 per cent of total pay under the new system. Therefore, when individual 
schools came to discuss the distribution of the flexible part of the pay, the 
employees expected to receive the remaining 30 per cent, and were disappointed 
if they received less than this. Since the total amount of “encouraging 
performance related pay” allocated to each school was fixed, an egalitarian 
distribution was the most effective way to obtain a majority vote.  
Compared to the pay level in School B before the reform, there was a small 
increase in the teachers’ average pay after the reform, while middle management 
average pay decreased slightly under the new system. According to the head 
teacher, one important conflict that occurred during the pay system reform in 
School B was a debate over pay differences between teachers and management. 
In the case of School B, due to the extra financial resources and flexibility in the 
pre-reform pay system, employees in management positions had received extra 
bonuses such as for working over-time in the holidays. However, since the total 
“encouraging performance pay” allocated to the school under the new pay 
system was fixed, balancing pay differences between teachers and management 
was a critical challenge for the reform committee. Unlike the experience in 
School A, the initial draft pay system proposed by the reform committee of 
School B was rejected at the first staff meeting, mainly because of disagreements 
over the pay differences between teachers and management. In order to obtain 
majority approval, members of the pay reform committee had to discuss the 
matter with the teachers, office by office, after the staff meeting, and then 
revised the draft, reducing the amount allocated to management bonuses. The 
new pay system was passed at the second staff meeting. Following the final 
distribution of “encouraging performance pay” at School B, the teachers’ 
average pay was 15,000 yuan/year, and average management pay was 19,000 
yuan.  
Taking into account both fixed and flexible pay, there was little difference in the 
teachers’ average annual pay in School B, while the employees in management 
positions experienced a small pay decrease, due to the reduced allowances in the 
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new pay system. Commenting on the result of the pay system reform in School 
B, one teacher said, “before the PRP reform, we never knew how much extra the 
leaders got. The reform process and the employees’ participation made the new 
pay system more transparent, and we realised how much extra the leaders could 
get; as the pay system reform was mainly implemented for us teachers, the pay 
advantages that employees in management positions receive should be 
minimized.” However, most of the employees in management positions in 
School B found the new pay system discouraging. For example, the deputy head 
teacher of the school, who was also a teacher of a Chinese course, said that the 
“encouraging performance” pay he received as a deputy head teacher was less 
than the subsidy a class teacher received, which made him a bit depressed.  
According to the head teacher, a significant decrease in the motivation of the 
middle management employees was observed after the new pay system was 
implemented; employees were less willing to take on extra work as it would not 
increase their pay, due to the limited subsidies available under the new pay 
system. For instance, it became more difficult to organize school events under 
the new pay system, because such events are very time consuming for those 
involved and, under the new system, there were no extra bonuses available. Even 
the class teachers, who received higher subsidies under the new system, were 
less willing to organize extra after-class activities, because their subsidy was 
fixed, regardless. During the interview with the head teacher, he expressed great 
concern regarding the decrease in motivation among employees, as people 
started to pay more attention to whether their performance was linked to their 
pay. A summary of the findings regarding the pay system reform and 
implementation in School B are presented in Table 6-7, based on feedback from 
the head teacher, the deputy head teacher and two senior teachers within the 
school.  
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Table 6-7: Summary of the interview feedback in School B (interviewees: the head 
teacher, one deputy head teacher, two senior teachers) 
 
Research 
objectives 
Summary of interview 
question 
Summary of feedback 
Change of pay  Q1: What changes were made 
to the pay system in your 
school, compared to the 
system before the PRP 
reform?   
Small increase in average pay of 
teachers, slightly decrease in the pay 
of employees in management 
positions.  
Questions 
regarding 
expectancy 
theory 
Q2: Do you think employees 
in your school could improve 
their performance by working 
harder? 
Yes 
Q3: If an employee works 
harder, will (s)he receive 
higher pay under the new PRP 
system? 
Very limited bonus for over-time 
teaching; very small portion of pay 
is available for those who perform 
better under the new PRP system.  
Q4: How large is the pay 
difference between high-
performing employees and 
others? 
Very little difference between 
employees in the new PRP system.  
Questions 
regarding goal-
setting theory 
Q5: How were the criteria for 
PRP chosen in your school? 
Proposed by the PRP reform 
committee; only objective criteria 
with an egalitarian orientation were 
passed by a majority vote. Initial 
proposal rejected in the first staff 
meeting; revised and passed in the 
second staff meeting 
Q6: Do the criteria included in 
the performance evaluation 
help to clarify the goals of the 
school? 
No. The new PRP system has 
reduced employees’ efforts 
regarding performance that is 
difficult to evaluate.    
Q7: Do the criteria included in 
the performance evaluation 
help to clarify the goals for 
individual teachers? 
No. The new PRP has reduced 
teachers’ efforts on any activities 
not included in the pay system.  
Questions 
regarding 
agency theory 
Q8: Has the implementation of 
the new PRP system reduced 
unwanted actions in the 
school? 
No. The new PRP system has 
brought about some unwanted 
activities. 
Questions 
regarding 
cognitive 
evaluation 
theory 
Q9: What impact has the new 
PRP system had on 
employees’ intrinsic 
motivation?  
Not much change in efforts made 
towards class teaching, but a 
negative impact (in terms of reduced 
motivation) on employees in 
management positions and teachers 
have been observed 
Questions 
regarding 
equity theory 
Q10: What do you think of the 
idea of linking pay to 
performance in schools? 
Agree 
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Q11: Do you think the current 
distribution of pay in your 
school is fair?  
No. Neither the teachers nor 
employees in management positions 
think it is fair.  
Q12: Has the new PRP system 
caused any jealousy among 
the teachers? 
Yes, especially between the teachers 
and employees in other positions.  
Q13: Equity or equality, 
which do you think is more 
important in your school?  
Equality 
Further 
comments 
Q14: What do you think of the 
PRP reform for 
schoolteachers? 
Good intentions by the government, 
but the fixed amount of pay 
allocated to each school and the 
voting system make egalitarian 
distribution the only choice for a 
primary school.  
Q15: How do you think the 
current PRP system in your 
school could be improved? 
 
The 70:30 ratio of fixed to flexible 
pay was announced too early in the 
national policy, so that every 
employee calculated the remaining 
30 per cent once they received their 
70 per cent fixed pay. The 
government should give more 
flexibility to individual schools to 
distribute the flexible part of the 
pay, and give schools more 
autonomy to link pay to actual 
performance. 
 
6.3.3   The Case of School C  
School C is a primary school located in a rural area of County H, with 94 
employees and over 1,600 students divided into 28 classes. Unlike Schools A 
and B, School C had no “sponsor fee” charging system before the reform as 
most students are from the local area. Before the PRP reform, teachers’ pay at 
School C came mainly from the government budget as there was limited extra 
income the school could get. In the case of School C, once the new PRP system 
was launched, there was a significant increase in average pay. According to the 
scheme announced in the national guide, teachers in rural areas would be paid 
the same as teachers in urban areas within the same county, and full-time 
employees in rural schools would also receive an extra fixed allowance of 3,600 
yuan per person per year (300 yuan/month). As a result, teachers’ average pay in 
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School C was higher than that in Schools A and B following the reform. One 
Chinese teacher interviewed in School C, for example, received an average total 
monthly pay of 2,300 yuan before the PRP reform. After the launch of the new 
system, the fixed part of her pay increased to 4,800 yuan/month (including 300 
yuan/month rural teacher allowance and 300 yuan/month class teacher 
allowance), more than double her previous monthly pay, even before she 
received her flexible “encouraging performance” pay.  
As in Schools A and B, the most important task for the reform committee in 
School C was to set criteria for the performance of different employees and then 
link their pay to these appropriately. Although every employee in School C was 
very happy with their doubled monthly pay, it was still not easy for the head 
teacher and the reform committee to decide how to distribute the “encouraging 
performance pay” within the school, and especially how to determine PRP for 
different management positions. According to the feedback from the head 
teacher of School C, after the reform, much more detailed descriptions were 
produced of different job positions and the workloads involved. In the new pay 
system, specific conversion rates between administration work and teaching 
hours were indicated, as well as detailed descriptions of allowances for different 
positions (e.g., deputy class teacher allowance, middle-management allowance, 
subject leader allowance etc.).  
Although the new pay system was passed in the first staff meeting, the 
employees were not as satisfied with it as expected. For example, one of the 
teachers interviewed for this research complained that “in the staff meeting, we 
were given a very long document regarding the new PRP system, which looked 
very complicated. When asked whether we would agree or not, most of us chose 
to agree as we did not really understand what the system was about.” One thing 
the teacher complained about was that, under the new PRP system introduced in 
School C, the pay differences between teachers with different performance 
levels were much smaller than the pay difference between management teams 
and teachers. For example, due to the “encouraging performance pay”, top-
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performing teachers could earn a maximum of 2,000 yuan/year more than other 
teachers in the school, while the average amount of pay for employees in 
management positions was 4,000 yuan/year more than the average pay of 
teachers. According to the national guide to the pay system reform, it was the 
teachers that this pay system reform aimed to motivate. However, according to 
the feedback from both this teacher and the head teacher of School C, although 
everyone in the school enjoyed a significant pay rise, many of the teachers were 
not happy about the internal distribution system, and especially the widened pay 
gaps between teachers and management under the new pay system. 
Another important change observed in the case of School C is that, before the 
PRP reform, the school had outsourced some aspects such as the student canteen 
and the snack shop in order to gain extra income for employee bonuses. Since no 
extra bonuses outside those funded by the government would be allowed under 
the new pay system, the snack shop was closed down soon after the PRP reform 
started, and there was also a cut in food prices in the student canteen. This does 
not support the idea that PRP reform would cut unnecessary charges in the 
compulsory education system. A brief summary of the pay system reform and its 
implementation in School C is presented in Table 6-8, based on the feedback 
from the head teacher and one senior teacher in the school). 
Table 6-8: Summary of the interview feedback in School C (interviewees: head 
teacher plus one other teacher) 
 
Research 
objectives 
Summary of interview 
question 
Summary of feedback 
Change of pay  Q1: What changes have been 
made to the pay system in 
your school, compared to the 
system before the PRP 
reform?   
Significant increase in the pay of all 
employees after the PRP reform, 
with increased pay differences 
between teachers and management 
staff. 
Questions 
regarding 
expectancy 
theory 
Q2: Do you think employees 
in your school could improve 
their performance by working 
harder? 
Yes.  
Q3: If an employee works 
harder, can (s)he get higher 
pay under the new PRP 
Very limited bonuses available under 
the new PRP system.  
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system? 
Q4: How great is the pay 
difference between high-
performing employees and 
others? 
Limited pay differences. 
Questions 
regarding goal-
setting theory 
Q5: How were the criteria for 
PRP chosen in your school? 
Proposed by the PRP reform 
committee, mainly transferring 
different levels of 
performance/achievement into 
objective criteria 
Q6: Have the criteria helped 
to clarify the goals of the 
school? 
Little help. 
Q7: Have they helped to 
clarify the goals for 
individual teachers? 
Not much help. 
Questions 
regarding 
agency theory 
Q8: Has the implementation 
of the new PRP system 
reduced unwanted activities 
in school? 
Yes. Reduced any unnecessary 
charges to students after the pay 
reform.    
Questions 
regarding 
cognitive 
evaluation 
theory 
Q9: What impact has the new 
PRP system had on 
employees’ intrinsic 
motivation?  
Not much difference.  
Questions 
regarding 
equity theory 
Q10: What do you think of 
the idea of linking pay to 
performance in schools? 
Agree with it. 
Q11: Do you think the current 
distribution of pay in your 
school is fair?  
Hard to say. 
Q12: Has the new PRP 
system caused any jealousy 
among the teachers? 
Yes, especially more conflict 
between teachers and employees in 
management positions. 
Q13: Equity or equality, 
which do you think is more 
important in your school?  
Both are important, but equality 
might be more important if we had to 
choose.  
Further 
comments 
Q14: What do you think of 
the PRP reform for 
schoolteachers? 
Good policy that balances the pay 
and social status of schoolteachers in 
urban and rural areas, and also cuts 
unnecessary charges to students. 
However, it has brought more 
conflict in inter-school pay 
distribution at the same time. 
Q15: How do you think the 
current PRP system in your 
school could be improved? 
It would be better if the government 
provided more detailed instructions, 
such as criteria for the performance 
evaluation of management teams 
within schools. 
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6.3.4  The case of  School D  
School D is an urban junior high school with 121 employees and more than 
1,800 students divided into 34 classes. Before the junior high school entry exam 
system was canceled in County H in 2004, School D was consistently the top 
junior high school, attracting the best students in the county. Before 2004, each 
year, primary school graduates in County H took an entrance exam for junior 
high school, and then applied to schools according to the marks they achieved. 
Each junior high school in County H would decide how many students they 
wanted to enroll, and then announce the minimum entrance exam score they 
required. As it was the most popular junior high school in County H, each year, 
the students that enrolled in School D fell into two types. Most had achieved the 
required score in their entrance exam. However, there would also be a small 
number of students who had not achieved the minimum requirement, but paid an 
extra “sponsor fee” instead. Every year, along with the exam entry requirement, 
a price list would be announced for students who had not achieved the required 
mark. The price would depend on demand. For example, in the mid-1990s, 5,000 
yuan was charged for each point a student’s mark was below the minimum 
requirement. Thus a student whose entrance exam score was three points below 
the entry level would have needed to pay 15,000 yuan in order to attend School 
D. The rate tended to increase gradually, year by year.  
In order to balance teaching resources and students more evenly among schools 
in the compulsory education system, in 2004, the junior high school entrance 
examination was abandoned in County H. Since then, all students were supposed 
to be allocated to junior high schools according to the school district to which 
they belonged, as is the case for primary schools in the county. However, due to 
the previous student selection system and differences in facilities and teaching 
reputations, most students, especially those with good academic performance, 
wanted to attend top junior high schools such as School D, which would give 
them a better chance of getting into top high schools afterwards. Hence, in 
School D, even though the exam system had been canceled, the charging of a 
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“sponsor fee” remained. The main difference was that, before 2004, it those 
students who did not achieve the entrance requirement had to pay the “sponsor 
fee”, while, after 2004, students from outside School D’s allocated district were 
required to pay, even if they had performed very well in primary school. Without 
the entrance exam, the “sponsor fee” became a relatively fixed amount that was 
charged to all students from other school districts, and was mainly based on the 
total number of students who applied from other school districts, rather than 
students’ performance at primary school level.  
As the most popular junior high school in County H, School D received a large 
income from “sponsor fees” before the reform. Thus, although government 
funding was increased, the average annual income of employees in School D fell 
significantly, due to the removal of all extra allowances outside of those 
provided by the government. For instance, one maths teacher in School D said 
that, under the new PRP system, the total pay she received for the year was 
approximately 20,000 yuan less than what she had received before the reform. A 
similar reduction in pay was expericence by all full-time employees.  
Unlike those in primary schools, students in junior high schools still have to 
participate in the senior high school examination, which acts as a very important 
standard in evaluating the teaching quality of a junior high school. Thus, the 
teaching load for junior high schoolteachers tends to be much heavier than for 
primary schoolteachers, and the distribution of “encouraging performance pay” 
in junior high schools was thus more challenging, as both equity and equality 
had to be considered. The junior high schools had to maintain their teaching 
quality by encouraging higher performance, but the pay system still needed to be 
accepted by the majority of employees.  
Compared to the new pay systems implemented in the case primary schools 
investigated for this research, the plan for the distribution of “encouraging 
performance pay” proposed by the reform committee in School D was more 
structured. It included specific points systems for different positions, teachers of 
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different subjects, and those with different teaching loads (see Sample B in 
Appendix 5 for further details). According to the head teacher of School D, the 
main task for the committee during the pay system reform was to benchmark 
different performance levels, and convert different workloads into specific 
criteria which could be evaluated accurately. Hence, a marking system covering 
employees in different positions was introduced, with very specific instructions 
about how specific points should be awarded (e.g., conference attendance, 
students winning awards in specific competitions, publishing academic papers, 
and achieving various teaching certificates). A penalty system was also included, 
covering absenteeism, for example, or the breaking of school regulations by a 
student.  
The total points awarded to an employee at the end of the year would be 
calculated during his/her performance evaluation. A corresponding amount of 
performance related pay would be allocated to the employee, accounting for 40 
per cent of the school’s total “encouraging performance related pay” (for details, 
see Sample B in Appendix 5). On top of this, a conversion rate was used to 
compare the working hours of teachers to those of administrators or 
management, and this was also included in the new pay system. For example, 
the workload of a middle manager would count as four hours of class teaching 
per week, using a conversion index of 30 per cent between the actual working 
hours of the employee and the teaching hours of a teacher.  
The new pay system proposed in School D was very detailed and complicated. 
Although it was passed at the first staff meeting, the teachers interviewed in 
School D said they did not really understand the new pay system when they 
voted for it. Moreover, despite the mostly objective evaluations of performance, 
the conversion rate between different types of workload also caused a lot of 
debate among the teachers. For instance, one teacher interviewed for this 
research was in charge of one maths class and was the head of the teaching and 
research office. She complained that she would rather take another class of 
maths teaching instead of the administrative position, because the allowance for 
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middle management positions had been cut significantly under the new system, 
and she was not happy with the conversion rate between her administration 
workload and teaching hours, especially since no extra preparation time would 
be involved in taking on another maths class.  
The conversion rates between back office employees and teachers thus caused a 
lot of debate, with employees from each group thinking they were underpaid 
under the new system. According to local government policy, any performance 
evaluation directly related to students’ exam scores was supposed to be reduced 
to a minimum. However, due to the comparative graduation system in junior 
high schools, a small amount of allowance was retained for teachers in charge of 
graduating classes, although the amount was reduced due to the lower pay level 
in the new pay system.  
Under the new system, the pay difference between high-performing teachers and 
others was reduced. The new system turned out to be quite egalitarian rather 
than being truly linked to individual performance. In reference to this change, 
both of the teachers interviewed said that they had not changed the amount of 
effort they put into class teaching, but they did feel less willing to take on extra 
responsibilities if such tasks were not included in performance evaluations under 
the new pay system. At the same time, the head teacher of School D also 
reported seeing reduced motivation among both teachers and management after 
the new pay system was introduced. Class teachers tended to be reluctant to take 
students on field trips, as the allowance they received was fixed, and helping 
with such activities would not count towards their performance contribution, and 
may even lead to penalties if a student was injured during the process. Both the 
head teacher and the teachers interviewed showed great concern about the effect 
the PRP system would have in the long run. A summary of the feedback from 
School D is presented in the following table.  
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Table 6-9: Summary of the interview feedback from School D (interviewees: the 
head teacher and two teachers) 
 
Research 
objectives 
Summary of interview 
question 
Summary of feedback 
Change of pay  Q1: What changes have been 
made to the pay system in 
your school, compared to the 
system before the PRP 
reform?   
Significant decrease in the average 
annual income for employees of the 
school. More egalitarian in the new 
system with smaller pay differences 
between employees. 
Questions 
regarding 
expectancy 
theory 
Q2: Do you think employees 
in your school could improve 
their performance by working 
harder? 
Yes 
Q3: If an employee works 
harder, can (s)he receive 
higher pay under the new PRP 
system? 
More bonuses for high-performing 
employees in the previous pay 
system; reduced bonuses in new 
PRP system.  
Q4: How great is the pay 
difference between high-
performing employees and 
others? 
Reduced pay differences among 
teachers.  
Questions 
regarding goal-
setting theory 
Q5: How were the criteria for 
PRP chosen in your school? 
Proposed by the PRP committee, 
converting different performance 
levels into specific criteria, mainly 
with objective evaluation 
benchmarks.  
Q6: Have the criteria helped to 
clarify the goals of the school? 
Not much. 
Q7: Have the criteria helped to 
clarify the goals for individual 
teachers? 
Not much. 
Questions 
regarding 
agency theory 
Q8: Has the implementation of 
the new PRP system reduced 
unwanted actions in the 
school? 
No. It has tended to make 
employees avoid some activities if 
they are not included in their PRP 
evaluations.  
Questions 
regarding 
cognitive 
evaluation 
theory 
Q9: What impact has the new 
PRP system had on 
employees’ intrinsic 
motivation?  
Reduced motivation for most 
employees. 
Questions 
regarding 
equity theory 
Q10: What do you think of the 
idea of linking pay to 
performance in schools? 
Agree with it.  
Q11: Do you think the current 
distribution of pay in your 
school is fair?  
No. There is more equality than 
equity.  
Q12: Has the new PRP system 
caused any jealousy among 
Not among the teachers, but there is 
increased conflict between teachers 
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the teachers? and other groups of employees. 
Q13: Equity or equality, 
which do you think is more 
important in your school?  
Equity, but we had to go for 
equality in order to get the system 
passed.  
Further 
comments 
Q14: What do you think of the 
PRP reform for 
schoolteachers? 
Good intentions from the 
government, but it is difficult to 
achieve its aims due to the 
competition in the current Chinese 
education system.  
Q15: How do you think the 
current PRP system in your 
school could be improved? 
 
As the total amount of pay is fixed 
within the school, and everyone 
tends to check whether his/her pay 
is above or below average, there is 
very little flexibility to link pay to 
actual performance and offer extra 
bonuses to those who perform 
better.  
 
 
6.3.5  The case of School E  
School E is a junior high school in a rural district, with 91 employees and more 
than 1,200 students divided into 25 classes. Under the previous junior high 
school entrance examination system, all top students in County H would go to 
School D, and most of the rest would choose from the remaining junior high 
schools according to personal choice. Most of the schools set their own entrance 
requirements, and as in the case of School D, “sponsor fees” would be charged 
by the better schools, to students who did not achieve their standards. As School 
E had a good reputation among schools in the area, every year a small number of 
students who did not reach its minimum requirements paid to gain entry. 
Although the extra income it received in this way was much lower than the 
amount received by top schools in urban areas (e.g., School D), the employees of 
School E enjoyed higher bonuses than teachers in other schools in rural areas.  
When the PRP reform was implemented, although the average pay the 
employees of School E received through government funding increased 
significantly, all extra bonuses previously allocated by the school were 
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discontinued, so that the total annual pay was only slightly higher, with an 
average boost of 5,000 yuan per person per year. According to the head teacher 
of School E, PRP provided sufficient financial support to schools in the 
compulsory education system, especially rural schools, and as a result head 
teachers would no longer need to worry about finding extra sources of teachers’ 
pay. Evening out pay among teachers in different schools would also help rural 
schools to retain good teachers; previously, teachers from rural schools had 
frequently sought transfers to urban schools where they would receive higher 
pay. 
However, another concern for the head teacher of School E was that, although 
the main purpose of introducing the pay system reform was to link pay more 
strongly with individual performance, due to the voting system and the fixed 
amount of “encouraging performance pay” allocated to each school, the new 
PRP system turned out to be a flatter pay system, with equality becoming the 
dominant guideline. In School E, the internal pay system before the national 
PRP reform had aimed to motivate teachers to perform well, and top-performing 
teachers could gain 15,000 yuan more than lower-performing teachers and back 
office staff. However, in the discussions about the new pay system, most 
employees were not willing to offer a high bonus to those who achieved 
outstanding performance, as this would inevitably reduce the average 
“encouraging performance pay” for the majority of employees. Therefore, under 
the new pay system that was finally passed by the staff, bonuses for outstanding 
performance and the pay difference between different groups of employees were 
both reduced (e.g., in the new PRP system, the maximium annual pay gap 
between top-performing teachers who were also class teachers, and back office 
staff was 7,000 yuan, less than half the maximum pay gap under the school’s old 
pay system).  
As in other schools, the head teacher of School E found the management team 
were less willing under the new system to take on extra tasks if they were not 
included in their performance evaluation (e.g., extra workload in extreme 
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weather situations, such as typhoons). A negative impact on the motivation of 
teachers was also noticed by the head teacher, especially among senior teachers 
who had already achieved a high standard of teaching qualification, as there was 
very little opportunity for them to obtain higher pay, due to the reduction in the 
bonus for higher performance. Thus, in the case of School E, although the 
average pay increased under the new pay system, many employees became less 
motivated. Therefore, although the head teacher believed that the PRP reform for 
schoolteachers in the compulsory education system could bring greater benefits 
in the long run, he found that the egalitarian distribution under the new pay 
system made it much more difficult to motivate the staff. A summary of the 
interview feedback from the head teacher of School E is given in Table 6-10. 
Table 6-10: Summary of the interview feedback from School E (interviewee: the 
head teacher) 
 
Research 
objectives 
Summary of interview 
questions 
Summary of feedback 
Change of 
pay  
Q1: What changes have been 
made to the pay system in your 
school, compared to the system 
before the PRP reform?   
Small pay increase for all 
employees,  
with minor pay decrease for some 
top-performing teachers and the 
management team. 
Questions 
regarding 
expectancy 
theory 
Q2: Do you think employees in 
your school could improve their 
performance by working harder? 
Yes. 
Q3: If an employee works 
harder, can (s)he get higher pay 
under the new PRP system? 
Yes, but only very limited 
opportunities. 
Q4: How great is the pay 
difference between high-
performing employees and 
others? 
Limited extra bonus available in the 
new PRP system. 
Questions 
regarding 
goal-setting 
theory 
Q5: How were the criteria for 
PRP chosen in your school? 
Proposed by the PRP committee, 
converting different performance 
levels into specific criteria, mainly 
with objective evaluation 
benchmarks, discussed several times 
in staff meetings, finally passed in 
May 2010. 
Q6: Have the criteria included in 
the performance evaluation 
helped to clarify the goals of the 
school? 
Not much. 
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Q7: Have the criteria helped to 
clarify the goals for individual 
teachers? 
Not much. 
Questions 
regarding 
agency 
theory 
Q8: Has the implementation of 
the new PRP system reduced 
unwanted actions in the school? 
No. Both the middle management 
team and teachers are less willing to 
put extra effort in, if allocated tasks 
outside of the performance 
evaluation scheme.  
Questions 
regarding 
cognitive 
evaluation 
theory 
Q9: What impact has the new 
PRP system had on employees’ 
intrinsic motivation?  
Reduced motivation for most 
employees, especially those in 
management positions and some 
senior teachers. 
Questions 
regarding 
equity 
theory 
Q10: What do you think of the 
idea of linking pay to 
performance in schools? 
Agree with it.  
Q11: Do you think the current 
distribution of pay in your school 
is fair?  
No. Those who perform better 
should receive higher pay, but this is 
restricted in the new PRP system. 
Q12: Has the new PRP system 
caused any jealousy among the 
teachers? 
Some conflict has been noticed, as 
there has been some debate 
regarding the pay difference 
between administrators and 
teachers.  
Q13: Equity or equality, which 
do you think is more important in 
your school?  
Equity is very important, but 
equality was the only choice that 
could be made during the PRP 
reform.  
Further 
comments 
Q14: What do you think of the 
PRP reform for schoolteachers? 
Good intentions from the 
government, helping to retain good 
teachers in rural schools. However, 
it has brought more problems than 
benefits so far during the transition 
period.  
Q15: How do you think the 
current PRP system in your 
school could be improved? 
 
No matter how much employees 
improve their performance, the total 
amount of encouraging performance 
related pay to be allocated within 
the school cannot be increased. It 
will be very difficult to motivate 
employees unless this imperfection 
is resolved.  
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6.3.6   The case of School F  
School F is a junior high school located in a rural district in County H, with 71 
employees and more than 1,000 students divided into 21 classes. It is one of the 
least popular junior high schools in the county, and the pay of its employees was 
much lower than that of staff in other schools prior to the reform, due to the 
limited funding available (e.g., it did not receive any “sponsor fees”). Therefore, 
when the PRP reform was introduced in County H, the average pay of 
employees at School F increased by about one third.  
Despite the considerable pay rise for all staff, it was still very challenging for the 
reform committee to design an appropriate pay system to allocate the 
“encouraging performance pay” within the school. When designing the new pay 
system, both the head teacher and most members of the reform committee 
believed that the school should take the opportunity to improve its teaching 
quality and reputation by motivating higher performance among the teachers. 
However, since the total amount of “encouraging performance pay” for the 
school was fixed, as in the other schools, the egalitarian approach was favoured 
as every employee wanted to receive at least their share of the total amount 
allocated to the school. Hence, there was a lot of debate over how to determine 
how much to allocate to different groups of employees, and the draft for the new 
pay system was changed seven times before it was presented at a staff meeting. 
The final version was a points calculation system, similar to that introduced in 
School D, with different positions and performance levels categorized according 
to objective criteria, using various indices and formulas. In the new system, both 
the allowance for the middle-management team and the bonus given to higher 
performing teachers have fallen as a percentage of total pay, but the actual 
amount of pay included in these bonuses has increased slightly, due to the 
significant rise in overall pay at the school.  
According to the head teacher, the implementation of the new PRP 
system―including such a big pay rise―did make employees much happier and 
has helped the school to retain good teachers. Before the PRP reform, every year 
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some teachers would move to other schools where they could earn more. Once 
the new system had been implemented, employees became much more willing to 
stay in rural schools in general: the average pay was higher there than in urban 
schools due to the extra rural allowance provided under the new system; 
furthermore, the teaching load and stress in urban schools, especially the top 
junior high schools, tended to be much higher. However, the head teacher of 
School F found that the new system did not motivate employees as hoped, 
mainly because the total amount of pay the school had to offer was fixed, and 
employees began to calculate how much extra pay they would receive from 
taking on extra tasks. Due to the intensive discussion and consultation during the 
design process of the new pay system, it was passed with over 90 per cent 
agreement at the first staff meeting. A brief summary of the interview feedback 
from the head teacher of School F is shown in Table 6-11. 
Table 6-11: Summary of interview feedback from School F (interviewee: the head 
teacher) 
 
Research 
objectives 
Summary of interview 
questions 
Summary of feedback 
Change of pay  Q1: How has the pay system 
in your school changed, 
compared to before the PRP 
reform?   
Significant pay increase for all 
employees in the school after the 
pay system reform. 
Questions 
regarding 
expectancy 
theory 
Q2: Do you think employees 
in your school could improve 
their performance by working 
harder? 
Yes.  
Q3: If an employee works 
harder, can (s)he receive 
higher pay under the new PRP 
system? 
Yes.  
Q4: How great is the pay 
difference between high-
performing employees and 
others? 
Although bonus available for 
higher-performing employees has 
fallen as a percentage of overall pay, 
the difference between the actual 
amount paid to top-performing 
employees and others has increased 
due to the rise in overall pay. 
Questions 
regarding goal-
setting theory 
Q5: How were the criteria for 
PRP chosen in your school? 
Proposed by the PRP committee, 
converting different performance 
levels into specific criteria, mainly 
with objective evaluation 
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benchmarks. The proposed pay 
system was revised seven times 
before being passed at the first staff 
meeting. 
Q6: Have the criteria included 
in the performance evaluation 
helped to clarify the goals of 
the school? 
Yes. 
Q7: Have the criteria helped to 
clarify the goals for individual 
teachers? 
Yes. 
Questions 
regarding 
agency theory 
Q8: Has the implementation of 
the new PRP system reduced 
unwanted actions in the 
school? 
No.  
Questions 
regarding 
cognitive 
evaluation 
theory 
Q9: What impact has the new 
PRP system had on 
employees’ intrinsic 
motivation?  
Reduced the intrinsic motivation, 
especially among the management 
team.  
Questions 
regarding 
equity theory 
Q10: What do you think of the 
idea of linking pay to 
performance in school? 
Agree with it.  
Q11: Do you think the current 
distribution of pay in your 
school is fair?  
Hard to say. The pay increase for 
higher-performing teachers should 
be bigger than average. 
Q12: Has the new PRP system 
caused any jealousy among 
the teachers? 
Not much impact.  
Q13: Equity or equality, 
which do you think is more 
important in your school?  
Equity is more important, but the 
new pay system had to be 
egalitarian due to the voting system 
used in the reform.   
Further 
comments 
Q14: What do you think of the 
PRP reform for 
schoolteachers? 
Very good policy which has brought 
more benefits to rural schools where 
the pay used to be much lower. Has 
helped to retain good teachers in 
rural areas.  
Q15: How do you think the 
current PRP system in your 
school could be improved? 
 
More flexibility should be given to 
individual schools, or a greater 
percentage of overall pay should be 
linked to actual performance in the 
policy guide.  
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6.4   Important findings regarding the PRP reform in the six public case 
schools : A summary of the cross-school analysis     
Through the exploration of the pay system reform and the impacts of the new 
PRP system on the six public case schools within the compulsory education 
system in County H, some important features became apparent. 
First, the employee pay changed by different amounts in different schools 
following the reform. According to a report from the Education Bureau of 
County H (Table 6.1), the reform led to a significant increase in the average pay 
of all full-time employees in the compulsory education system in the county. 
However, when examining individual schools, significant differences could be 
seen, especially between those in urban and rural areas. All three schools located 
in rural areas experienced an increase in the average pay of their employees, 
especially in the cases of Schools C and F, where all employees’ pay was 
boosted significantly. As a popular junior high school in a rural area that had 
charged “sponsor fees” prior to the reform, for School E the pay rise was not as 
large. Meanwhile, for the three urban schools, the situation was quite different. 
A small increase in average pay was observed in School B, although the pay for 
employees in management positions decreased slightly. In School A, the top 
primary school, and School D, the top junior high school in the county, however, 
all employees experienced pay cuts, due to the abolition of school-specific 
bonuses from extra income sources, which had been significant in both schools 
before the pay reform.  
For schools in the compulsory education system in County H, before the new 
PRP scheme was implemented, due to imbalances in facilities and teaching 
quality, teachers in urban areas usually enjoyed higher pay. This was especially 
the case for those teaching in top schools, where various extra bonuses would be 
allocated within the school, funded, for example, by the large “sponsor fees” 
charged each year. Under the reform, the central government banned all school-
specific bonuses, stating that from now on schoolteachers’ pay could come from 
	   139 
government funding only. Hence, although the government budget allocated to 
employees of top schools may have increased compared to before the reform, 
their total annual pay actually decreased under the new system. Furthermore, 
employees of rural schools actually received higher pay than their counterparts 
in urban schools, due to the extra allowance of 2,550 yuan per year, provided to 
them. A summary of the changes in average pay in the six sample schools in 
County H is shown in Table 6-12. 
Table 6-12: Changes in average pay in the six case schools in the compulsory 
education system in County H 
 School A School B School C School D School E School F 
Category Primary  Primary  Primary  Junior high  Junior high  Junior high  
Location  Urban Urban Rural Urban Rural Rural  
Popularity 
of the school 
in local area  
Most 
popular 
Very 
popular 
Less popular 
with no 
‘sponsor fee’ 
charging 
Most 
popular Popular 
Less popular 
with no 
‘sponsor fee” 
charging 
Change in 
average pay  
Small 
decrease  
Small 
increase  
Significant 
increase  
Significant 
decrease 
Small 
increase  
Significant 
increase 
 
The second notable point was that the new system changed the pay gaps between 
different groups of employees within schools, which especially affected 
employees in middle-management positions and high-performing teachers. It 
was found that, in most of the sample schools, the pay advantages for both top-
performing teachers and management staff were reduced, as the new pay system 
tended to provide a more equal distribution than existed before the reform. As all 
school-specific funding was abolished in the new system, in Schools A, B, D 
and E, where extra bonuses had previously been available, the change to a fixed 
amount of “encouraging performance pay” for the whole school led to the pay 
gaps between teachers with different performance levels being reduced. In 
Schools C and F, although the percentage pay difference between top-
performing and other teachers fell, the actual difference rose slightly because of 
the significant increase in average pay in the two schools.  
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Compared to the pay differences between teachers, those between employees in 
management positions and teachers were much more complicated, due to the 
opaque pay distribution in most schools before the reform. In County H, the 
increase in average annual pay for all employees in compulsory education 
schools was 16,383 yuan, while that for management positions was 15,285 yuan 
(see Table 6.1). As for the situation among teachers, the pay differences between 
management and teachers were significantly reduced in Schools A, B, D, and E, 
but slightly increased in Schools C and F. It could be observed that the more 
extra income the school received before the pay system reform, the smaller the 
pay gaps between different groups of employees under the new PRP system. In 
other words, in schools where employees previously enjoyed higher income due 
to non-government funding sources, bonuses for high performers and 
management were significantly reduced after the reform, especially in the urban 
schools (A and D), where their pay decreased most.  
The third point of note is that, when asked about the potential for improving 
employees’ performance, all of the interviewees, including both head teachers 
and teachers, believed that the performance of the employees in their schools 
could be improved, especially performance outside class teaching. However, 
despite the generally agreement that “those with higher performance should be 
rewarded by higher pay”, they all felt that only very limited bonuses were 
available under the new system for higher performing staff in their schools. Pre-
reform, most of the schools linked a much higher proportion of pay to individual 
performance. Although, one of the government’s main purposes in introducing 
PRP was to encourage employees to achieve higher performance by linking it to 
individual pay, the actual result of the reform turned out to be the opposite, with 
a reduced proportion of the total available pay offered to those who performed 
well, in all of the schools investigated. 
The fourth observation is that, in terms of the criteria used to evaluate 
performance, all of the interviewees said that they did not like the idea of 
including subjective measurement (e.g., appraisal by supervisors). It was agreed 
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by both the head teachers and the employees that personal bias should be 
reduced to a minimum in order to maintain harmony within the school. Thus, 
when setting their criteria, all six schools chose objective ones. For example, 
when evaluating the performance of employees in different positions, specific 
conversion rates would be adopted to compare the teaching hours for different 
subjects (e.g., different standards were set regarding the minimum weekly 
teaching hours for Chinese, Maths, English and Science versus those for PE, 
Arts and Music). The workload for management/administration positions also 
tended to be converted into standard teaching hours, using specific exchange 
rates for different positions.  
Compared to the appraisal system in the junior high schools, that in the primary 
schools was less complicated, with the main focus being on the calculation of 
working hours. The criteria used to evaluate performance included overtime 
hours, special achievements, such as winning awards (the teachers or the 
students they supervised), as well as negative aspects such as lateness or absence 
from classes or meetings. Similar exchange rates between the working hours of 
different groups of employees could be found in the performance appraisal 
systems of all three junior high schools (School D, E and F), where a more 
complicated points calculation system was introduced to evaluate performance. 
Employees in the three junior high schools were evaluated by awarding points 
for different performance criteria (e.g., class and meeting attendance, number of 
published papers, number of family visits, achievements of students, etc.), and 
the total points determined the overall performance category awarded (e.g., 
“excellent”, “eligible”, “just qualified”, and “fail”). This performance category 
was then used to calculate the amount of encouraging performance pay allocated 
to the individual. Due to these objective criteria, employees could be evaluated 
with a minimum of supervisor bias. However, most of the interviewees said that 
the performance appraisal system introduced during the PRP reform were not 
very different to those used beforehand, with one exception. In School F, the 
significant increase in pay following the reform enabled a clarification of the 
performance criteria, which attached a greater bonus to high performance.  
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The fifth observation relates to the fact that, according to the national guide, all 
bonuses from sources other than official government funding would be 
abolished under the reform. This aimed to end all unofficial charging by 
compulsory education schools, and thus reduce costs for students and parents. 
However, due to the traditional imbalance in school facilities and teaching 
quality, the top schools in County H are still much more popular than other 
schools in the area. Even under the new pay system, the charging of “sponsor 
fees” cannot be avoided, due to the high demand for places at popular schools. 
Only in the case of School C, a rural primary school, were some business 
branches closed down which had previously been used to gain extra income for 
the school. The price of food in the student canteen was also reduced after the 
PRP reform, which did support the goal of reducing unnecessary charges in state 
schools that the national policy aimed to achieve.  
The sixth point refers to the central aim of motivating teachers to perform well 
by linking pay to performance. However, when asked about the impact of the 
PRP reform on employees’ motivation, none of the interviewees provided 
positive feedback. Instead, both the head teachers and teachers interviewed in 
five of the schools in County H reported reduced motivation among employees, 
especially among high-performing teachers and management, whose pay had not 
increased as much as others’, and had even decreased in some schools. One 
common problem that many head teachers noted was that employees had started 
to pay more attention to the fact that their pay was linked to different aspects of 
their performance, and tended to be less willing to put in effort if there was no 
allowance attached to a task. This problem was more prevalent among 
management staff, as the overtime allowance had been reduced or abolished 
altogether in most schools under the new pay system.  
The seventh point is that, in terms of the fairness of the new pay systems, 
intensive debates regarding the choice between equity and equality were 
observed. In all six schools investigated, the new pay system tended to be 
egalitarian, rather than encouraging higher performance. All of the head teachers 
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from the sample schools said that they would prefer an equity-based distribution, 
in order to motivate employees to perform well. However, due to the fixed 
amount of pay allocated to each school and the voting system which required 
agreement from a large majority of staff (over two thirds), in all six schools the 
new systems allocated only a limited portion of pay to be linked to individual 
performance. Interviewees from five of the schools said that the implementation 
of the PRP system had caused more jealousy among employees, as those from 
different groups had started to compare their pay, and the changes in their pay 
due to the reform, and none felt satisfied. Such conflict tended to be fiercer 
between senior teachers and middle management, as both believed they should 
achieve above-average pay within the school, but this could not be achieved due 
to the fixed pool of total pay allocated. The only exception was the case of 
School F, where all employees received significant pay increases. The head 
teacher of School F said that he had not observed extra conflicts caused by the 
pay system reform, as the pay advantages for both high-performing employees 
and management staff had increased, due to the substantial overall pay increase 
for everybody. 
The final point is that the implementation of PRP has helped to retain teachers in 
rural areas. The head teachers of all three rural schools observed a significant 
reduction in the turnover rate of employees following the introduction of PRP. 
Before the reform, many teachers in rural areas wanted to move to urban 
schools, mainly due to the significantly higher pay they would receive there. 
Due to the more equal salaries under the new pay system, teachers in rural areas 
have been less inclined to move to urban schools. According to the head teachers 
of Schools C and F, this standardization of pay for both teachers and head 
teachers across schools in the county would also make teachers from top schools 
more willing to be appointed as head teachers at rural schools, which could 
improve the overall teaching quality of rural schools in the long run.  
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6.5   Conclusion 
Based on the review of the implementation of PRP and its impact on different 
groups of employees in the six case schools in the compulsory education system 
in County H, a summary of the key findings is presented in Table 6-13. Further 
analysis of the findings will be given in Chapter 8.  
Table 6-13: The cross-school analysis—a summary of the key findings of the pay 
system reform and the implementation of the new PRP system in six different 
schools in compulsory education in County H  
 School A School B School C School D School E School F 
Category  Primary  Primary Primary Junior high Junior high Junior high  
Location  Urban Urban Rural Urban Rural  Rural  
Change in 
pay after 
the reform 
Slight 
decrease in 
pay for all 
employees, 
more of a 
decrease for 
employees in 
management 
positions  
Small 
increase in 
average pay, 
slight 
decrease in 
pay for the 
management 
team 
Significant 
increase in 
the pay of all 
employees. 
Significant 
decrease in 
the pay of 
all 
employees 
Small 
increase for 
most 
employees, 
with minor 
decrease in 
the pay of 
top-
performing 
teachers and 
management 
staff. 
Significant 
pay increase 
for all 
employees  
Change in 
pay 
differences 
between 
employees 
with 
different 
performan
ce levels 
Smaller pay 
differences 
Smaller pay 
differences  
Reduced 
bonus as a 
percentage 
of overall 
pay, but 
bigger 
absolute pay 
differences 
due to the 
increased 
average pay 
Smaller pay 
differences 
Smaller pay 
differences 
Reduced 
bonus as a 
percentage 
of overall 
pay, but 
bigger 
absolute pay 
differences 
due to the 
increased 
average pay 
Can 
employees 
improve 
performan
ce? 
Yes. Yes.  Yes Yes. Yes.  Yes.  
Is higher 
pay given 
for higher 
performan
ce under 
the new 
pay 
system? 
Yes, but very 
limited 
Yes, but 
very limited. 
Yes, but 
very limited. 
Yes, but 
very 
limited. 
Yes, but very 
limited. 
Yes, but 
limited. 
Setting of 
performan
ce 
evaluation 
Objective 
criteria 
dominated  
Objective 
criteria 
dominated 
Objective 
criteria 
dominated 
Objective 
criteria with 
points 
system. 
Objective 
criteria 
dominated 
Objective 
criteria with 
points 
system. 
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criteria 
Has it 
helped to 
set goals 
for the 
school? 
No.  No. No. No. No. Yes. 
Has it 
helped to 
set goals 
for 
individuals 
No. No. No. No. No. Yes.  
Has it 
reduced 
unwanted 
behaviour? 
N/A No.  Yes. No.  No.  No.  
Changes in 
intrinsic 
motivation 
of 
employees 
Reduced 
motivation 
Reduced 
motivation  
Not much 
difference.  
Reduced 
motivation 
Reduced 
motivation 
Reduced 
motivation. 
Acceptance 
of the idea 
of linking 
pay to 
performan
ce for 
schoolteach
ers 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fairness of 
the new 
PRP 
system 
Hard to say. No.  Hard to say. No.  No.  Hard to say. 
Jealousy 
caused by 
the new 
PRP 
system 
Yes.  Yes.  Yes. Yes.  Yes.  Not much impact.  
Preference 
between 
equity and 
equality 
during the 
reform 
Equality  Equality  Equality.  
Both but 
had to 
sacrifice 
equity for 
equality. 
Equity, but 
had to go for 
equality 
during the 
reform. 
Both, but 
had to 
sacrifice 
equity for 
equality. 
General 
comment 
about the 
PRP 
reform  
More 
disadvantages 
than benefits.  
More 
disadvantage
s than 
benefits.  
Good, but 
has also 
brought 
more 
conflict.  
More 
disadvantag
es than 
benefits. 
Good policy 
in the long 
rum, but has 
brought more 
conflict so 
far. 
More 
advantages 
than 
disadvantag
es overall.  
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Chapter 7   Case Study B:  
Pay system reform in a publishing organization in Beijing 
  
The pay system reform aimed at producing higher performance in commercial 
PSUs started a little earlier than that among public welfare PSUs, in 2000, when 
a national financial and ownership reform was launched by the central 
government of the PRC, requiring all commerce-related PSUs in China to move 
towards a more enterprise-based nature, and self-funding. There is great 
diversity among the commercial PSUs; one segment is the publishing industry, 
which used to be an important component of the Chinese culture industry, and 
belonged to the traditional PSU system. In this chapter, an in-depth case study of 
the pay system reform in one publishing organization in Beijing will be 
discussed, providing an insight into how it changed from a traditional PSU pay 
system to a PRP scheme, and the influence the new scheme has had on the 
employees and the organization as a whole.  
 
7.1   The publishing industry in China 
The structural reform of publishing organizations, which were formerly a part of 
the traditional Chinese public service sector, started in 2004, when the General 
Administration of Press Publications, part of the central government of the PRC, 
announced that all publishing organizations belonging to the PSU sector would 
have to change into enterprises, and would be no longer be supported by 
government funding. The structural reform involved all of the 568 publishing 
organizations belonging to the PSU sector, except for the People’s Publishing 
House, which remained in the PSU system and continued to be run by the 
government (General Administration of Press Publications of the PRC, 2004). 
Since then, all publishing organizations across China have been pushed into the 
market, and must fund themselves. At the same time, they were given the 
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flexibility to decide on their own personnel system, including pay. Therefore, 
publishing organizations represent a typical example of how Chinese 
commercial PSUs have been pushed into the market and as a result have 
adjusted their pay systems spontaneously in order to achieve higher 
performance.  
 
7.2   An introduction to Publishing Organization M  
Located in Beijing, Publishing Organization M (“Organization M” hereafter) is a 
medium-sized professional publishing institution, specializing in the field of 
humanities and social sciences, with 106 full-time employees. As a former PSU, 
previously supported by government funding, organizational reform in 
Organization M began in 2000, after the abovementioned announcement by the 
central government. Organization M was one of a group of PSUs that were 
pushed into the market, and forced to fund themselves. As a result, Organization 
M started to adjust its organizational structure, and changed from the traditional 
PSU system to a corporate orientation. Later, in 2004, it carried out a pay system 
reform of the old PSU-style system, with the main purpose of encouraging 
higher performance. Thus, the pay system reform in Organization M did not 
affect the company’s entire governance structure, because it had already 
reformed this aspect into a corporate system by the time the pay system reform 
was launched. Exploring the change of pay system in Organization M will 
provide us with an insight into how a commercial PSU dealt with this issue and 
the impact the PRP system has had on its employees.  
 
7.3   The origin of the pay system reform in Organization M 
The organizational structural reform in Organization M started in 2000. The 
management structure was changed and the organization adopted an independent 
employment and financial system. As a pioneer in organizational structural 
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reform in publishing industry, Organization M stopped receiving funding from 
the government in 2000, but from then on was allowed to keep all revenue and 
decide on its own recruitment budget. While it changed from the traditional PSU 
system to one that was enterprise-based, in order to smooth the process and 
minimize the direct impact on employees, the internal pay system was kept 
unchanged. However, as the organizational structural reform deepened, the 
traditional seniority-dominated pay system became inconsistent with the new 
corporate management style, raising two important problems, which brought pay 
system reform onto the agenda.  
First, as a result of changing from the previous PSU system to the new corporate 
structure, different collective contracts existed among Organization M’s 
employees, which made the pay system very complicated. For example, all 
employees who had joined the organization in or before 1996 held a PSU 
(“shiye”) status, which enabled them to enjoy the same welfare system as 
government officials. For all new employees recruited after 1997, however, the 
PSU status was no longer available. All new employees held an “enterprise 
(qiye) status” and had to join the national public welfare system rather than 
receiving welfare directly from the government. Thus, before the pay system 
reform in Organization M, employees with different working statuses had their 
pay set according to different benchmarks. Employees with PSU status did not 
need to participate in the public welfare system as their medical treatment and 
pensions would be paid directly by the government, while for those with 
enterprise status, medical treatment and pensions would be provided under the 
public welfare system, meaning they depended on their tenure and monthly 
amount they paid into the public welfare fund. The different components of 
monthly pay that each individual received were mainly determined by their 
contract status and level in the organization. This seniority-dominated pay 
system did little to motivate young employees, as life-long employment was no 
longer available under “enterprise (qiye) status”. The two different statuses and 
different pay benchmarks also made the pay system too complex to be 
transparent.  
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The second problem, and the main reason behind the pay system reform, was 
that the old pay system became inconsistent with the development of the 
organization, due to the limited link between employees’ pay and their actual 
performance. The traditional PSU-style pay system was mainly seniority-based, 
with limited bonuses available for those who performed well. This failed to 
motivate employees, especially those in production positions. Before the pay 
system reform, there was little difference between the pay of employees in 
administration departments and those in production departments, as seniority 
was the most important determinant of pay. Most administrative staff were paid 
as much as those in production positions, such as editors, even though the 
performance of the latter is the key driver of productivity for an organization in 
the publishing industry. As were all commercial PSUs under the new system, 
Organization M was facing a more competitive market following its 
independence―both financially and in terms of employment―from government 
invention. Hence, as its management team sought to improve organizational 
performance in order to better compete in the publishing market, it decided to 
change to a new pay system, which would better motivate employees by linking 
their pay to their performance. As a result, in October 2004, the top management 
of Organization M, proposed a pay system reform aiming to change the old, 
inflexible and seniority-based system into a new one, which they hoped would 
be more systematic and encourage higher performance. The next section 
demonstrates how the pay system reform was launched, highlighting the key 
features of the transition process.  
 
7.4   The PRP reform process 
In October 2004, the chief director of Organization M proposed introducing a 
pay system reform at a management meeting. He claimed that the old pay 
system was no longer consistent with the organization’s development. The 
proposal was quickly accepted by the senior managers of Organization M and, 
after a short discussion period, in the same month a “pay system reform 
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committee” (henceforward “the reform committee”) was formed, made up of 18 
senior managers and directors from different departments of the organization.  
For the committee, the reform had three main goals: to design a new pay system 
which would be more transparent and easier to operate; to link pay under the 
new system appropriately to performance, especially for employees in 
production positions, whose performance played such a critical role in boosting 
the productivity of the whole organization; to introduce proper rewards and 
penalties into the new pay system in order to make the whole organization more 
flexible, and more capable of dealing with market competition, and maintaining 
its financial independence. In order to achieve these goals, a four-step strategy 
was developed by the reform committee, consisting of data collection, the design 
of the new pay system, its implementation, and its evaluation.  
 
7.4.1   Data collection regarding the pre-reform pay system 
The first step of the pay system reform was to collect data about the existing pay 
system, in order to clarify the pay each employee received and provide a 
statistical reference for designing the new system. The wage bill of September 
2004 was chosen, and the human resource management department and financial 
and accounting department worked together to calculate each individual’s pay 
and each department’s expenditure. Samples of individual employees’ monthly 
wage bills are given in Table 7-1. These acted as a reference in the design of the 
new system.  
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Table 7-1: Samples of employees’ monthly pay in the pre-reform pay system in 
Organization M 20 (September 2004) 
Item 
Amount 
     (Yuan) 
Name 
Pay of full-time employees in Organization M (09-2004) 
Fixed 
Pay 
Position 
Allowance 
Duty 
Allowance 
Total 
pay Position Status 
Director 1,700 1,700 2,100 5,500 Senior manager (Level 1) 
Chief editor 2,130 1,700 1,700 5,530 Senior manager (Level 1) 
Vice director 1,580 1,400 1,300 4,280 Senior Manager (Level 2) 
Consultant 	  1,400 1,300 2,700 Senior Manager (Level 2) 
Editing 
department 
director 
1,334 1,500 1,000 3,834 Designer (Level 1) 
Publication 
department 
director 
1,152 1,500 1,000 3,652 Sales (Level 1) 
Chief editor 
department 
director 
1,514 1,300 1,000 3,814 Senior manager (Level 3) 
Office director 1,452 1,300 1,000 3,752 Senior manager (Level 3) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  
Social science 
department 
director 
1,194 1,500 700 3,394 Designer Editor (Level 1) 
Song ** 849 800 	  1,649 Word Editor (Level 3) 
Liu ** 	  1,000 	  1,000 Word Editor (Level 2) 
Summation 2,043 3,300 700 6,043  
	  	  	  	  	  	  
Financial 
department 
director 
1,518 1,500 700 3,718 Designer Editor (Level 1) 
Deng ** 853 1,200 400 2,453 Designer Editor (Level 2) 
Zhang ** 853 800 	  1,653 Word Editor (Level 3) 
Wang ** 853 800 	  1,653 Word Editor (Level 3) 
Xue ** 579 600 	  1,179 Word Editor (Level 4) 
Summation 4,656 4,900 1,100 10,656  
      
… … … … … … 
… … … … … … 
Grand total 64,423 89,000 24,200 177,623  
Source: Internal report of the financial and accounting department in Organization M, 
October 2004 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This shows the actual monthly pay received by full-time employees in Organization M in 
September 2004. Employees’ welfare is not included due to the extreme complexity of the 
calculation system. Furthermore, the employees’ welfare fund was not included in the pay 
system reform as this depends on an individual’s contract status, and is part of the national 
system, thus beyond the scope of the reform within the organization.  
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At the same time as examining individual employees’ pay and the entire wage 
bill of the organization, the total annual expenditure of the organization was also 
reviewed. The HR department and the finance and accounting department 
calculated the total production costs and expenditure of each department in 
2003. All costs were divided into two categories: human resource costs and 
departmental expenditure. Human resource costs denote the total pay of all 
employees within the department, including all pay and bonuses allocated over 
the year. Departmental expenditure included all other spending by the 
department over the year, such as business trip expenses and delegation costs. 
The total costs of each department in 2003 acted as an important benchmark for 
budgeting for department costs over the next year. In the meantime, the outputs 
of all departments with production functions were also reviewed. These would 
then be linked to the total departmental costs, in order to work out the unit cost 
of each procedure involved in the publishing process (e.g., the total annual 
human resource costs of the production department were divided by the total 
annual departmental production, providing the unit labour cost within the 
department). 
 
Although the existing pay system acted as a basic reference point for the design 
of the new pay system in Organization M, information from other organizations 
was also considered, in order to make the new pay system more competitive in 
the local labour market. For example, the pay system for government officials in 
Beijing city was reviewed, acting as a benchmark for management pay in 
Organization M. The minimum wage in Beijing city was also taken into account 
in setting the basic wage. Information about the pay systems of other 
organizations within the publishing industry was not available, due to the large 
amount of sensitivity surrounding the pay system in the publishing sector in 
China.  
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7.4.2   The design of the new pay system 
After reviewing the wage bills and departmental performance, the reform 
committee decided that the new pay system should fulfill three criteria. First, 
both individual employee and departmental annual targets should be introduced 
in the new system, to provide a clear picture of the production and revenue the 
organization aimed to achieve. Second, proper performance appraisals should be 
implemented, and the results should be linked to individuals’ pay. Third, 
departments should take more responsibility for cost control, which would help 
to maintain the cost-revenue balance of the whole organization. Based on these 
criteria, the guidance of the reform committee and the information collected 
during the preparation stage, the HR department proposed a new pay system in 
November 2004, with the following main features.  
The implementation of the internal annual goal-setting 
First, an annual internal goal-setting process was introduced into the new pay 
system, with all employees signing an internal agreement indicating the 
performance target they committed to achieve within the year. According to the 
new system, every year, all department heads would sign an internal contract 
showing the performance targets for their department. A budget for the 
department’s total annual expenses would also be included in the internal 
agreement. The setting of both performance targets and department costs would 
be based on the previous year’s figures, taking inflation and changes in 
performance targets into account. For individual employees, the internal 
agreement would act as the main gauge of their performance at the end of the 
year. For all employees in production departments (e.g., editing and sales 
departments), specific performance targets would be indicated in the internal 
agreement. For other employees, in administration positions, for example, 
detailed job requirements would be indicated, which would be evaluated by their 
supervisor at the end of the year. Unlike before, the position levels in 
Organization M would be based on the performance targets that the employees 
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committed to meet in their annual agreements. Samples of the production 
assignments given to employees in the production departments are shown in 
Table 7.2. Each individual performance target was categorized as falling under a 
certain position level and then linked to the employee’s position pay under the 
new system.  
Table 7-2: Position levels for employees in different production departments in 
Organization M (sample data) 
Department Job position Assignment quota 
Design editing 
department 
Editor (Level 1) Number of editions produced: 27 Gross profit:￥810,000 
Editor (Level 2) Number of editions produced: 20 Gross profit:￥600,000 
Editor (Level 3) Number of editions produced: 15 Gross profit:￥450,000 
Text editing 
department 
Editor (Level 1) Number of words edited: 4,500,000 
Editor (Level 2) Number of words edited: 3,600,000 
Editor (Level 3) Number of words edited: 3,000,000 
Editor (Level 4) Number of words edited: 2,400,000 
Editor (Level 5) Number of words edited: 1,400,000 
 
  Source: Internal pay system policy Organization M, 2005 
Secondly, the new pay system redefined monthly pay for all employees, with the 
aim of achieving internal equity and ensuring that employees in identical 
positions received the same pay (“tong gong tong chou”). In the pre-reform pay 
system, there were three components of an individual employee’s monthly pay: 
“basic pay”, “position allowance” and “duty allowance”. Both “position 
allowance” and “duty allowance” were based on the employee’s position level, 
while “basic pay” was decided by various factors, such as the employee’s 
contract status (PSU or enterprise), education level or seniority. Before the pay 
system reform, there was no systematic definition of positions across the 
organization, and only a very vague link between a person’s pay and their 
position. Thus, the HR department redefined all of the positions throughout the 
organization so that the setting of position pay and duty allowances under the 
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new system would be more transparent. As mentioned earlier, employees in 
production roles were categorized into different position levels, based on the 
performance quota assigned in their internal annual contract, and this was then 
linked to their specific monthly position pay. Meanwhile, in non-production 
departments positions were redefined based on factors such as the individual’s 
educational background, their work experience within the organization and the 
responsibilities involved in their job. In the pre-reform system, there was a wide 
range of positions in the non-production departments, and managers usually had 
specific position titles that were linked to different position or duty allowances. 
For example, prior to the pay reform, the director of the organization and the 
chief editor had received the same position allowance, but different duty 
allowances.  
Under the new pay system, each management category (senior managers, middle 
managers and junior managers) was divided into five levels, each of which was 
defined clearly and linked to specific amounts of position pay and duty 
allowance; all employees at the same position level received the same position 
pay and the same duty allowance. In the new pay system, each employee had a 
specific position, on which their monthly position pay was based. For managers, 
a corresponding “duty allowance” was allocated based on their position level as 
well, using the salaries of government officials in Beijing city as a benchmark. 
Table 7.3 below shows the monthly wages for individual employees before and 
after the pay system reform. The previous “basic pay” was replaced with “fixed 
pay” under the new system, which was introduced in order to guarantee that all 
employees in Organization M would receive more than the local minimum wage 
of Beijing. The fixed pay was set at 600 yuan per month for production staff, and 
500 yuan per month for other employees.  
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Table 7-3: Individual employees’ monthly pay before and after the pay system 
reform21  
 
Name 
 
Monthly pay before the reform Monthly pay after the reform 
Pay 
increase 
Percentage 
increase 
(per cent) Basic 
Pay 
Position 
Allowa
nce 
Duty 
Allow
ance 
Sum Position Title 
Position 
level 
Fixed 
Pay 
Position 
Pay 
Duty 
Allowa
nce 
Sum 
Director 1,700 1,700 2,100 5,500 Director 
Senior 
manager 
(Level 1) 
500 6,500 1,000 8,000 2,500 45.45 
Chief editor 2,130 1,700 1,700 5,530 Chief editor 
Senior 
manager 
(Level 2) 
500 6,000 1,000 7,500 1,970 35.62 
Vice 
director 1,580 1,400 1,300 4,280 
Vice 
director 
Senior 
manager 
(Level 4) 
500 5,000 800 6,300 2,020 47.20 
Consultant  1,400 1,300 2,700 Consultant 
Senior 
manager 
(Level 5) 
500 3,500 800 4,800 2,100 77.78 
Editing 
department 
director 
1,334 1,500 1,000 3,834 
Editing 
department 
director 
Middle 
manager 
(Level 1) 
 
500 4,000 600 5,100 1,266 33.02 
Publication 
department 
director 
1,152 1,500 1,000 3,652 
Publication 
department 
director 
Middle 
manager 
(Level 1) 
 
500 4,000 600 5,100 1,448 39.65 
Chief 
editing 
department 
director 
1,514 1,300 1,000 3,814 
Chief 
editing 
department 
director 
Middle 
manager 
(Level 1) 
500 3,300 600 4,400 586 15.36 
Office 
director 1,452 1,300 1,000 3,752 
Office 
director 
Middle 
manager 
(Level 1) 
500 3,300 600 4,400 648 17.27 
             
Social 
science 
department 
director 
1,194 1,500 700 3,394 
Designing 
Editor 
(Level 1) 
Middle 
manager 
(Level 1) 
500 4,000 400 4,900 1,506 44.37 
Song ** 849 800  1,649 
Word 
Editor 
(Level 3) 
Text 
Editor 
(Level 2) 
600 2,500  3,100 1,451 87.99 
Liu **  1,000  1,000 
Word 
Editor 
(Level 2) 
Text 
Editor 
(Level 2) 
600 2,500  3,100 2,100 210.00 
             
Financial 
department 
director 
1,518 1,500 700 3,718 
Designer 
Editor 
(Level 1) 
Middle 
manger 
(Level 1) 
500 4,000 400 4,900 1,182 31.79 
Deng ** 853 1,200 400 2,453 Designer Editor 
Text 
Editor 600 2,500  3,100 647 26.38 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The change in pay for all employees in Organization M as a result of the pay reform was 
reviewed by the HR department in Organization M, and this table is drawn from the full list.  
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(Level 2) (Level 2) 
Zhang ** 853 800  1,653 
Word 
Editor 
(Level 3) 
Text 
Editor 
(Level 2) 
600 2,500  3,100 1,447 87.54 
Wang ** 853 800  1,653 
Word 
Editor 
(Level 3) 
Text 
Editor 
(Level 2) 
600 2,500  3,100 1,447 87.54 
Xue ** 579 600  1,179 
Word 
Editor 
(Level 4) 
Text 
Editor 
(Level 2) 
600 2,500  3,100 1,921 162.93 
…             
…             
Sum 64,423 89,000 
24,20
0 
17,76
23      
255,4
50 79,277 44.63 
 
  Source: Internal pay sheet in Organization M, 2005 
 
Thirdly, the most important change for the employees in Organization M was the 
introduction of a link between pay and performance, which aimed to encourage 
higher productivity among individuals and departments. Along with the annual 
internal agreement introduced by the reform, each individual would commit to 
achieving an annual performance target, agreed by both the employee and the 
organization. For production staff, the performance target was the main 
benchmark used to set their position pay for the year. The internal contract 
would be renewed every year, and if the performance target changed, the 
position level would be adjusted along with the corresponding position pay. 
More importantly, a standard unit labour cost was introduced, based on the data 
obtained during the preparation stage. Thus, at the end of the year, if employees 
had achieved better performance than indicated in their internal agreement, an 
extra bonus would be provided based on the unit labour cost and the outstanding 
performance they had achieved. At the same time, specific percentage of 
revenue were set for each department, and department heads were authorized to 
distribute an extra bonus within their department if it had exceeded the overall 
performance indicated in the department’s internal agreement. Meanwhile, the 
end of year bonus for administrators and managers was based on the overall 
performance of the whole organization: it was calculated according to the total 
revenue growth and the employee’s individual position level.  
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As well as the extra bonuses offered to those who performed well, the new 
system introduced pay deductions as a means of punishment. If an employee 
failed to fulfill his/her annual performance targets, a pay deduction would be 
made from his/her end of year bonus, and his/her position level could also be 
downgraded in the following year. If a department failed to fulfill its target, the 
HR costs allocated to it would be reduced as would the pay of the department 
director. Additionally, as the quality of publications plays a critical role in the 
organization’s long-term development, any substandard production would not be 
included in the review of total performance, and deductions of pay could also be 
made for below-standard products.  
 
To sum up, the new pay system proposed by the HR department restructured the 
way pay was set for employees in different positions, and introduced an internal 
annual agreement system, which set performance targets for each individual and 
linked their pay to these targets. In order to implement the system appropriately, 
performance appraisals would be used to review both individual and department 
performance, so as to provide a fair benchmark for the pay distribution. The next 
section discusses how the new system was implemented in the organization, 
including how the proposed pay system was adjusted during the reform. 
 
 
7.4.3   Introduction of the new pay system 
After the new pay system had been designed, it was first reviewed by the reform 
committee, and then released at a staff meeting. Although the HR department 
had followed the reform committee’s guidelines and based the new system on 
the performance and financial data collected during the preparation stage, there 
was still some debate among the committee members about the proposed new 
system. One issue concerned the department’s responsibility for their cost 
control. A fixed department budget would be allocated, based on the 
department’s predicted performance and the historical financial report. These 
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department budgets would have to be agreed by both the reform committee and 
the department heads, who would then be in charge of the costs and revenues 
within their own departments. Although the new pay system would give 
department heads more flexibility over the distribution of pay if the department 
achieved a higher performance, the department heads would also have a lot more 
responsibility. They would need to stay within a fixed budget while achieving 
the specific goals included in their internal agreement. Therefore, it was crucial 
to set appropriate targets that both the top managers and the department heads 
were happy with.  
Under the new system proposed by the HR department, the setting of department 
budgets and targets would mainly be based on the results of the previous year, as 
well as factors such as inflation or predictions of annual performance growth. 
However, since this was the first time such internal agreements had been used in 
Organization M, and directly linked to individual pay, the discussion within the 
reform committee mainly took the form of a bargaining process between the 
organization director and individual department heads. The chief director of 
Organization M was very experienced in the publishing industry, and using 
formal and informal communication and historical data as a guide, mutual 
agreements over budgets and performance targets were eventually made with 
each department director.  
Following the review and confirmation by the reform committee, the new pay 
system was released at an internal staff meeting, during which the details were 
explained to all of the employees of Organization M. In December 2004, two 
staff meetings were arranged; at the first, the new system was introduced and 
employees’ comments were encouraged. At the second, employees were asked 
to vote for either the new system or the existing one. Since there was a 
significant pay rise for each employee under the new pay system, all employees 
voted for it. Then, in January 2005, each employee signed their internal 
agreements indicating their annual performance targets, and the new pay system 
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took effect in the same month. The next section discusses the different impacts 
the new pay system has had on Organization M, along with a review of the 
research objectives of this thesis.  
 
7.5   The situation after the implementation of the new pay system  
The new pay system introduced in Organization M was significantly different 
from the previous one. It was the first time that an individual’s pay had been 
linked to their actual performance and to the development of the whole 
organization. The new system brought about a lot of changes. Some of the main 
findings regarding its impact are summarized below.  
First of all, there was a significant pay rise for the employees of Organization M 
under the new pay system, and especially for those working in production who 
committed to achieve higher performance targets. When the system was first 
implemented in 2005, the pay of most administrators and managers increased 
slightly, while some editors’ pay more than doubled (see Table 7.3). In the pre-
reform pay system, employees in production positions (e.g. editors) received 
position pay based mainly on seniority, and there were no specific performance 
requirements for employees in different positions. When the pay system reform 
was introduced, the position pay of each individual was redefined, and based 
mainly on their performance targets. Therefore, those in production roles were 
encouraged to aim for higher performance standards. The monthly pay for a 
junior editor who committed to achieve a high performance target, for example, 
would have increased significantly.  
Secondly, the new pay system was linked to both individual and organizational 
performance, and employees in Organization M showed great potential for 
improving their performance, especially those in production positions, who 
started to set higher performance targets in order to obtain higher pay. According 
to the HR department’s historical performance records, in the first two years 
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after the new pay system was implemented (2005 and 2006), annual productivity 
and revenue in Organization M grew by 20 per cent per year, and after that, an 
average of 5 to 10 per cent annual revenue growth was maintained. The growth 
was mainly a result of the improvement in employees’ performance, especially 
the boost in productivity among those working in the production departments, 
according to the feedback of the vice director of the organization. 
Table 7-4: First mid-year evaluation of individual performance versus targets in 
the production departments of Organization M 
Department Name 
Mid-year assignments 
accomplished 
(thousand words) 
Annual assignment 
(thousand words) 
Percentage of 
annual assignment 
accomplished  
(per cent) 
Notes 
Social Science 
Department 
Liu ** 184.8 240 77.00 	  
Xu ** 104.4 140 74.57 	  
Xu 88 338.7 360 94.08 	  
Song ** 143.9 300 47.97 
Half-year 
target 
unfulfilled 
 
Sales 
Department 
Xue ** 219.3 300 73.10 	  
Wang ** 165.1 300 55.03 	  
Zhang ** 185.4 300 61.80 	  
Yu ** 138.6 140 99.00 	  
 
Series books 
department 
Chen ** 306 360 85.00 	  
Ding ** 182.9 300 60.97 	  
Ren ** 183.6 360 51.00 	  
 
Text book 
department 
Zhou ** 185.45 360 51.51 	  
Qu ** 163.8 300 54.60 	  
Li ** 162.3 300 54.10 	  
 
Editing centre 
Liang ** 295 300 98.33 	  
Zhao ** 143.8 450 31.96 
Half-year 
target 
unfulfilled 
Zhu ** 159 300 53.00 	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Li ** 252.1 300 84.03 	  
Fan ** 391 450 86.89 	  
Zhang ** 433.2 450 96.27 	  
Zhou ** 388.1 450 86.24 	  
Chen ** 	  	  	  	  
Song ** 185.5 300 61.83 	  
Li ** 237.5 360 65.97 	  
Zhang ** 124.5 300 41.50 
Half-year 
target 
unfulfilled 
 
Translating 
centre 
Qiu ** 130.75 100 130.75 19 projects fulfilled 
Zhong ** 200	  Self-learning English: 20,500; Editing: 2,230; Joint-editing: 4,350 (thousand words) 
   
Source: Mid-year performance evaluation in Organization M, July 2005 
 
Thirdly, the introduction of the annual internal agreement helped to clarify the 
performance targets of individual employees, and to predict the organization’s 
output through the year. In setting the performance criteria for both individuals 
and departments, the previous year’s performance was taken into consideration, 
allowing for the expected growth rate. For each employee, the performance 
target they aimed for was linked to their position pay, and the fulfillment of the 
target was linked to the end of year bonus they received. Since a failure to meet 
their target would lead to a pay deduction, employees tended to put realistic 
targets in their internal agreements. Thus, at the beginning of each year, the 
management team of Organization M would have an overview of the predicted 
organizational performance, based on the performance targets of the individual 
employees.  
At the same time, the setting of performance targets helped to align the interests 
of the employees with those of the organization, and also reduced conflict by 
allocating performance tasks though two-way communication. For example, 
both the revenue and quality of published products play an important role in an 
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organization’s development in the publishing market. Under a PRP scheme, 
employees will tend to choose more popular books as they will produce higher 
revenue and thus higher salaries. However, some books, such as certain 
academic titles, while perhaps not very popular in the commercial market, will 
help to build an organization’s brand. As a result, Organization M would still 
want to includ such titles in its performance targets. Thus when finalizing 
internal annual agreements, tasks would need to be properly allocated, so as to 
align the interests of the individual employees and the organization. According 
to the director of the HR department of Organization M, for some non-revenue-
bringing productions, the revenue requirements and pay distribution would be 
adjusted during the setting of performance targets, so as to balance employees’ 
targets and achieve the overall aims of the organization.  
As well as the changes in employees’ performance levels, the pay system reform 
also affected their motivation. The effects on production staff differed from 
those on administrative staff. According to the director of the HR department, 
production staff had more opportunities to earn higher pay by working harder 
under the new system. Therefore, most of them were highly motivated after it 
was implemented, and a large increase in their intrinsic motivation was 
observed, especially at first. Compared to this, the motivation of administrative 
staff increased only moderately, as the potential pay increases for them were not 
as significant. Before the introduction of the new system, administrative staff 
usually received similar pay to production staff. After the pay system reform, 
however, the average pay for administrative staff was set to 85 per cent of the 
average pay for production staff. Thus, although everyone enjoyed a pay 
increase as a result of the reform, administrative staff were not as excited about 
the change as their colleagues in production departments. However, the end of 
year bonus for employees in both management and administrative positions were 
based on the overall achievements of the organization, which was mainly the 
result of the productivity of the production departments. Therefore, although 
there were some complaints about the enlarged pay gaps under the new system, 
a moderate increase in the motivation and performance levels of non-production 
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employees was also observed when the new pay system was implemented. A 
brief summary of the different impacts of the new pay system on Organization 
M is presented in Table 7-5.  
Table 7-5: Summary of the pay system reform in Organization M (Interviewees: 
the vice director of Organization M, the HR director and three employees in the 
HR department) 
Research 
objectives 
Summary of interview 
questions 
Summary of findings 
Change of pay  Q1: What was the change in 
the pay system following the 
reform?   
Redefined pay system with higher 
average pay for all individuals. 
More significant pay increase for 
employees in production positions 
who achieved higher performance 
levels. 
Questions 
regarding 
expectancy 
theory 
Q2: Do you think employees 
in your organization could 
improve their performance by 
working harder? 
Yes. 
Q3: If an employee works 
harder, can (s)he obtain higher 
pay under the new PRP 
system? 
Yes. 
Q4: How great is the pay 
difference between high-
performing employees and 
others? 
Significant pay advantages for 
employees who perform well under 
the new system.  
Questions 
regarding goal-
setting theory 
Q5: How were the criteria for 
PRP chosen during the 
reform? 
Proposed by the HR department, 
based on reference data drawn from 
internal historical records and the 
pay systems of local government 
officials. They consulted with all 
department deputies and the 
proposed system was reviewed by 
the pay reform committee before it 
was released.  
Q6: Do the criteria included in 
the performance evaluation 
help to clarify the goals of the 
organization? 
Yes. 
Q7: Do the criteria help to 
clarify the goals of individual 
employees? 
Yes. 
Questions 
regarding 
agency theory 
Q8: Has the implementation 
of the new PRP system 
reduced unwanted actions 
Yes. 
	   165 
within the organization? 
Questions 
regarding 
cognitive 
evaluation 
theory 
Q9: What impact has the new 
PRP system had on 
employees’ intrinsic 
motivation?  
Employees are better motivated, 
especially those in production 
positions. 
Questions 
regarding 
equity theory 
Q10: What do you think of the 
idea of linking pay to 
performance in this 
organization? 
Agree with it.  
Q11: Do you think the current 
distribution of pay in your 
organization is fair?  
Fairer than the previous pay system.  
Q12: Has the new PRP system 
caused any jealousy among 
the employees? 
Yes. There has been more debate 
regarding the different pay increases 
for employees in different positions.  
Q13: Equity or equality, 
which do you think is more 
important?  
Equity.  
Further 
comments 
Q14: What do you think of the 
PRP reform for employees in 
the publishing sector? 
More PRP is the trend. 
Q15: How do you think the 
current PRP system in your 
organization could be 
improved? 
 
How to balance the responsibility 
and flexibility of department heads 
is an important challenge that needs 
to be addressed. 
7.6   Chapter Summary  
Generally speaking, the pay system reform launched in Organization M was 
quite successful. After it was implemented, a significant increase in individuals’ 
productivity levels was observed, especially among employees in production 
positions (see Table 7-3). It was the first time that a structured PRP system has 
been used in Organization M, where not only was the pay of employees in 
production positions linked to their individual performance, but also the end of 
year bonuses of employees in administrative and management positions, were 
related to the performance of the whole organization. The next chapter presents a 
cross-case analysis of the pay system reform in the state schools in the 
compulsory education system in County H, and that in Organization M, the aim 
being to provide a comparative investigation into how the pay systems in 
different PSUs in China have been changed.  
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Chapter 8   Discussion   
 
Chapters 6 and 7 presented the results of two in-depth case studies that were 
carried out to determine the impact the recent pay system reform has had on 
different PSUs in China. These included a sample of six state schools in County 
H that went through the national PRP system reform of the compulsory 
education sector, and an organization-initiated reform towards a performance-
oriented pay system in a publishing organization in Beijing (Organization M). In 
this chapter, the findings of a cross-case analysis will be presented, and linked to 
the aims of this study.  
First, the changes of pay system in the sample PSUs will be reviewed, including 
the process of how PRP was introduced in different organizations. Second, the 
findings will be discussed under the framework of the NEP, comparing the 
similarities and differences between the implementation of PRP in PSUs with 
different characteristics. Thirdly, the chapter will look at how the employees in 
different PSUs reacted to these changes in the pay system. In this, a range of 
research objectives are explored, and we draw on different motivational theories, 
such as expectancy theory, goal-setting theory, agency theory, cognitive 
evaluation theory and equity theory. Finally, some unexpected findings 
regarding the pay system reforms in different PSUs will be presented, and this 
will be followed by a table summarizing the cross-case comparative analysis of 
all of the PSUs investigated.  
 
8.1   An overview of the pay system reforms in different PSUs in China 
In order to investigate the pay system reforms introduced in the PSU sector in 
China, two in-depth case studies—six state schools in County H and one 
publishing organization in Beijing—were carried out. Although the pay system 
	   167 
reform in both cases aimed to better motivate employees by linking their pay to 
actual performance, significant differences were observed across the 
organizations. 
First, the origins of the pay system reform were different in the two cases, 
within the compulsory education sector, the national government required 
schools to implement the PRP system reform. Meanwhile, the publishing 
organization launched its pay system reform itself. As explained in the first case 
study, due to the public welfare characteristics of the Chinese compulsory 
education system, the PRP system for schoolteachers in the compulsory 
education sector was intended to solve the twofold problem of motivating high 
teaching performance while attracting and retaining good teachers in less 
developed areas, where they had previously received low pay. A general 
guideline was announced by the national government, with the local government 
acting as a supervisor—introducing the pay system reform into individual 
schools and providing full financial support at the same time. In the second case 
study, as a PSU of a commercial nature, the publishing organization mainly 
targeted its pay system reform at encouraging higher performance. Here, the 
organization was aiming to compete better in the publishing market, after being 
forced to transform into an enterprise following the removal of government 
financial support.  
Second, the implementation of the new pay systems brought different changes 
to employees’ pay depending on the characteristics of the PSUs, especially in the 
case of the schoolteachers, where both “winners” and “losers” could be 
identified across schools as a result of the reform. Due to the previously unequal 
distribution of teaching resources among schools in County H and the traditional 
system of charging a “sponsorship fee”, employees in popular schools tended to 
be “losers” following the PRP reform, as it meant that their pay would be 
allocated from the government budget, with no extra bonuses coming from other 
financial sources. Due to the standardization of pay levels across schools, pay 
gaps between teachers from different schools disappeared: the salaries of 
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teachers in some rural schools increased considerably while those of teachers in 
some of the popular schools decreased. Compared to the government-led pay 
system reform, the organization-initiated reform in the publishing organization 
allowed much more flexibility. In Organization M, although employees were 
given the choice to stay with the pre-reform pay system, all employees chose to 
follow the new pay scheme as this brought about a pay increase for each 
individual, ensuring there were no “losers” as a result of the reform.  
Another difference between the two cases is the implementation process of the 
reforms at the organizational level. In the compulsory education sector, the first 
official government policy setting out the pay system reform for all 
schoolteachers within the compulsory education system (“the guide”, introduced 
in Chapter 6) was released on December 23rd 2008. This announced that the new 
PRP system would start from January 1st 2009, nationwide. Due to the short time 
period between the official announcement by the central government and the 
actual start time of the reform, there was no time for either local governments or 
individual schools to prepare for the reform. According to the deputy director of 
the Bureau of Education in County H, although the total amount of pay for all 
employees in the local county involved in the reform was calculated at the start 
of the process, it took the Bureau of Education in County H more than eight 
months to release a detailed guide to implementation for the compulsory 
education schools in the local area. This was due to the fact that the county 
government spent six months waiting for further instructions from the provincial 
government. Then, after this policy guide was released, it took individual 
schools a few months more to decide how the “encouraging performance pay” 
should be distributed within their school. According to one official in the Bureau 
of Education in County H, the encouraging performance related pay systems in 
most state schools in the county were confirmed by the end of 2009. The 
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decision about the internal pay distribution system in some schools was finally 
approved in February 2010, just before the Chinese new year of 201022.  
In contrast to this, a structured pre-reform preparation stage was implemented 
during the pay system reform in the publishing organization, and the data 
collected during the preparation stage helped to provide a solid reference point 
for the design and introduction of the new pay system within the organization. 
The idea of introducing a pay system to encourage higher performance was 
proposed by the chief director in October 2004, and the new pay system was 
approved by December 2004 and took effect from January 2005. In other words, 
the whole preparation and decision-making process regarding the changes to the 
pay system in Organization M was completed within three months―much more 
efficient than the implementation of the government-led PRP reform in the 
schools.  
As discussed in previous chapters, introducing an effective performance pay 
system was the central aim of the pay system reform in both cases. During the 
field research, when asked the question “what do you think of the idea of linking 
pay to performance?”, all of the interviewees, including both managers (head 
teachers) and employees in the different PSUs, as well as government officials 
involved in the pay system reform, agreed with the idea that pay should be 
linked to actual performance. However, due to the great diversity in the 
organizational characteristics of different PSUs, significant differences in the 
implementation of the new PRP systems, and in the impacts of the reforms, were 
noticed in different sample organizations. In the next section, findings related to 
the predictions of the NEP will be presented, followed by a discussion of how 
employees in different PSUs reacted to the changes, as well as further findings 
that go beyond the proposed research objectives.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 According to the policy for the PRP reform in the compulsory education system in 
County H, the “encouraging performance pay” for the whole school would be kept by the 
government, and employees would only receive this part of their salary once the distribution 
system had been agreed within the school. In other words, if the school’s pay system could 
not be agreed upon at a staff meeting, none of the employees of the school would receive 
their “encouraging performance related pay”. 	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8.2   PRP in different PSUs and the predictions of the NEP  
The NEP yields numerous testable predictions concerning the choice and 
implementation of pay systems. It “incorporates the measurement of 
performance and output, monitoring behaviour and effort and various product 
and labour market characteristics like quality/quantity trade-offs and the extent 
of technical change” (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998: 1). As an important theory in 
the field of pay system research, the NEP explains why some workers are paid 
on the basis of their output while others are paid according to their inputs. As 
explained in Chapter 3, according to the guidelines produced by the central 
government, one of the main targets of the recent pay system reform across the 
PSU sector in China was to link pay to performance. However, although it is 
believed that the idea of linking pay to performance was well accepted by 
employees in China (Chow, 1992; De Cieri et al. 1998; Chiu et al., 2002), due to 
the wide range of organizations in the Chinese PSU sector, there may be some 
occupations for which PRP is inappropriate. For example, teaching is in theory 
among the least suitable professions for linking pay to performance (Marsden 
and Belfield, 2006). In light of this diversity, one of the most important 
questions this research aims to explore is whether the implementation of PRP in 
different PSUs is consistent with the predictions of the NEP.  
Comparing the reforms in the two categories of PSU, it was observed that, 
although in both cases they were aimed at more effectively linking pay to 
performance, different changes were made to the amount of pay attached to 
employees’ performance. In the case of the compulsory education schools in 
County H, all of the sample schools had in fact reduced the proportion of pay 
available to those who performed well. For example, bonuses for unexpected 
tasks were available prior to the reform but not under the new pay system, and 
bonuses for those who achieved outstanding performance (e.g., supervising 
students who went on to win special awards) were reduced in most schools, 
especially in popular schools where inadequate funds were allocated. On the 
other hand, compared to the previous seniority-based pay system, the new pay 
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system adopted in the publishing organization became highly related to 
individual performance. The salaries of employees in production departments 
were mainly based on their annual performance, while the pay of administrative 
staff or those in management positions was based on their level of responsibility 
as well as the performance of the whole organization. Considering the 
predictions of the NEP, there could be several reasons for such differences in the 
implementation of PRP. 
According to the NEP, the most common factors behind the choice between 
basic pay and PRP are measurement and monitoring costs. When the monitoring 
of behaviour and effort is costly, an organization is less likely to use time-based 
rates and will prefer to use an output or performance-based pay measure, while 
when the cost of measuring output is high, the organization will use time-based 
rates (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998). According to the predictions of the NEP, 
linking pay to performance is likely to be less suitable for schoolteachers, mainly 
because the nature of their work is imprecise and characterized by multiple 
tasks, which makes their performance difficult to monitor and control (Murnane 
and Cohen, 1986; Marsden and Belfield, 2006). Such characteristics of teachers’ 
work were observed in all of the sample schools within the compulsory 
education system in County H, and the so-called PRP introduced in the schools 
actually had limited measurable performance criteria in all cases; in particular, 
both national and local government policies advised reducing the use of 
students’ exam results to gauge teachers’ performance to a minimum within the 
compulsory education system. Therefore, although the pay system reform was 
meant to link pay to performance, the new pay systems implemented in the 
schools were mainly based on employees’ working hours and the attendance rate 
became the dominant measure of performance when distributing encouraging 
performance pay. This choice of performance evaluation criteria was mainly due 
to the imprecise nature of teachers’ work and the multiple tasks involved, which 
make it very difficult to measure their actual performance. Working hours was 
simply the easiest criterion to measure.  
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Compared to the situation in the schools, it is more difficult to monitor the input 
of employees in the publishing organization. For example, editors may have 
flexible working hours as they may work at home beyond normal work hours. At 
the same time, performance evaluation in the publishing organization also tends 
to be easier, especially for employees in production positions, whose 
performance can be measured according to their actual productivity (e.g., total 
words edited or published etc.) or the amount of revenue/profit achieved. 
Therefore, Organization M found it easier to link individuals’ pay to their actual 
performance, and such objective performance criteria were happily accepted by 
employees in different positions. For employees in non-production positions, 
meanwhile, flexible pay was linked to the overall performance of the 
organization, particularly the organization’s annual production and revenue 
growth, again, measurable objective data that convinced the employees. 
Thus, despite the original purpose of implementing PRP being similar in both 
cases, the actual systems employed were quite different. Due to the lack of 
measureable criteria among the teachers’ outputs in the compulsory education 
schools, the new pay systems were actually linked more to input than output, 
with employees’ working hours the dominant criteria in the distribution of 
encouraging performance pay, in all six schools investigated. The new pay 
system introduced in Organization M, on the other hand, successfully linked pay 
to performance; individuals’ annual targets and their fulfillment were taken to be 
the most important benchmark in setting their pay after the reform. Such 
divergence in the choice of pay-setting criteria between the two cases is 
consistent with the predictions of the NEP, which suggests that organizations for 
which the cost of measuring output is low will tend to adopt PRP (Organization 
M), while those with high output measurement costs but a relatively low cost of 
monitoring input will prefer a system of pay-by-basic (schools in the compulsory 
education sector).  
As well as looking at the relative costs of monitoring input and measuring 
output, the NEP also provides many predictions regarding the choice of pay 
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system, and other organizational characteristics such as features of the labour 
market and the product market (for details, see Table 4.1, Chapter 4). These 
were also found to be consistent with the findings observed in the sample PSUs 
in both cases. 
First, the NEP indicates that, if an employee can earn a relatively high wage in 
an alternative firm, the firm will be likely to use PRP since this allows the 
employee to boost his or her earnings via extra effort, thereby preventing him or 
her from moving to another firm (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998). This prediction was 
found to be consistent with the evidence observed in the schools and the 
publishing organization. In the case of the compulsory education system, 
previous pay gaps between schools were removed during the reform, and 
standardized average pay was adopted across the county, fully funded by the 
local government. Before the reform, due to the different funding resources 
available to schools―especially popular ones which tended to receive a large 
amount of “sponsor fees”―extra allowances would be provided for high-
performing employees at most schools. After the pay system reform, due to the 
ban on any non-government funding, an egalitarian distribution of pay turned 
out to be the preferred choice for the majority of employees in the schools. Each 
employee expected to receive their fair share (i.e., the average) of the total pay 
allocated to the school, which led to a significant reduction in the percentage of 
pay that was linked to employees’ performance. The same situation was reported 
by the head teachers of all of the sample schools investigated.  
On the other hand, as Organization M belongs to the category of PSUs that have 
been pushed into the market and forced to fund themselves, its employees have 
more opportunities to seek a higher wage in a competing publishing firm. 
Therefore, the new performance-based pay system was introduced in order to 
attract and maintain high-performing employees. Employees can boost their 
earnings via extra effort under the new pay system, and high-performing staff 
are less likely to leave in search of higher wages elsewhere. Hence, the 
differences observed between the two cases are consistent with the prediction of 
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the NEP that the opportunity wage―the pay the employee could earn 
elsewhere―is positively related to the use of PRP (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998).  
Second, in the case of the schools, although jobs are similar across different 
types of schools, it was observed that, for teachers in junior high schools, more 
of the performance criteria were linked to students’ performance in the new pay 
system, compared to those introduced for their counterparts in primary schools. 
According to the feedback from the head teachers of both the primary and the 
junior high schools, the difference was mainly due to the different graduation 
systems of the two levels of school. Graduates of junior high schools must take 
the high school entrance exam while primary school graduates do not need to 
take an exam due to the requirement of compulsory education. These differences 
in the competition between graduates led to the differences in the weight given 
to performance criteria based on students’ performance. This is consistent with 
the prediction of the NEP that an intensification of competition promotes the 
adoption of some form of PRP (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998). Thus, although the 
proportion of pay linked to students’ performance was found to be reduced in all 
of the sample schools, the exam performance of the students remained an 
essential criterion when evaluating teachers’ performance in all three of the 
junior high schools, while no such criteria were included in the performance 
measurement used in the primary schools.  
Some further predictions of NEP theory were also supported by the case studies. 
For example, NEP theory predicts that organizations whose staff have longer 
tenures (e.g., schools within the compulsory education sector belonging to the 
traditional PSU system) will tend to use time-based rates, whereas those with 
short tenures (e.g., Organization M, which has been pushed into the market with 
an increased turnover of staff) are usually associated with PRP.  
To sum up, the original goal of linking pay to performance being the same in the 
two cases, the new pay systems implemented in these two different groups of 
PSUs varied in the method used to judge performance and set pay. For schools 
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within the compulsory education system in County H, where the costs of 
measuring output are high, there is a wide range of job tasks, little difference in 
the wages paid by different schools, and on average a long tenure among the 
employees, the new pay system turned out to be more input-based than 
performance based. The working hours of different groups of employees were 
found to be the most dominant criteria used to distribute pay, and the percentage 
of pay available for employees who achieved higher performance was reduced in 
all of the sample schools during the reform.  
In contrast, the new pay system introduced in Organization M successfully 
linked the employees’ pay to their performance. In the case of this publishing 
organization, which has been pushed into the market, the job tasks are easier to 
define, employees’ performance is less costly to measure, competition in both 
the labour market and the product market is higher, with potentially higher 
wages available in other firms and increased turnover among the employees. All 
of these characteristics are consistent with the type of organization predicted by 
the NEP to implement PRP. Therefore, when we come to the question of “How 
does performance related pay fit into different PSUs in China?” (Q1), the actual 
implementation of PRP systems observed in the case studies were found to be 
highly consistent with the NEP’s predictions. This suggests that the NEP could 
be a powerful theory for predicting the effectiveness of introducing PRP into 
different PSUs in China. Linking pay to performance may not be a suitable 
choice in some PSUs, such as compulsory education schools, where the nature 
of the jobs and the labour and product markets could make pay-by-basic a better 
option than pay-by-performance.  
 
8.3   Pay system reform and its impact 
To explore the application of PRP in the PSU sector in China, different 
motivational theories, including expectancy theory, goal-setting theory, agency 
theory, cognitive evaluation theory and equity theory, were discussed earlier in 
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this thesis. Based on the theory and the literature review, a list of research 
objectives was proposed, aiming to investigate the changes in employees’ 
motivation during the pay system reform in different PSUs. In the next section, 
findings drawn from different motivational theories will be presented, relating to 
both cases and revealing the impact the change in pay systems has had on the 
employees’ motivation in the sample PSUs investigated. 
 
8.3.1   The assumptions of expectancy theory 
According to expectancy theory, employees’ willingness to supply the required 
effort will depend on their perception of the link between performance and 
reward (Marsden and Belfield, 2009). In other words, if employees do not think 
they will get the reward even if they perform well, they will have no incentive to 
do anything other than supply a low level of effort (Marsden, French et al., 
2001). Therefore, based on the assumptions of expectancy theory, three 
questions were explored when investigating the pay system reform in the two 
cases.  
The first question asks whether employees can improve their performance by 
working harder (Q2a). In each sample organization, all of the interviewees (both 
managers/head teachers and regular employees) agreed that employees could 
improve their performance by working harder. Both the teachers and the head 
teachers of the schools believed that the performance of the employees in their 
schools could be improved, especially regarding tasks which went beyond the 
obligation to teach class. In the case of the publishing organization, according to 
the feedback from the HR department based on the information collected in 
preparation for the reform, employees from different departments showed a 
willingness to improve their performance. Those in production positions 
especially admitted that they could improve their performance if they were 
offered better motivation through the linking of pay to performance.  
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The second question was: “If the employee works harder, will he/she get higher 
pay?” (Q2b). Although all of the interviewees agreed that employees could get 
higher pay through working harder under the new pay system, the amount of 
bonus available for higher performance differed significantly between the two 
cases. In the compulsory education sector, due to the fixed amount of total pay 
allocated to each school under the new pay system, the proportion of pay 
attached to higher performance was found to have fallen in all sample schools, 
and by a considerable amount in the popular schools. Meanwhile, the principle 
of “those who work harder should get higher pay” (duo lao duo de) was reported 
to be better implemented after the pay system reform in the publishing 
organization, where individuals’ performance became the most important 
benchmark when setting wages under the new system.  
The third question asks whether the employees perceive the bonus they would 
receive by working harder to be valuable (Q2c). In contrast to the general 
agreement on the first two questions, there was significant divergence in the 
interviewees’ responses to this question, depending on the PSU for which they 
worked. For example, due to the previously imbalanced distribution of teaching 
resources, some schools were more popular than others before the reform 
because of their reputation for good teaching (e.g., a high percentage of 
experienced teachers or better teaching facilities). As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
traditional “sponsor fee” charging system in the education sector provided extra 
funding for popular schools, and part of this income was used to provide extra 
bonuses to employees before the pay system reform. According to both the head 
teachers and the teachers interviewed, before the reform, schools could be more 
flexible when setting internal bonuses, and teachers who achieved higher 
performance or employees who took on extra workloads (e.g., organizing events, 
being on-duty during vacations) usually received bonuses for the extra effort 
they had made. However, following the reform, no non-government funding was 
allowed, causing a significant drop in the amount of pay attached to higher 
performance or extra workloads in many schools, especially in popular schools 
that had previously granted large bonuses. In the case study, although only 
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Schools A and D experienced a reduction in their total wage bill, four schools 
reported a decrease in the amount of extra pay available for high-performing 
employees (Schools A, B, D and E). In Schools B and E, although average pay 
increased, due to the removal of the bonus for higher/extra performance, the 
amount of pay attached to higher performance or extra workload decreased; pay 
distribution became more egalitarian, with smaller pay gaps between employees 
with different performance levels. The two exceptions were Schools C and F, 
where the total wage bill was boosted most significantly when the PRP reform 
was implemented. Nevertheless, according to the head teachers of these schools, 
although the actual bonus available to high performers rose due to the substantial 
increase in average pay, as a percentage of total pay it fell, compared to before 
the reform. As a result, many employees, especially from the popular schools 
(e.g., School A, B, D and E), found the bonuses less attractive under the new 
system. In the less popular schools, where the average pay increased 
significantly and brought slightly wider pay gaps between employees (School C 
and F), although the amount of pay attached to higher performance increased 
slightly, it brought only a very limited change in employees’ attitudes.  
On the other hand, in the case of the publishing organization, due to the 
significant increase in the amount of pay available to employees who committed 
to achieving higher performance levels under the new pay system, employees 
were observed to value the bonus attached to higher performance much more, as 
reported by the HR department. For example, under the new pay system, 
employees were allowed to set their own annual performance targets, which 
would decide the amount of pay they received. Once the new pay system was 
launched, the pay of employees in the production departments increased most 
significantly. The pay of some of the more experienced employees more than 
doubled. Thus, once the pay system reform was implemented, a much wider pay 
gap was observed in Organization M. Most of the employees, and especially 
those in the production departments, found the bonus for working hard much 
more valuable under the new pay system, according to the HR manager of the 
organization.  
	   179 
To sum up, regarding the fulfillment of expectancy theory in the two cases, our 
results suggest that all three conditions (Q2a, Q2b, and Q2c) were fulfilled in the 
publishing organization, but not all were met in the sample schools, mainly due 
to the limited amount of pay available to those who perform well.  
 
8.3.2   The application of goal-setting theory 
Goal-setting theory emphasizes the virtues of setting clear, acceptable and 
achievable work goals within an organization (e.g., Locke, 1968; Marsden and 
Richardson, 1994, etc.). It claims that the way appraisals and goal-setting divide 
employees into different performance grades is usually critical to the success of 
PRP, especially in the public sector where services may be multifaceted 
(Marsden et al., 2001). Therefore, the next important question in this research 
was how the criteria for PRP were chosen in the PSUs (Q3).  
In the literature on PRP for schoolteachers, it is stated that one of the biggest 
problems in designing a workable model of performance pay for schools has 
been the operationalization of suitable performance criteria, because teachers’ 
work is ‘imprecise’, and frequently involves a range of different kinds of 
activities, some of which are more amenable to measurement than others, for 
example students’ test results versus educating future citizens (Marsden and 
Belfield, 2004, 2006). Education may have many goals, but the “public’s most 
immediate concern in educating its children is to provide the skills necessary to 
ensure a productive populace” (Lazear, 2003: 183). This is the goal that the 
compulsory education sector in China aims to achieve. However, in the case 
study, differences in goal setting between the primary and junior high schools 
were noticed, which were mainly due to the different graduation systems for 
primary and junior high school students.  
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As mentioned in Chapter 6, under the compulsory education system in China, 
graduates from primary schools are automatically allocated to a junior high 
school in their local area, while graduates from junior high schools must take the 
high school entrance exam in their county/city and then apply to certain high 
schools according to their exam results. This difference was found to influence 
the goal setting in the two types of school significantly. No performance criteria 
based on students’ exam results were included by the primary schools, while a 
much more complicated performance evaluation system was implemented in the 
junior high schools, with bonuses linked to students’ exam results. Six sample 
schools were investigated: three primary schools (A, B and C) and three junior 
high schools (D, E and F). During the interviews, it was observed that, despite 
fundamental agreement on the schools’ responsibility to provide high quality 
teaching, only the head teachers of the three junior high schools emphasized 
improving students’ academic performance as one of their most important goals. 
This is because the number of students from a given junior high school who get 
into top high schools, based on the graduation exam, acts as the main benchmark 
by which students and parents judge that junior high school’s teaching quality.  
This difference in the goal setting of the two types of school seemed to play an 
important role in the implementation of the new PRP system. For example, very 
few criteria were linked to pupils’ academic performance in the new pay systems 
in the three primary schools. The only one was a small bonus granted to teachers 
of students who received certain awards. In other words, the new pay systems 
adopted in all three primary schools were mainly input-based, focusing on 
workload and attendance rate. The new pay systems in the junior high schools 
were much more complicated, with all three schools adopting a points-
calculation system (for a sample system, see Appendix 5). Under these systems, 
an employee’s performance would be evaluated according to different criteria, 
with specific points awarded or deducted for each category of performance (e.g, 
a detailed conversion rate was introduced between the working hours of teachers 
of different subjects, with points awarded for different workloads, or deducted if 
a teacher failed to attend certain activities/meetings). Although employees’ 
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working hours were used as the main criteria in all three junior high schools, 
students’ academic performance (e.g., exam results) were also considered 
important benchmarks for evaluating teachers’ performance. Detailed calculation 
methods/formulas were listed in the new pay systems of each of the junior high 
schools investigated (see Appendix 5).  
In the interviews, when asked to review the decision process used to determine 
the performance criteria in the new system, all of the head teachers agreed that 
deciding how to set the criteria, and how much pay to attach to different 
performance levels, was the most challenging part of the pay system reform. As 
required by the education bureau in County H, in each school a “PRP reform 
committee” was in charge of the reform. The committee was in charge of setting 
specific performance criteria and determining how employees’ “encouraging 
performance pay” would be linked to such criteria. According to the government 
regulations, the new pay system had to be approved by more than two thirds of 
the school’s employees. Then, a “performance appraisal committee” was formed 
in each school, in charge of the performance evaluation when the new PRP 
system was implemented. The “performance appraisal committee” in each 
school included the head teacher, deputy head teacher, and representatives from 
different groups of employees, such as middle managers and class teachers. 
However, although there were differences in the performance criteria used in 
different schools, all of the interviewees (including both head teachers and 
teachers) across the different schools agreed that personal bias had to be 
excluded during performance appraisals, to ensure the system was fair. It was 
observed that the performance evaluation systems introduced in all the sample 
schools were mainly based on objective criteria, with subjective measurement 
reduced to a minimum. Thus, although the “performance appraisal committee” 
was in charge of employees’ performance evaluations, the employees’ 
performance would mainly be evaluated according to specific objective 
measurements, and the supervisor would have limited involvement in the 
appraisal process. 
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Compared to the multiple goals used in the compulsory education sector, the 
goal setting by the publishing firm tended to be less complicated. When asked 
about the goals of Organization M, the deputy director confirmed that 
productivity, quality and profit were the main goals, and that these were also 
included in the performance measurement of each individual under the new pay 
system. During the reform, a reform committee, which was made up of 18 
members including senior managers and directors from different departments in 
the organization, was in charge of setting the performance criteria for each 
position. According to the feedback from the deputy director of Organization M, 
the goal setting of each department was negotiated between the senior managers 
and the department head, with historical data on departmental costs and revenue 
used as the main reference during the process. As introduced in Chapter 7, once 
the new pay system was proposed, it was released and discussed at a staff 
meeting involving all employees. Once the new pay system was confirmed by a 
majority vote among the employees, each employee in Organization M had to 
sign an annual internal contract, clarifying the specific performance target they 
committed to achieve. The process of setting out this individual annual contract 
was again a two-way communication process, mainly between the individual 
employee and the department head (e.g., employees could choose a high 
performance target, or simply use the previous year’s performance record to set 
the next year’s target). Once the individual’s internal contract was confirmed, a 
corresponding monthly wage would be allocated based on the annual 
performance target. Then, at the end of each year, the performance of each 
employee would be evaluated by his or her supervisor (usually the department 
head), mainly comparing this to their performance target agreed at the beginning 
of the year. Then, an annual bonus would be allocated, based on the fulfillment 
of their annual performance target. In the system, although supervisors play an 
important role in evaluating employees’ performance, it can be seen that the 
overall performance appraisal is again mainly based on objective criteria. All of 
the members of the reform committee of Organization M agreed that personal 
bias should be reduced to a minimum in performance evaluation.   
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To sum up, the performance criteria for the new PRP systems introduced in both 
cases were proposed by a “reform committee” in each organization, and the new 
pay system was approved by the majority of employees at a staff meeting. In the 
case of the schools, due to the different competitive environments faced by the 
primary and junior high schools, performance measurement in the junior high 
schools was found to be more structured, with detailed points systems involving 
specific criteria relating to students’ academic performance adopted in all three 
junior high schools investigated. In the case of the publishing organization, a 
negotiation process was used to set individual performance targets, ensuring they 
were acceptable to both the employee and his/her supervisor. However, despite 
the differences between the goals of the schools and the publishing organization, 
one important feature of both cases is that the performance criteria tend to be 
objective measurements. Both the managers and the employees across the 
different PSUs agreed that subjective measurement should be avoided in order to 
reduce personal bias to a minimum in the performance appraisal process.  
 
8.3.3   Agency theory and moral hazard 
According to Marsden and Belfield (2009), the application of PRP enables 
management to attach rewards to certain discretionary activities and not others. 
Thus it gives a signal as to which activities the management values most, and so 
guides work priorities. By rewarding particular aspects of a job, PRP sends out 
messages about what is valued and the sort of behaviour that is desired 
(Chamberlin et al., 2002). Scholars have warned that using simplistic measures 
of performance can easily bias performance towards tasks which are more easily 
measured and away from the, equally important but harder to measure, 
qualitative aspects of a person’s job (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Marsden 
and Belfield, 2009, etc.). As discussed above, in both case studies, the new 
performance criteria set in all of the sample PSUs were mainly objective, which 
might be counter-productive, leading to employees being too focused on hitting 
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their measurable targets while ignoring other important elements. In light of this 
discussion of goal-setting theory, the next question investigated in this research 
is whether the introduction of PRP in different PSUs has helped to align the 
interests of different parties and reduce moral hazard among their employees 
(Q4).  
In the case of the pay system reform in Organization M, according to the 
feedback from the HR director, the introduction of annual contracts in the new 
pay system has helped to align the interests of the organization with those of 
individual employees. For instance, under the new pay system, when each 
department head signs their annual internal contract, they discuss it with the 
senior managers and clarify the annual budget and performance targets for the 
department. Through this negotiation process, the departmental performance 
targets are made consistent with the interests of the whole organization. Then, 
the employees’ annual contracts are discussed between the department head and 
the individual employees, with the aim of aligning the interests of the individual 
employee with the goals of the department. Since the new performance appraisal 
scheme is mainly based on the volume of books published and the profits 
achieved, it was expected that employees might choose books they believed 
would be most profitable. However, for development purposes, the publishing 
organization has to publish some books each year, such as academic books, that 
may not be very popular in the commercial market but will help to build the 
organization’ branding. These books are therefore included in the organization’s 
performance target. Thus, when setting the employees’ annual agreements, tasks 
are allocated so as to align the interests of the individual employees with those 
of the whole organization. For some non-revenue-purpose products, the revenue 
requirement is adjusted in the allocation of performance targets, to encourage the 
employees to engage in such tasks, and reduce conflicts of interests.  
Compared to the situation in Organization M, the principal-agent relationship 
seems to be more complicated in the case of the pay system reform in the 
compulsory education system. During the reform in County H, the Bureau of 
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Education was the principal in relation to the local authorities, as the county 
government set the guidelines for all schools in the area, and would provide full 
funding for each school under the new system; the local schools were agents of 
the local government and were held accountable by them, while individual 
schools also acted as principals when managing their employees internally. 
According to many researchers, one possible problem with applying PRP in 
schools is that employees may “put their effort into maximizing the measurable 
one [task] at the expense of the unmeasured one” (Lazear, 2003: 194; also, 
Marsden and Belfield, 2009, etc.). In fact, this moral hazard problem has 
happened as a result of the PRP reform in the schools in County H. All of the 
head teachers in the sample schools remarked that staff had started to focus more 
on the measurable criteria in their performance, while reducing their effort in 
areas that are not included in the appraisal criteria under the new scheme. 
According to the head teachers, this is due to the fact that a fixed total amount of 
pay is allocated to each school and because of the objective criteria used to 
measure performance under the new system. For example, in all three primary 
schools, the head teachers reported that class teachers had become less willing to 
organize after-class activities, as their salary would be the same regardless of 
whether or not they did so. Similar problems occurred in the junior high schools; 
for example, the head teacher of School D reported that, under the new pay 
system, class teachers had become reluctant to take students on field trips 
because such activities do not count towards performance and may even bring 
penalties if students are injured. The feedback from the teachers themselves 
confirmed these changes in employees’ behaviour. Most agreed that, during the 
discussions held during the pay system reform, they had tended to pay more 
attention to clarifying whether or not certain activities would be linked to their 
pay, and this now influences how willing they are to organize activities outside 
class teaching. At the same time, teachers from both the primary and the junior 
high schools said that, although they would not reduce the effort they put into 
teaching classes, they do feel less willing to put in extra effort if they know it 
will not alter how much they are paid.  
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In sum, in the case of the pay system reform in the publishing organization, the 
implementation of performance pay and the annual internal contract have helped 
to align the goals between different groups of principals and agents. The 
interests of senior managers and department heads, and of departments and 
individual employees are aligned during the negotiation process used to set 
performance targets. This process has helped to solve the problem of moral 
hazard, by significantly reducing conflicts between the interests of principals and 
agents through two-way communication. On the other hand, in the case of the 
schools, due to the variety of tasks involved in education and the objective 
measurement of performance used in the new pay system, it has actually 
increased the risk of moral hazard. Employees have been observed avoiding 
tasks which are harder to measure and/or reducing the effort they put into tasks 
that are not included in the official performance appraisal.  
 
8.3.4   Intrinsic motivation and cognitive evaluation theory 
It is suggested that many public service jobs offer great opportunities for 
intrinsic motivation (Marsden, French, et al., 2000), which is the motivation to 
perform a task or activity for no apparent reward except that directly involved 
with the task itself (Ryan and Deci, 2000). According to cognitive evaluation 
theory (CET), intrinsic motivation, under certain conditions, can be undermined 
by the implementation of PRP, because the extrinsic motivation provided by the 
contingent rewards offered in PRP may sometimes conflict with employees’ 
intrinsic motivation, such as the individual’s desire to perform the task for its 
own sake (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). According to CET, if a person receives a 
performance-contingent monetary incentive to do something they already enjoy, 
their motivation to do it will fall, as they view the task as externally-driven 
rather than internally appealing (Weibel, Rost, et al., 2009). Therefore, the next 
question investigated in this research is whether the implementation of the new 
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PRP system in different PSUs in China has reduced employees’ intrinsic 
motivation (Q5).  
Intrinsic motivation is usually believed to play an important role in state schools, 
as good teachers not only deliver high quality teaching, but also exhibit strong 
intrinsic motivation due to the value they place on interacting with students and 
seeing them succeed (Lavy, 2007). At the same time, teachers’ working hours 
can be divided into two broad categories: “directed hours”, when they are 
obligated to be available to teach and undertake other duties as directed by their 
employer or head teacher, and “extra hours”, beyond the “directed hours”, in 
which they do marking, write reports and prepare lessons. The number of hours 
teachers spends on the latter are usually not defined by the employer but depends 
on how long it takes the teacher to complete their duties (Marsden and Belfield, 
2009). According to Marsden and Belfield’s (2009) survey of teachers in 
England, the reasons why teachers spend extra hours on their jobs have little to 
do with financial or promotion-related incentives. The most common reason 
given by the teachers was that they felt it was ‘the only way to continue to give a 
high quality of education to their pupils” (Marsden, 2000: 5).  
To explore changes in intrinsic motivation due to the reform, the interviewees 
were asked whether money is an important determinant of how hard employees 
work, and what is the main driver that causes employees to go beyond the 
requirements of their job. Most of the teachers claimed that money was not the 
main consideration in teaching, but admitted that they had started to pay more 
attention to the amount of pay they received for extra tasks since the new PRP 
system had been implemented. Before the reform, individual schools had had 
greater flexibility over allocating internal allowances, and some money was 
specifically set aside for those who took on extra tasks (e.g., teachers who 
organized sports meetings). However, both head teachers and class teachers 
complained that, under the new system, although schools have flexibility over 
distributing “encouraging performance pay”, the total pay allocated to the school 
is fixed, regardless of how much extra effort it makes. This means that the more 
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extra tasks staff take on, the smaller is the bonus available for each task. 
Moreover, the nature of teaching is imprecise and frequently involves a range of 
activities, some of which are more amenable to measurement than others. Thus, 
as mentioned earlier, under the new PRP system with its standardized objective 
performance measurement, teachers have started to pay more attention to 
whether or not the tasks they perform will be linked to their pay.  
According to the feedback of teachers across the schools, before the pay system 
reform, they were more willing to work harder in order to gain respect from 
colleagues, students and parents, and pay was not the main consideration when 
putting extra effort into teaching. However, due to the aspects mentioned above, 
money has become a more important issue. Teachers are now less willing to 
work beyond the requirements of their job, especially when such efforts will not 
count towards their salaries. This finding is consistent with the prediction of 
CET (Deci, Koestner et al., 1999) that unexpected tangible rewards, awarded 
after performing a task, tend not to affect intrinsic motivation towards the task 
(before the reform, teachers paid less attention to the money they would gain for 
performing extra tasks due to the flexibility of the pay system), while expected 
tangible rewards significantly undermine the intrinsic motivation based on free 
choice in most situations (teachers have started to pay more attention to whether 
extra tasks would be linked to their pay under the new system, as wages are 
more fixed). Therefore, although the reform was aimed at better motivating 
employees, it can be observed that, across the schools sampled, the emphasis on 
linking pay to performance has only made teachers pay more attention to the 
money they receive. Although gaining the respect of students and parents is still 
a major consideration for many teachers, especially those in the top schools 
(e.g., School D), most of the teachers interviewed agreed that they had started to 
pay more attention to money. 
In the publishing organization, according to the feedback from the HR 
department, money is an important issue for most employees, especially among 
the younger ones, who view salary as a major factor. In Organization M, once 
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the new PRP system was introduced, it was reported that employees were 
showing more initiative in their work as they could obtain higher pay by 
improving their performance. According to the HR department, under the new 
pay system and internal annual contract system, editors in production 
departments were motivated to achieve above-target performance, while 
administrative staff were also working harder, providing more voluntary over-
time than before the reform.  
To sum up, the findings in the schools are consistent with CET. The setting of 
financial rewards based on performance sent a signal that the relationship 
between the employees and the school had moved towards a market relationship, 
which diluted teachers’ intrinsic motivation, giving them a “distaste for the 
required effort” (Kreps, 1997). On the other hand, the publishing organization’s 
annually-adjusted internal performance targets and organizational performance-
based annual bonus allocations were found to have a positive impact on its 
employees’ willingness to work beyond their job requirements. This confirms 
the importance of material incentives among the employees, suggesting that 
money could be an effective element in attracting, retaining and motivating staff 
in PSUs of a commercial nature in China.  
 
8.3.5   Equity or equality? 
Equity and equality are two of the central principles used to allocate pay. The 
equity principle suggests that rewards should be allocated according to 
individual contribution, while equality means that all individuals are offered 
equal rewards, regardless of their comparative contributions (Chiang and Birtch, 
2007; Bozionelos and Wang, 2007). It has been suggested that the maintenance 
of social harmony is promoted through the use of equal reward allocations, 
whereas the maximization of performance is promoted by systems, such as PRP 
schemes, which allocate outcomes equitably, in proportion to relative 
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performance (Deutsch, 1985; Greenberg, 1990; Leventhal et al., 1980; Chen, 
1995, etc.).  
According to the literature, equity theory generally plays a critical role in 
introducing PRP into an organization, as rewarding employees according to their 
performance basically translates into a differential allocation of the available 
rewards according to individual contribution (Erez, 1997). However, although 
some recent studies have found Chinese employees to be more positive towards 
equity than equality (e.g., Chen, 1995; Bozionelos and Wang, 2007), it is also 
argued that Chinese people are still very sensitive to incomes gaps and prefer 
egalitarian distributions (Cooke, 2004). Therefore, the next question investigated 
in the two case studies was how the new systems balanced equity and equality. 
The interviewees were asked “equity or equality, which do you think played a 
more important role in the pay system reform in your organization?” (Q6)  
For the schools, the pay system reform was intended to balance teachers’ pay 
across schools, while paying employees according to their actual performance 
within schools. However, the case studies showed that the new pay systems 
launched in all of the sample schools turned out to follow an egalitarian 
distribution. According to the head teachers, this was mainly because of the 
voting process and the “harmonious” transaction process required by the local 
government. For example, the head teachers of all three primary schools agreed 
that internal harmony was their priority in implementing the reform, due to the 
non-competitive graduation system from primary schools to junior high schools. 
Egalitarian distribution was the best choice for reducing internal conflicts 
(regarding pay differences between different groups of employees). The 
situation in the junior high schools was slightly different. All of their head 
teachers said they would have preferred an equity-based pay system, to better 
motivate high-performing employees, because the reputation of their school was 
strongly linked to their students’ performance in high school entrance exams. 
However, they all said that, due to the fixed total amount of pay allocated to 
each school, and the voting process requiring that two thirds of the staff 
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approved the scheme, they had to choose an egalitarian distribution in the end, 
with much smaller pay gaps than originally proposed. 
As a result, despite the differing views between the head teachers of the primary 
schools and the junior high schools, the pay systems eventually introduced in all 
of the sample schools tended to be more egalitarian, mainly so as to maintain 
harmony during the reform process. Comparing the pay systems before and after 
the reform, both head teachers and teachers reported that employees were more 
tolerant towards pay gaps before the reform because schools had more flexibility 
in allocating bonuses and paying high-performing employees more did not 
reduce the average pay of the other staff. However, once the new standardized 
pay system was introduced, if some employees received higher bonuses, other 
teachers would receive less pay overall, due to the fixed amount of total 
“encouraging performance pay” allocated to each school. In the primary schools, 
egalitarianism tended to be the agreed principle from the beginning. However, in 
the junior high schools there was more debate. The original pay systems 
proposed by the reform committees in all three junior high schools included 
wider pay gaps between employees with different performance levels but these 
systems were not accepted by the majority of employees. According to the head 
teachers, the proposed pay system had to be adjusted several times, each time 
narrowing the pay gaps and pushing towards an egalitarian distribution. For 
example, in School F, although average pay more than doubled due to the extra 
funding provided by the government, the proposed pay system had to be 
changed seven times. The initial priority under the pay distribution proposed by 
the reform committee was to encourage higher performance by introducing 
wider pay gaps between employees. According to the head teacher of School F, 
these increased pay differences were opposed by the majority of employees. The 
final pay system approved by the employees included much narrower pay gaps. 
In contrast to the fixed amount of pay available to the schools, the self-funding 
system of Organization M gave the reform committee much more flexibility 
when designing its new pay system. According to the director of the HR 
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department, an equity principle, whereby each employee should be rewarded 
according to his/her actual performance, was confirmed at the very start of the 
reform process, and this brought about wider pay gaps following the reform. On 
the other hand, similarly to the situation in the schools, the employees of 
Organization M were given the choice between staying with the previous pay 
system or participating in the new one. This policy was aimed at maintaining 
internal harmony during the reform. However, due to the organization’s control 
over its total wage bill, every employee received a pay increase under the new 
system, meaning there were no losers in the process. Hence, although the pay 
system was guided by the equity principle and brought about wider pay gaps in 
the organization, it was accepted without conflict by the majority of employees.  
To sum up, the importance of internal harmony was confirmed in both cases and 
all of the sample PSUs. In the schools, due to the fixed amount of pay available, 
the application of the equity principle―causing wider pay gaps―was found to 
conflict with the priority of maintaining internal harmony. Thus, an egalitarian 
distribution was chosen so as to gain approval from the majority of employees. 
In Organization M, which had greater flexibility due to its independent funding, 
equity theory was implemented more successfully, and approved by the majority 
of employees, helped by the fact that everyone enjoyed a pay increase under the 
new system. 
 
8.4   Some further findings  
As well as addressing the proposed research objectives, the case studies revealed 
some further changes brought about by the pay system reform in the PSUs.  
8.4.1   Changes in workplace relations 
Compared to many organizations in the private sector, a high degree of 
cooperation is needed between employees in the public service, to ensure 
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organizations perform efficiently (Marsden et al., 2001). Researchers have 
argued that the implementation of PRP may have a negative impact on 
workplace relations, because although some employees may be motivated to 
perform better, especially those getting above average pay (Marsden et al., 
2000), jealousy and divisiveness may undermine teamwork (Makinson, 2000; 
Marsden, French et al., 2000). In this study, in both cases, the priority of 
maintaining internal harmony was confirmed by all of the interviewees from the 
sample PSUs, raising the question of whether the implementation of PRP has 
changed workplace relations among PSUs in China. 
According to equity theory, employees will compare the ratio of their own 
perceived work outcomes (i.e., rewards) to their own perceived work inputs (i.e., 
contributions), to the corresponding ratio of a “comparison other” (e.g., a 
coworker) (Greenberg, 1990). This equity theory of motivation is based on the 
principle that, since there are no absolute criteria for fairness, employees 
generally assess fairness by making comparisons with others who are in a 
similar situation (Beardwell and Claydon, 2007). Therefore, the divergence in 
beliefs about the priorities of the new PRP system became the most controversial 
when judging the fairness of the new system for teachers and managers. The 
comparison between the effects on the two groups was observed to have had a 
negative impact on workplace relations in some of the schools. According to the 
head teachers, in all of the sample schools, the bonuses available to employees in 
management positions as a proportion of their total pay reduced significantly 
following the reform, due to the attempt to narrow the pay gaps between average 
employees and those in management positions. However, there were observed to 
more complaints from both teachers and employees in management positions 
following the reform, as both groups felt they were underpaid under the new 
system. For instance, in the case of School B, where average pay increased 
following the reform, the deputy head teacher complained that his pay had 
reduced significantly under the new system, and he would earn higher 
performance pay if he gave up his management position and took on an extra 
class of teaching (instead of teaching one class and performing the deputy head 
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teacher role). On the other hand, the teachers interviewed from School B 
believed that the managers at their school were still being paid too much under 
the new system, as improving school teachers’ pay was supposed to be the 
priority of the reform. Similar complaints from both management staff and 
teachers were observed in all of the sample schools investigated, with more 
complaints from both groups in the popular schools, where employees in middle 
management positions had enjoyed much larger bonuses prior to the reform. 
Although the implementation of the new PRP system increased the conflict 
between teachers and management staff, no deterioration of cooperation among 
teachers was observed in the sample schools. However, a negative impact was 
observed on the cooperation among teachers when dealing with after class tasks, 
especially regarding the duties performed by class teachers, whose pay increased 
significantly following the reform. According to the policy of the local Bureau 
of Education in County H, in each school class teachers would receive 300 yuan 
per month, which was much higher than the wages they received before the 
reform (usually between 50 and 100 yuan per month). Following the reform, 
class teachers’ average annual pay was 3,600 yuan more than that of other 
teachers, a significant pay gap in the generally egalitarian pay system. Although 
the extra allowance paid to class teachers was categorized as part of fixed pay, 
and allocated by the government directly under the new pay system, it was a 
significant amount, and was reported to cause jealousy among the teachers. 
Many teachers are now less willing to support the class teachers (e.g., after-class 
activities which are mainly the responsibility of class teachers), according to the 
head teachers of all the sample schools. 
In the publishing organization, according to the HR department, although 
everyone enjoyed a pay increase, when the new pay system was first 
implemented, administrative staff complained about the much wider pay gaps 
between themselves and employees in the production departments. However, the 
end of year bonuses for administrative staff are based on the revenue of the 
whole organization, under the new scheme, and this is mainly a result of the 
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achievements of the production departments. Thus, despite the complaints, the 
HR department confirmed that there has been no deterioration in workplace 
relations following the reform, and no decrease in cooperation between 
administration and production departments.  
To sum up, in the case study schools, increased conflict regarding the pay 
differences between teachers and employees in management positions, and 
deterioration in the cooperation between class teachers and other teachers have 
been observed, and these have had a negative impact on workplace relations in 
the sample schools investigated. In the publishing organization, however, little 
change has been observed in workplace relationships. 
 
8.4.2   The role of employee participation 
Another important feature of the two case studies was the participation of 
employees, as a channel for exchanging information during the pay system 
reform. The employees were observed to play a significant role in determining 
the new pay systems, especially in the case of the schools, where an internal 
voting process was required by the government.  
According to the national guide and County H’s policy, two thirds of employees 
had to approve the distribution of “encouraging performance pay” in each 
school. As mentioned in Section 8.3.5, this voting system was observed to have 
a critical impact on the internal pay gaps between different groups of employees. 
Pay distributions with large pay gaps were rejected by the majority of 
employees, according to the head teachers of all the sample schools investigated. 
For example, although all of the schools decided to base their performance 
appraisal systems on objective measures, they all found setting an appropriate 
conversion rate between the workloads and performance pay of management 
staff and teachers to be an extremely controversial topic. Many of the schools 
reported that an internal bargaining process took place, focusing on the setting of 
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internal pay gaps between different groups of employees (e.g., bonuses for high 
performance, or allowances for management staff).  
According to many of the head teachers, the fixed amount of total pay available 
to each school, and the voting process described above, made an egalitarian 
distribution the best solution for maintaining internal harmony. Following the 
announcement of the reform by the government, the average salaries of 
employees in the compulsory education sector in the local county were also 
published. This gave the employees a benchmark against which to judge the 
salaries they were offered under the new system. At the same time, under the 
government funding process, the total amount of pay allocated to each school 
was fixed, meaning that if higher salaries were paid to some, the average pay for 
the rest would fall. Therefore, most employees voted for a pay system with small 
pay differences, significantly reducing the amount of pay available for bonuses 
or allowances. 
Significant differences in the employees’ voting process were observed across 
schools. In four of the schools, the new system was passed at the first staff 
meeting (School A, C, D, E), but in two of the schools (School B and F) it had to 
be adjusted several times before it passed. In School B, members of the reform 
committee had to talk to teachers office by office, and eventually reduced the 
allowances attached to management positions. The new pay system was only 
approved at the beginning of 2010, just before the Chinese new year, and 
probably only because the employees would not have received 30 percent of 
their pay that year otherwise. However, although it was passed by a majority of 
employees, a significant deterioration in workplace relations was observed, and 
neither teachers nor management staff were convinced by how their pay was 
determined under the new system (as discussed in Section 8.1 above). In two 
other schools (Schools C and D), where the new pay system was passed at the 
first staff meeting, teachers reported that they were provided with only a limited 
explanation of the new system before they voted, and did not really understand 
it.  
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However, although the head teachers complained that the voting process led to 
an egalitarian distribution of pay, this is the first time that a standardized system 
of pay has been implemented in the compulsory education sector involving 
employees’ participation. Before the reform, due to the diverse sources of 
funding obtained by different schools, official pay systems were not published 
for individual schools. Part of the employees’ pay came from the government 
budget, while the rest came from external sources obtained by individual schools 
(e.g., sponsor fees for popular schools), which varied across schools each year. 
Many of the teachers had never really understood the pay system in their schools 
before the recent reform. The teachers interviewed from School B stated that, 
before the reform, they simply checked their bank account balance monthly and 
did not pay any attention to the details of how pay was set in their school. As a 
result, employee participation during the pay system reform did make the new 
pay systems more transparent, and also helped employees to understand how 
internal pay is set.  
In the case of the publishing organization, although it was mainly the HR 
department that was responsible for developing the new pay system, channels 
were set up so that information could be exchanged between different groups of 
employees. Representatives from different departments were consulted before 
the reform. Then, the new pay system proposed by the HR department was 
reviewed by a reform committee, which involved all of the senior managers and 
department heads. After adjustments had been made by the reform committee, 
the new system was announced at a staff meeting, during which the details of the 
new system, along with the reference data collected during the pre-reform 
process (e.g., pay-setting under the old system, the benchmark pay in the local 
job market, etc.), were explained to the entire workforce. Employees were 
invited to make comments, and then, two weeks later, a second staff meeting 
was arranged, at which employees were asked to vote on the new system. In the 
interim, employees with questions could consult the HR department, and the 
reference data used for setting the pay both before and after the reform were 
made available. Employees were given the choice to stay with the previous pay 
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system. However, since all employees received a significant pay rise under the 
new pay system, they all chose the new system, and this was confirmed by a 
large majority at the first official vote. Moreover, since individual employees’ 
pay under the new system was highly related to the performance targets they 
committed to achieving, a negotiation process of two-way communication 
between the employees and their department heads was used, which helped to 
align the interests of the two parties when setting goals (as discussed in Section 
8.3.2).  
To sum up, the employees’ participation in the voting system, as required by the 
government, was found to be a major reason for the introduction of egalitarian 
pay distributions under the new systems in all of the sample schools. Although 
internal arguments were observed as a result of the employees’ participation, 
which have had a negative impact on workplace relationships in some of the 
schools, employees’ involvement in the reform process also helped to clarify the 
internal pay systems of the schools and make the pay distribution more 
transparent. Compared to the fixed-budget pay systems introduced into the 
schools, the reform in the publishing organization was found to be more flexible, 
and appropriate employee participation was observed during the reform process, 
making the transition to the new pay system smoother.  
 
8.4.3   Pay and employees’ social status 
As addressed in the national guide, one of the most important aims of the pay 
system reform in the compulsory education sector across China was to improve 
the social status of employees in the sector, especially for teachers in rural areas, 
who had previously received low salaries. According to an internal report by the 
Bureau of Education for County H, the new PRP system increased the average 
pay for employees in the compulsory education sector in the county by 36.6 
percent, a significant amount. However, not all employees in the sector received 
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higher salaries under the new system, due to the removal of extra funding 
sources. Given the different changes in pay across schools, various impacts can 
be observed on the self-perceived social statuses of different groups of 
employees. 
Firstly, for most of the employees of the rural schools (Schools C, E and F), total 
annual pay increased significantly, especially in the schools that did not charge 
“sponsor fees” before the reform (C and F). Teachers in these schools were 
previously paid much less than those in popular urban schools, but after the 
reform, the pay differences between schools were largely removed, with 
employees of rural schools paid more than those in top urban schools due to the 
extra allowance allocated to them. Although there were complaints about the pay 
distribution within these schools, all of the interviewees agreed that the 
standardization of pay across schools, and the significant increase in their total 
annual pay, made them proud to be school teachers, and more willing to stay at 
rural schools due to their improved social status.  
Secondly, however, compared to the overall pay increase for those in rural 
schools, many teachers at the popular schools in County H felt they were 
“losers” in the pay system reform, as their pay shrank. According to the teachers 
from these schools (A, B and D), the teaching load tends to be much heavier in 
popular schools, as both the school and the teachers tend to put more effort into 
maintaining their leading position in the local area. When the new pay system 
was implemented, there was no change in the teaching load, but their pay 
decreased significantly due to the removal of all school-specific 
allowances/bonuses. For example, one teacher from School D―the top junior 
high school in the county―said that her total annual pay had decreased by 
20,000 yuan (approximately 25 percent of her pre-reform pay) following the 
reform. The decrease was partly due to the decrease in average pay across the 
whole school (by approximately 15,000 yuan/year), due to the loss of extra 
funding from “sponsor fees”, and partly because of the more egalitarian pay 
distribution under the new system, which significantly reduced the bonuses 
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allocated to high-performing teachers (a reduction of around 5,000 yuan/year in 
her case). Therefore, it was observed that most of the employees of popular 
schools felt that they had lost their superior social status from teaching in 
popular schools. Meanwhile, the head teachers of these schools worried that 
their schools would lose their advantage in the local education market, due to the 
reduction in salaries. 
The third impact is as follows. As discussed earlier, one noteworthy change in 
the way pay is set under the new system in the compulsory education sector is 
the significantly reduced bonuses allocated to teachers who perform well and to 
employees in management positions. Thus high-performing teachers and 
management staff from top schools lost out the most in the reform. For these 
employees, a significant feeling of loss was observed, especially among 
management staff in the top schools. However, when asked whether they would 
consider giving up their management positions because of the pay cut, most said 
they would not, as they believed that there was still significant social recognition 
attached to such positions. This is known as “face” (“mianzi”), which acts as an 
important form of intrinsic motivation, and is consistent with the traditional 
image that “face” is especially important for Chinese managers because 
employees expect their managers to have great integrity and sound moral 
judgment (e.g., Bond and Hwang, 1986; Zhou and Martocchio, 2001).  
Fourth, according to officials at the Bureau of Education in County H, not only 
did the average pay of employees in the compulsory education sector increase, 
but also the pensions of retired employees, which significantly improved their 
social status in the local area. One retired teacher from School A, for example, 
saw her pension grow from 2,100 yuan/month to 4,300 yuan/month. She 
reported that the increase in her pension made her much happier and made her 
proud to be a retired primary school teacher. 
To sum up, significant increases in the self-perceived social status were reported 
among employees who received significant pay increases due to the reform, and 
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among retired teachers, for whom pensions increased significantly. For 
employees in popular schools, whose pay did not increase and sometimes 
decreased significantly, the previously superior status gained from working in 
top schools was significant reduced, especially among high-performing teachers 
and management staff. Such findings suggest that self-perceived social status is 
highly related to pay, confirming that the increase in average pay for the 
employees in the compulsory education sector has helped to improve the social 
status of school teachers in general. 
In the publishing organization, all employees received a pay increase under the 
new pay system, which ensured there were no “losers” in the reform. According 
to the HR department of Organization M, employees in the production 
departments were found to be most strongly motivated under the new system. 
For them, higher performance would not only bring about a pay increase but also 
a higher position in the firm. This would enable them to gain and maintain 
“face”, through the respect of other employees, and they would perceive their 
social status as higher.  
 
8.5   Summary of the pay system reform in the two cases 
This section presents a discussion of the achievements and limitations of the pay 
system reforms implemented in the compulsory education sector and the 
publishing organization. The aim is to provide an empirical review of the two 
reforms studied. 
8.5.1   The PRP reform in the compulsory education sector in County H: 
achievements and limitations 
At the end of the interviews, the head teachers of the sample schools were asked 
to give an overall comment on the reform as it had affected their own school. 
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The head teachers from all three urban schools (Schools A, B and D) felt that the 
pay system reform had caused more problems than it had solved, while those 
from the three rural schools (Schools C, E and F) tended to be more supportive 
towards the reform, believing that the new system would bring more benefits in 
the long run. Based on the feedback from all of the interviewees, including the 
head teachers, teachers, and government officials who were involved in the 
reform in County H, the following paragraphs present a practical review of the 
reform’s achievements.  
First, one of the main aims of this government-led reform was to improve the 
social status of employees in the compulsory education sector in China, 
especially those teaching in rural areas. Although the reform has had diverse 
impacts on different groups of employees (as discussed in Section 8.4.3), 
overall, the case study showed that there has been an improvement in the social 
status of these employees in County H, confirming that the original purpose of 
the reform has been achieved.  
Second, the reform has helped to reduce some unnecessary charging in the 
compulsory education sector in China, although “sponsor fees” 23  are still 
charged due to the unbalanced distribution of resources across schools. In the 
new PRP system, the total wage bill of all employees in the compulsory 
education sector is fully funded by the government, and all extra allowances paid 
by individual schools out of non-government sources have been banned. This 
policy, announced in the national guide, aimed to prevent all unofficial charges 
for compulsory education, reducing the costs for students and parents. Although 
the system of “sponsor fees” has remained due to differences in the teaching 
reputations of different schools in County H, the new pay system has helped to 
reduce some unnecessary charges, for example, by closing down profit-
orientated departments and reducing the price of food in student canteens.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Schools in County H still charge a “sponsor fee” for students from another district, but such 
income would be restricted for school construction only.  
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Third, due to the employees’ participation and the voting system required by the 
county government, all of the teachers interviewed agreed that the new pay 
system is more transparent and standardized than the previous one. Most of the 
teachers stated that they did not pay much attention to the specific details of the 
old pay system before the national guide to the PRP reform was announced by 
the central government. Although various internal arguments were observed 
during the reform process (as discussed in Section 8.4.3), it was generally agreed 
by the interviewees across all of the sample schools that the reform, and the 
employees’ voting system, had made them more aware of the internal pay 
system, and made the internal pay distribution more transparent than previously.  
Fourth, one of the most important changes that the reform has brought about in 
County H is the reduction in the turnover of employees in rural schools. The 
retention of teachers has been a growing concern in China, especially those in 
rural areas. The transition to a market economy and the opening up of the labour 
markets has created alternative career paths for current and potential teachers 
(Sargent and Hannum, 2005). It is generally agreed that competitive salaries and 
benefits are crucial to attracting and retaining high-quality teachers (Dolton and 
Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011), consistent with the findings of this case study. All 
of the head teachers from rural schools reported that their teachers are now less 
keen to be transferred to urban schools due to the disappearance of the pay gap 
between urban and rural schools since the reform. For example, according to the 
head teacher of School F, for the first time in the history of the school, no 
employee had applied for a transfer to another school for a whole year, 
confirming the significant impact of the reform in retaining teachers in rural 
areas. All of the head teachers of the rural schools also believed that the new pay 
system would encourage experienced teachers from urban schools to transfer to 
rural schools to work as head teachers, which would improve the management 
and teaching quality of rural schools and balance teaching resources across the 
country in the long run.  
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Nevertheless, despite the achievements listed above, a number of problems with 
the pay system reform came to light during the case study. For example, it was 
observed that employees tend to be less motivated under the new system due to 
the fixed amount of pay available and the egalitarian distribution system 
implemented. A deterioration in workplace relations has also occurred as 
employees now compare their pay to other people’s pay, which has caused 
jealousy and had a negative impact on the internal cooperation in some of the 
schools.  
To sum up, the findings of the case study suggest that the new PRP system has 
fulfilled the original goals of the national policy, by improving schoolteachers’ 
pay and social status, clarifying the setting of pay in individual schools, reducing 
some of the unnecessary charges for compulsory education, and retaining 
teachers in rural schools where turnover was previously high. However, the 
target of linking pay to performance has not been achieved, as the new pay 
systems introduced in all six sample schools have turned out to be more 
egalitarian than previously, with smaller bonuses/allowances attached to high 
performance and extra workloads. The reform has thus failed to achieve its 
initial aim of motivating employees to perform better and has also had a negative 
impact on workplace relations and cooperation.  
 
8.5.2   PRP in the publishing organization: a successful story 
Compared to the controversial results of the pay system reform in the 
compulsory education sector in County H, the pay system reform introduced in 
Organization M seems to have been more successful. It links employees’ pay to 
both individual and organizational performance, and both employees’ 
productivity and motivation have been found to have increased, fulfilling the 
aims of the reform. Several points should be noted. 
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First, in the reform, Organization M clarified its internal pay system by 
redefining monthly pay for all employees, aiming to achieve internal equity and 
ensure that employees in identical positions received equal pay (“tong gong tong 
chou”). For employees in production positions, performance is now the most 
important criteria when setting monthly pay, instead of seniority or contract 
status which was used before the reform. Meanwhile, positions in non-
production departments were redefined based on factors such as the individual’s 
education, their work experience within the organization and the responsibility 
included in the position. This redefinition of positions and the clarification of the 
pay attached to each position has made the new pay system more transparent and 
easier to operate. 
Second, an annual internal goal-setting process has been introduced. All 
employees sign an internal agreement indicating the performance targets they are 
aiming to achieve during the year. This goal-setting process has helped to align 
the interests of individuals with those of the organization, and has also provided 
an accurate prediction of the organization’s performance for the year, which has 
helped the organization to be more flexible when competing in the publishing 
market.  
Third, by linking employees’ pay to the achievement of their performance 
targets, Organization M has significantly increased its employees’ productivity 
and motivation. Employees in production positions, in particular, have started to 
set themselves higher performance targets, as this can lead to higher pay under 
the new pay system. Most of the employees had achieved more than 60 percent 
of their annual performance target at the first mid-year evaluation following the 
pay system reform (Table 7.4, Chapter 7), and overall, a 20 percent growth in 
annual productivity was achieved by the organization in the first year after the 
pay system reform, which has been followed by an average of 5 to 10 percent 
growth since then.  
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Fourth, as a former PSU that has been pushed into the market and made to fund 
itself, Organization M has experienced an increase in employee turnover since 
the change in pay system from a seniority-based to a performance-based one. 
According to the HR department, annual turnover increased from 5 percent 
before the reform to 10 percent after the reform. Among senior employees with 
traditional PSU (“shiye”) status, turnover has remained very low, mainly due to 
the more advantageous public welfare system that is attached to their 
employment status when they retire. However, among new employees with 
enterprise (“qiye”) status was found to increase, especially among those who 
found it difficult to achieve their performance targets under the new pay system. 
This change in turnover is consistent with the sorting function predicted by the 
study of Lazear (2000), however, which suggests that average output per worker 
and average worker ability should rise when a firm switches from hourly wages 
to performance pay. Despite the increase in turnover in Organization M, the 
average output per employee in the production departments has increased.  
Finally, although there have been some complaints about the wider pay gaps 
among employees, there has been no deterioration of workplace relations in 
Organization M since the pay system reform, and no decrease in cooperation 
between administrative and production staff.  
8.6   A summary of the cross-case analysis 
A summary of the cross-case analysis including the key findings observed in 
each sample PSU is presented in Table 8-1. 
Table 8-1: Summary of the cross-case analysis 
PSU 
Category PSUs with a public welfare function 
PSU of a 
commercial 
nature 
 School A School B School C School D School E School F Organization M 
Sector Primary School 
Primary 
School 
Primary 
School 
Junior High 
School 
Junior High 
School 
Junior 
High 
School 
Publishing 
Industry 
Location  County H (Urban) 
County H 
(Urban) 
County H 
(Rural) 
County H 
(Urban) 
County H 
(Rural) 
County H 
(Rural)  Beijing City 
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Reason for 
the pay 
reform 
National 
PRP reform 
National 
PRP 
reform 
National 
PRP 
reform 
National 
PRP reform 
National 
PRP reform 
National 
PRP 
reform 
Organizational 
PRP reform 
Official start 
of the 
reform  
01/01/2009 01/01/2009 01/01/2009 01/01/2009 01/01/2009 
01/01/200
9 10/2004 
Final 
confirmation 
date of the 
new system  
12/2009 02/2010 12/2009 12/2009 12/2009 01/2010 01/2005 
Changes to 
pay 
Slight 
decrease in 
the pay of 
all 
employees; 
greater 
decrease in 
the pay of 
high-
performing 
teachers and 
managemen
t staff 
Small 
increase in 
average 
pay; slight 
decrease in 
pay for 
high-
performing 
teachers 
and 
managemen
t staff 
Significant 
increase in 
pay for all 
employees 
Significant 
decrease in 
average pay 
across the 
school; 
greater 
decrease for 
high-
performing 
teachers and 
managemen
t staff 
Small 
increase for 
all, with 
minor 
decrease for 
top-
performing 
teachers and 
managemen
t staff 
Significan
t pay 
increase 
for 
everyone  
Increased pay 
for all 
employees, 
more 
significant pay 
increases for 
employees in 
production 
positions  
The 
implementat
ion of PRP 
and 
consistency 
with the 
NEP 
Very 
limited 
PRP after 
the reform; 
consistent 
with the 
NEP 
Very 
limited 
PRP after 
the reform; 
consistent 
with the 
NEP  
Very 
limited 
PRP after 
the 
reform; 
consistent 
with the 
NEP 
Very 
limited 
PRP after 
the reform; 
consistent 
with the 
NEP 
Very 
limited 
PRP after 
the reform; 
consistent 
with the 
NEP  
Very 
limited 
PRP after 
the 
reform; 
consistent 
with the 
NEP  
Effective PRP 
introduced by 
the reform; 
consistent 
with the NEP 
Acceptance 
of the idea of 
linking pay 
to 
performance  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Extra pay 
for 
employees 
with higher 
performance  
Reduced  Reduced   
Smaller as 
a 
proportio
n of total 
pay, but 
larger 
absolute 
amount 
due to the 
significan
t average 
pay 
increase 
Reduced  Reduced  
Smaller 
as a 
proportio
n of total 
pay, but 
larger 
absolute 
amount 
due to the 
significan
t average 
pay 
increase 
Larger 
proportion of 
total pay with 
significantly 
more 
performance 
pay available 
in the new 
system 
Can 
employees 
improve 
their 
performance
? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Is higher 
pay given 
for higher 
performance 
in the new 
Yes, but 
very 
limited 
Yes, but 
very 
limited 
Yes, but 
very 
limited 
Yes, but 
very 
limited 
Yes, but 
very 
limited 
Yes, but 
limited 
Yes, much 
higher pay for 
those with 
high 
performance  
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system? 
Setting of 
performance 
evaluation 
criteria 
Objective 
criteria 
dominate 
Objective 
criteria 
dominate 
Objective 
criteria 
dominate 
Objective 
criteria 
with points 
system 
Objective 
criteria 
with points 
system 
Objective 
criteria 
with 
points 
system 
Objective 
performance 
targets set 
down in an 
annual 
agreement  
Does it help 
with the goal 
setting of the 
organization
? 
No No No No No Yes Yes 
Does it help 
with goal 
setting for 
individuals? 
No No No No No Yes Yes 
Has it 
reduced 
unwanted 
behaviour 
among the 
employees? 
No No No No No No Yes 
Change in 
intrinsic 
motivation 
of employees 
Reduced  Reduced  Reduced Reduced  Reduced  Reduced  Increased 
Preference 
between 
equity and 
equality (by 
head 
teacher/seni
or manager 
during the 
reform) 
Equality  Equality  Equality 
Both but 
have to 
sacrifice 
equity for 
equality 
Equity, but 
have to go 
for equality 
during the 
reform 
Both, but 
have to 
sacrifice 
equity for 
equality 
Equity 
Jealousy 
caused by 
the new PRP 
system 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes, but very 
limited and 
has not 
affected 
workplace 
relations 
Is the new 
PRP system 
fair 
according to 
head 
teachers/HR 
manager? 
Hard to say No Hard to say No No 
Hard to 
say 
Generally 
speaking, yes. 
General 
comment 
about the 
PRP reform 
(by head 
teachers/HR 
managers) 
More 
disadvantag
es than 
benefits 
More 
disadvanta
ges than 
benefits 
Good 
policy in 
the long 
term, but 
has also 
introduce
d more 
conflicts 
within the 
school 
More 
disadvantag
es than 
benefits 
Good 
policy in 
the long 
term but 
has brought 
about more 
conflicts 
within the 
school 
More 
advantage
s than 
disadvant
ages 
overall 
Has improved 
individual 
and 
organizational 
productivity 
significantly  
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Chapter 9   Conclusion 
 
This research has looked at changes in pay systems in the PSU sector in China, 
where, in the last decade, pay system reforms have aimed to link employees’ pay 
to performance. This pioneering research has explored the new pay systems and 
the suitability of PRP at an organizational level. Two in-depth case studies were 
discussed, one consisting of six state schools in the compulsory education sector 
and the other looking at a publishing organization, with the aim of providing an 
insight into how the new pay systems have affected different PSUs in China.  
This final chapter summarizes the research. First of all, key findings identified 
from the two case studies will be revisited, and the research questions will be 
answered. Secondly, empirical implications will be presented, in terms of both 
the achievements and limitations of the pay system reforms in the sample PSUs, 
and suggestions will be provided for future pay system reforms in other types of 
PSU in China. Then, the contributions and limitations of this research will be 
discussed. Finally, possible directions for future research will be suggested. 
 
9.1   Pay system reforms in PSUs in China: A review of the key findings 
Compared to the extensive discussion of public sector pay in western countries, 
there has been a lack of in-depth research into pay systems in the PSU sector in 
China, leaving a significant gap in the understanding of the key changes that 
have occurred in different Chinese PSUs and the challenges faced by their 
human resources departments. In recent years, the main theme of the pay system 
reforms instigated across the PSU sector in China has been to link pay to 
performance. However, no-one has answered the question of how such PRP 
systems actually work in different PSUs. Aiming to contribute to this research 
gap, the main research question of this study was as follows: “How well has 
performance related pay performed in different PSUs in China, since the recent 
	   210 
pay system reform?” To answer this question, different theories about PRP have 
been reviewed and six research objectives have been proposed, based on the 
assumptions of the NEP and a range of motivational theories, including 
expectancy theory, goal-setting theory, agency theory, CET and equity theory.  
In order to explore the processes and outcomes of the pay systems at an 
organizational level, among PSUs with different characteristics, two in-depth 
case studies were conducted. The first included six state schools from the group 
of PSUs with a public welfare function, which are fully funded by the 
government. The second consisted of a publishing organization, representing the 
group of PSUs of a commercial nature, which have been pushed into the market 
and forced to fund themselves. Each research objective was investigated in 
relation to both cases. The key findings relating to the research objectives, as 
well as some further findings, are summarized below.  
Table 9-1: Summary of PRP theories and proposed research objectives 
Theory 
Category 
Theories in 
PRP 
Research 
objective 
proposed 
Findings identified 
Economic 
Theory The NEP 
Q1: How does 
PRP fit into 
different PSUs in 
China? 
PRP was found to have been better implemented in 
the publishing organization, where job tasks are 
easier to define, employees’ performance is less 
costly to measure, and competition in both the 
labour and product markets is higher, with 
potentially higher wages available in other firms.  
 
For schools in the compulsory education sector, 
where the costs of measuring output are high, a wide 
range of tasks are performed, there are only minimal 
differences between the wages offered in each 
school and employees tend to have long tenures, the 
new pay system was found to be input-based, with 
working hours used as the dominant criteria when 
distributing pay.   
Motivatio
nal Theory 
Expectancy 
Theory 
Q2a: Can the 
employees 
improve their 
performance by 
working harder? 
All of the employees and managers in both cases 
believed that employees could improve their 
performance through hard work. 
Q2b: If an 
employee works 
harder, will he/she 
be paid more? 
In the compulsory education sector, due to the fixed 
amount of total pay allocated to each school under 
the new system, the proportion of pay attached to 
higher performance was found to have been reduced 
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in all of the sample schools, and especially in 
popular schools where bonuses for higher 
performance were reduced considerably.  
 
The principle of “those who work harder should get 
higher pay” (duo lao duo de) was reported to be 
better implemented after the pay system reform in 
the publishing organization. Here, individuals’ 
achievements became the most important 
benchmark used to set pay under the new system.  
Question2c: Do 
the employees 
perceive the 
bonuses they can 
receive by 
working harder to 
be valuable? 
There were some differences in the interviewees’ 
responses in the case of the schools. Employees in 
popular schools perceived the bonuses under the 
new system to be less valuable, as the bonuses 
available previously were much larger in these 
schools. Employees in less popular schools saw 
average pay increase significantly, with slightly 
wider pay gaps among employees (Schools C and 
F). However, although the amount of pay attached 
to higher performance increased slightly, as a 
proportion of total pay, they went down as in other 
schools. Thus, employees attitudes towards the 
bonuses changed very little.  
 
In the publishing organization, due to the significant 
increase in the amount of pay available to those who 
achieved a high performance under the new system, 
employees were observed to value the bonuses more 
highly than previously.  
Goal-setting 
Theory 
Q3: How were the 
criteria for the 
PRP decided? 
In both cases, the new system, including the 
performance measurement, was proposed by a 
“reform committee” within the organization, and 
then discussed and verified at staff meetings.  
 
In the junior high schools, performance criteria 
included students’ exam results, but in the primary 
schools, they were not. This was mainly due to 
differences in the graduation systems of primary and 
junior high schools.   
 
In the publishing organization, a goal-setting 
process is used. Each employee signs an internal 
contract with their supervisor, which sets a specific 
performance target for the year.  
 
All performance criteria in both cases are objective-
based under the new system, with the aim of 
reducing personal bias to a minimum.  
Agency 
Theory 
Q4: Has the 
introduction of 
PRP helped to 
reduce moral 
hazard among 
employees? 
There seems to be an increased risk of moral hazard 
in the schools investigated since the reform. This 
may be due to the multiple tasks involved in 
education. Employees have been found to avoid 
tasks that are harder to measure or are not included 
in the performance measurement under the new 
system. 
The introduction of PRP has helped to reduce moral 
	   212 
hazard in the publishing organization, however, as 
the interests of the organization and its employees 
are better aligned as a result of the negotiation 
process used to set performance targets under the 
new system.  
CET 
Q5: What 
influence has PRP 
had on the 
employees’ 
intrinsic 
motivation? 
Decreased intrinsic motivation has been observed in 
all of the sample schools since the implementation 
of the new PRP system. Increased intrinsic 
motivation has been observed in the publishing 
organization, due to individuals’ greater autonomy 
over goal setting.  
Equity 
Theory 
Q6: Equity or 
equality? Which 
has had a more 
significant impact 
in the design of 
the PRP systems? 
In the schools, due to the fixed amount of pay 
allocated to each school, the equity principle (which 
would lead to wider pay gaps) was found to conflict 
with the priority of maintaining internal harmony. 
As a result, an egalitarian distribution was chosen 
by all of the schools investigated. 
 
In the publishing organization, the equity principle 
was better implemented, thanks to the greater 
flexibility it had over setting pay, due to its 
independent funding system.  
Some 
further 
findings 
Changes in 
workplace 
relations 
Has there been 
any change in 
workplace 
relations since the 
pay system 
reform? 
Increased conflict has been observed between 
teachers and management staff, as well as a 
deterioration in the cooperation between teachers 
and other teachers, across all schools in the 
compulsory education sector since the pay system 
reform. 
 
No change in workplace relationships was reported 
in the publishing organization.  
Employee 
participation 
How were the 
employees 
involved in the 
pay system 
reform? 
In the schools, employee participation through a 
voting procedure was required by the government, 
which made the pay distribution in the schools more 
transparent and egalitarian-based. 
  
In the publishing organization, channels for 
exchanging information between different groups of 
employees were included in the reform process, 
which helped to better implement the new pay 
system.  
Pay and 
employees’ 
social status 
How is pay linked 
to employees’ 
social status in 
different PSUs in 
China? 
In the case of the compulsory education sector, self-
perceived social status was found to be highly 
related to changes in pay among different groups of 
employees. A significant increase in self-perceived 
social status was observed among the employees of 
less popular schools and among retired teachers 
whose pay/pensions were significantly increased. 
For employees in popular schools, who experienced 
a decrease in pay, a general feeling of demotivation 
was reported, especially among high-performing 
teachers and employees in management positions, 
whose pay was cut most significantly.  
 
In the publishing organization, employees were 
found to be better motivated following the reform, 
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as higher performance would not only bring a pay 
increase, but also a higher position in the 
organization, which would enable high-performing 
employees to gain and maintain “face” by obtaining 
respect within the organization.  
  
9.2   Implications for future PSU pay system reforms in China 
As described in Chapters 5 and 6, a national pay system reform, aiming to 
introduce PRP into all PSUs providing public welfare, was announced by the 
General Office of the State Council of the PRC in 2008. According to this three-
step reform project, a new pay system, made up of seventy percent fixed wages 
and thirty percent performance pay, would be introduced first to all state schools 
in the compulsory education sector, then to all public hospitals and PSUs within 
the national medical care system, and finally to all other PSUs providing public 
welfare across China. As they made up the first wave of this national PSU pay 
system reform, the case study of schools in the compulsory education sector 
provided a first insight into the impacts of the reform at an organizational level. 
Mixed results were observed in the schools investigated.  
Table 9-2: Summary of the key findings from the case study of the pay system 
reform in the compulsory education sector in County H  
Original aims of the pay 
system reform for employees 
in the compulsory education 
sector  
Achievements of the pay 
system reform  
Problems that occurred 
during the pay system 
reform 
• To improve the social status 
of employees in the 
compulsory education sector, 
especially teachers in 
remote/rural areas 
(Achieved) 
• To attract and retain teachers 
in the compulsory education 
sector (Achieved) 
• To implement a PRP system 
by linking employees’ pay to 
• Improved social status 
for employees in the 
compulsory education 
sector, especially for 
teachers in rural areas 
• Reduced some of the 
unnecessary charging in 
the compulsory education 
sector  
• Employee participation 
in the reform, which 
• The charging of “sponsor 
fees” remained after the 
reform, due to the 
imbalanced distribution of 
resources across schools 
• Limited links between 
employees’ pay and 
performance under the new 
system 
• Reduced the proportion of 
pay available for high-
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performance in all state 
schools in the compulsory 
education sector in China 
(Limited achievement) 
• To better motivate teachers 
to achieve higher 
performance through the 
implementation of PRP in 
the compulsory education 
sector (Failed) 
• To remove all unnecessary 
charges for compulsory 
education for the general 
public, by banning any extra 
allowances/bonuses drawn 
from outside the government 
budget (Limited 
achievement) 
• To balance the teaching 
quality across schools by 
reducing the turnover of 
teachers, especially in less 
developed/rural areas. (To be 
achieved in the longer run) 
made the new pay system 
more transparent 
• Significantly reduced the 
turnover of employees in 
rural schools 
• May balance teaching 
resources across schools 
in the compulsory 
education sector in the 
longer run 
performing teachers and 
management staff 
• Employees tend to be less 
motivated under the new 
PRP system due to the fact 
that it is based on an 
egalitarian distribution 
• Deterioration in workplace 
relations, with reduced 
internal cooperation 
observed across schools 
after the reform 
 
 
Table 9-2 compares the achievements of the pay system reform in the 
compulsory education sector with the original aims of the government policy. It 
shows that the full funding provided by the government, the use of civil 
servants’ pay as a benchmark, the removal of pay differences between schools, 
and the requirement for employees to approve the new system helped to fulfil 
several of the government’s original goals. For example, schoolteachers’ pay 
level and social status have improved, the way pay is set in individual schools 
has been clarified, some of the unnecessary charges within the compulsory 
education system have been removed, and teachers are being retained in rural 
schools where turnover was previously high. However, the target of linking pay 
to performance has not been accomplished. The new pay systems introduced in 
all of the sample schools used an egalitarian distribution, with smaller bonuses 
available for higher performance or taking on extra workloads. The result is 
more input-based than the PRP first proposed by the government policy. 
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According to the feedback from both the head teachers and employees of the 
schools and the government officials who were involved in the reform, it has 
failed to achieve the original goal of motivating employees to achieve higher 
performance, and has also had some negative impacts on workplace relations 
and reduced cooperation between employees in some of the schools investigated.  
However, despite the only partial success of the implementation of PRP in the 
compulsory education sector, the government is still aiming to introduce PRP 
systems in other PSUs, as set out in the three-step PSU pay system reform 
project announced by the General Office of the State Council of the PRC. 
Compared to the mixed results observed in the compulsory education sector, the 
pay system reform in the publishing organization was found to be more 
successful. Its previous seniority-based pay has been replaced by a new 
performance-based pay system, which strongly encourages employees to aim for 
higher performance as it links their pay to both their own individual and the 
entire organization’s performance. At the same time, it has avoided having a 
negative impact on workplace relationships and cooperation. As one of the first 
studies of the pay system reform in the PSU sector in contemporary China, the 
two case studies in this research have demonstrated a process of experimentation 
and learning, leading to successive improvement. As a result, we now present 
some suggestions for future pay system reforms in other PSUs in China.  
First, although the principle of linking employees’ pay to their performance was 
found to be well accepted by all employees across the PSUs investigated, it 
needs to be acknowledged that there are some occupations in the PSU sector 
where PRP may be less appropriate, such as teaching, which involves a wide 
range of tasks and where measuring output is costly. In the schools investigated, 
due to the nature of compulsory education, the initial system of implementing 
PRP was almost bound to be flawed due to the multiple aims of the reform. 
Thus, in similar situations in the future, it may be better for both the government 
and the individual PSUs themselves to approach the reform more gradually. For 
example, pre-reform research should be carried out before the pay system reform 
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is introduced and the interests of different groups of employees should be 
aligned through effective communication throughout the reform process.  
Second, adequate preparation should be made before adjusting the pay systems 
in PSUs. This may help to avoid problems with the initial implementation. For 
example, in the publishing organization, a structured preparation process was 
followed, which involved collecting relevant data such as employees’ wage bills, 
department expenditure and historical performance, all of which acted as an 
important reference for linking pay to performance under the new system. No 
preparation process was possible in the compulsory education sector, due to the 
very short time period between the announce of the reform by the central 
government (December, 2008) and its start date (January 1st 2009). This meant 
no preparations could be made by the local government or the individual schools 
and caused significant delays in the implementation of the new systems in all of 
the schools investigated.  
Third, there needs to be efficient communication within the organization and 
transparency regarding performance measurement and pay setting , which will 
help to align the interests of different groups of employees. In this research, one 
of the main conflicts observed in the schools was caused by a lack of trust 
between the teachers and the management staff. Employees from both groups 
believed that their performance was being underestimated, and this also caused a 
deterioration in workplace relationships after the reform. Employees are less 
likely to be motivated by PRP if they believe they are being unfairly appraised, 
that their performance is hard to measure, or that there is no appropriate standard 
of performance for their job (Marsden et al., 2000). It should also be kept in 
mind that better motivation does not automatically translate into better 
performance, as other conditions may need to be met, such as appropriate 
management, adequate training and efficient equipment (Marsden and 
Richardson, 1994). Based on the experiences of OECD countries, PRP should be 
applied only in environments that maintain and support trust-based work 
relationships, transparency, clear promotion mechanisms, and trust in top and 
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middle management. These are essential conditions for achieving an effective 
PRP system (Dahlstrom and Lapuente, 2009). Thus, in other Chinese PSUs, 
improvements should first be made to internal management, so as to build trust-
based workplace relationships, before PRP is implemented. 
Furthermore, in future government-led pay system reforms, some flexibility 
should be granted to individual PSUs so that they can create appropriate internal 
pay differences and an effective PRP system. Due to the fixed amount of pay 
allocated to the schools and the employee voting system used to approve the new 
pay distribution, egalitarian philosophies were followed in all schools and a 
reduced proportion of pay was made available to reward higher performance. 
However, it was found that the employees would have been more tolerant of 
larger pay gaps if the bonuses paid to high-performing employees had not 
involved a reduction in their own salaries. Thus, in order to implement an 
effective PRP system, which both narrows pay gaps between PSUs and widens 
pay gaps within PSUs, the government needs to allow PSUs more flexibility 
over setting their own budgets for pay. For example, two separate pools could be 
allocated by the government to each PSU: one for paying bonuses to high-
performing employees and another to be allocated across all employees.  
To sum up, setting up an effective PRP system is not a one-time task, but an 
ongoing process, which requires appropriate performance management that 
measures true performance in a way that minimizes random variations, and 
undesired and unintended consequences, aligns performance with the ultimate 
goals of the organization, and monitors performance so as to discourage cheating 
(Lavy, 2007). In the PSU sector in China, which involves such a great diversity 
of occupations, appropriate preparation and improvements in internal 
management are essential so as to link employees’ pay to their performance 
effectively. This will require the efforts of both the PSUs themselves and 
different levels of government. 
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9.3 Contributions, limitations and directions for future research 
The contributions of this thesis rest on a number of factors. First, very few 
studies have systematically investigated pay system reforms in organizations in 
China using empirical evidence, as this thesis does. In addition, this research has 
explored changes in pay systems in PSUs (shiye danwei), a very important part 
of the Chinese public sector that is rarely explored. Secondly, detailed case 
studies were conducted involving in-depth semi-structured interviews, site visits 
of long duration and the collection of documentary evidence on the changes of 
pay systems in several different organizations. Appointments were made before 
each site visit to ensure there was plenty of time to complete the interviews 
without interruption, which enabled the researcher to collect detailed feedback. 
To my knowledge, this is the first in-depth study of the recent PRP reform in the 
PSU sector in China to provide an insight into the changes and impacts of the 
reform at an organizational level. Thirdly, different types of PSU were selected 
for the study, including a group of schools within the compulsory education 
system which are fully funded by the government, and a publishing organization 
which has been pushed into the market and forced to fund itself. In both cases, 
the organizations acted as pioneers within that type of PSU, which also makes 
this thesis the first comparative study across cases based on first-hand data. This 
thesis is therefore a valuable piece of research into the empirical implications for 
future pay system reforms in the PSU sector in China.  
In spite of the contributions made by this research, it has some unavoidable 
limitations. First, although the case study method has its advantages in terms of 
exploring the organizational context and permitting theoretical generalization, it 
also has the restriction of a possible lack of generalizability of the research 
results to other classes or types of cases. In order to strength the external validity 
of this research, two different in-depth case studies were conducted: six sample 
schools in the compulsory education sector in County H, belonging to the 
category of PSUs providing public welfare which are fully supported by the 
government, and a publishing organization in Beijing, representing the group of 
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PSUs that have been pushed into the market and forced to self-fund. However, 
due to the great diversity of services provided by PSUs in China, the case study 
findings may not be generalizable to other types of PSU or to PSUs from other 
parts of China. This suggests that future research could apply the findings of this 
research to other types of PSUs in different locations in China.  
Second, although multiple sources of evidence were used during the case studies 
in order to ensure construct validity, the data collection was limited by the 
amount of access allowed. In the case of the schools, the data were collected 
through interviews with the head teachers of each sample school as well as a 
small number of other teachers, picked across the schools. The interview data 
were complemented with documents and policies from the government and from 
individual schools, as well as published material where available. In the case of 
the publishing organization, the data were mainly collected through interviews 
with staff from the HR department who were in charge of the pay system reform, 
and then complemented with company documents and policies, with the full 
support of the HR team. Even so, the data included in this research tends to rely 
more heavily on the views of the management staff of the organizations studied. 
Although it is recognized that management perceptions of employees’ 
perceptions are important since they are the basis of management behaviour 
(Huang, 2010), future research should explore employees’ perceptions further 
using larger samples.  
Finally, hidden contextual variables may underlie this research due to the case 
study approach adopted, and future research may be able to explore the broader 
contextual impacts of different changes in pay systems across the PSU sector in 
China by conducting a large-scale survey and applying quantitative analysis. 
Alternatively, based on the findings identified in this research, further issues 
regarding the changes in the pay systems and the implementation of PRP in the 
PSU sector in China could be explored in future research, such as the validity of 
tournament theory regarding the changes in internal pay gaps, the influence of 
Chinese culture (e.g., the importance of “face”) on pay distribution, and 
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comparing the implementation of PRP in the public sector in China to the cases 
from other countries. 
In sum, the case study approach adopted in this research has demonstrated its 
unique advantage in providing an insight into the recent pay system reform in 
the PSU sector in China. By exploring its implementation in individual PSUs 
and its impact on employees, this study has shed light on the undergoing pay 
system reform in the Chinese PSU sector, and contributed to the research gap 
regarding how well PRP performs in different PSUs in China.  
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Appendix 1   Interview Questions in Case Study A 
 
Part I: Interview Questions for Government Officials in County H (Semi-
Structured Interviews) 
1. What did the local government think of the implementation of the recent 
pay system reform in the compulsory education sector? 
2. What guidance did the province/city government provide to the county 
government?  
3. How did the county government implement the pay reform for 
schoolteachers in the local area? 
4. What was the most difficult part of implementing the pay system reform? 
5. What were the most significant changes made to the schoolteachers’ pay 
in the local county during this reform? 
6. What effect did the implementation of the pay system reform for 
schoolteachers have on the local government?  
7. How was fairness ensured when implementing the PRP reform in 
different schools? 
8. How did the local government evaluate the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the pay system reform in different schools in the 
compulsory education sector in the county? 
9. According to government information, what changes did the pay system 
reform and the implementation of the new PRP system bring about in 
different schools? 
10. According to government information, what impacts did the pay system 
reform and the implementation of the new PRP system have on different 
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groups of employees across the schools? (a. teachers; b. middle 
managers; c. class teachers; d. other employees) 
11. According to government information, overall, how did the 
schoolteachers in the compulsory education sector feel about the pay 
system reform and the implementation of the new PRP system? 
12. According to government information, what impact  have the pay system 
reform and the implementation of the new PRP system had on the 
development of compulsory education in the county?  
13. According to government information, what have been the achievements 
and what problems have occurred in the pay system reform and the 
implementation of the new PRP system across different schools in the 
compulsory education sector in the county? 
14. According to government information, how could the pay system reform 
in the compulsory education sector have been improved?  
15. According to government information, how could the implementation of 
the new PRP system in the compulsory education sector have been 
improved? 
16. Any further comments regarding the pay system reform or the 
implementation of the PRP system in the compulsory education sector?  
17. Any further comments regarding the implementation of PRP in future 
pay system reforms in other PSUs? 
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Part II: Interview Questions for Head Teachers and Teachers in the 
Compulsory Education Sector in County H (Semi-Structured Interviews) 
1. Do you agree with the idea of linking pay to performance in schools in 
the compulsory education sector? 
2. What changes were made to the pay system in your school during the 
reform? (a. pay level; b. components of the pay system) 
3. What changes were made to your own pay in the pay system reform? (a. 
pay level; b. components of the pay system) 
4. How was the pay system reform implemented in your school? 
5. What were the most difficult parts of implementing the pay system 
reform in your school? 
6. How were the criteria for performance appraisals decided upon during 
the pay system reform? 
7. How has the implementation of the new PRP system affected the 
school’s goals? 
8. How has the implementation of the new PRP system affected the 
schoolteachers’ goals? 
9. Do the performance appraisals used in the new PRP system help to align 
the goals of the teachers with those of the school? 
10. How is the performance of different employees in the school evaluated 
under the new PRP system? 
11. As a  teacher (or an employee in a management position) in the school, 
what do you think of the changes made to the pay system in your school 
during the pay system reform?  
a. Can you improve your performance by working harder? 
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b. If you work harder, will you get higher pay? 
c. What do you think of the additional pay you could receive 
through working harder? 
12. As the head teacher of the school, what do you think of the changes 
made to the pay system in your school during the pay system reform?  
a. Can employees improve their performance by working harder? 
b. If employees work harder, will they get higher pay? 
c. What do the employees think of the additional pay they can 
receive through working harder?  
13. How did the pay gaps between high-performing and average employees 
change after the pay system reform in your school? 
14. How did the pay gaps between employees in management positions and 
teachers change after the pay system reform in your school? 
15. As head teacher of the school, has the implementation of the new PRP 
system helped you to manage the school? 
16. Has the implementation of the new PRP system helped to motivate 
employees in management positions in your school? 
17. Has the implementation of the new PRP system helped to encourage 
teachers in your school to achieve higher performance? 
18. Do you think money is an important factor for teachers in compulsory 
education, motivating them to work hard? 
19. How important to you is the pay you receive for your own work? 
20. As head teacher, how important do you think pay is for the employees in 
your school? 
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21. As a teacher/employee in compulsory education, what would you say has 
the biggest effect on how hard you work? 
22. Did the implementation of the new PRP system help to reduce any 
unwanted behaviour in your school? 
23. Did the implementation of the new PRP system help to reduce any 
unwanted behaviour among the employees in your school? 
24. Did the implementation of the new PRP system impact on the 
cooperation between different groups of employees in your school? 
25. Did the implementation of the new PRP system impact on the 
competition among teachers in your school? 
26. How were you (or your employees) involved in the pay system reform in 
your school? 
27. “Equity” or “equality”, which perspective do you think should have 
played the biggest role in the pay system reform in your school? 
28. How do you perceive the fairness of the pay system reform in your 
school? 
29. How do you perceive the fairness of the new PRP system implemented in 
your school? 
30. Was there any changes in workplace relations in your school after the 
pay system reform? 
31. Do you think the social status of teachers in compulsory education has 
changed since the pay system reform? 
32. How do you perceive the role of the government in the pay system 
reform in compulsory education in your local area? 
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33. From your point of view, what do you think were the achievements and 
what problems occurred during the pay system reform and the 
implementation of the new PRP system in your own school? 
34. From your point of view, what effect has the implementation of the pay 
system reform in the compulsory education sector has on different 
schools in the county? 
35. From your point of view, how do you think the whole process of pay 
system reform in the compulsory education sector and the 
implementation of the new PRP system in your school could have been 
improved? 
36. From your point of view, how do you think the whole process of pay 
system reform in the compulsory education sector and the 
implementation of the new PRP system across schools in your county 
could have been improved? 
37. Do you have any further comments? 
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Appendix 2   Interview Questions in Case Study A   
                                                                  (Chinese Version) 
 
 
Part I: 访谈问题——政府部门相关人员部分（半结构式访谈）  
1. 当地政府对近期实行的义务教育教师绩效工资改革的看法？ 
2. 在实行义务教育教师绩效工资改革的过程中，上级政府（省/市政府
相关机构）是否提供了具体的指导意见？ 
3. 如何在全区范围内具体实行义务教育教师绩效工资改革？ 
4. 在实行义务教育教师绩效工资改革的过程中，什么是最困难的环节？ 
5. 对比改革前后当地义务教育教师工资，最大的变化是什么？ 
6. 对当地政府来说，实行义务教育教师工资改革带来了什么样的影响？ 
7. 政府如何监督义务教育教师绩效工资改革实施的公正性？ 
8. 政府如何评估全区范围内不同义务教育学校教师绩效工资改革实施的
效果？ 
9. 从政府角度来看，此次工资改革和新的绩效工资的实施对各个学校带
来什么样的影响？ 
10. 从政府角度来看，义务教育教师绩效工资改革对各个学校相关人员带
来什么样的影响？（a. 任课教师； b. 中层管理人员； c. 班主任； d. 
其他员工） 
11. 从政府角度来看，大部分义务教育教师如何看待此次的教师工资改革
和新的绩效工资的实行？ 
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12. 从政府角度来看，此次教师工资改革和新的绩效工资的实行对全区范
围义务教育的发展产生什么样的影响？ 
13. 从政府角度来看，此次义务教育绩效工资改革的过程和新的绩效工资
的实施有哪些利与弊？ 
14. 从政府角度来看，此次教师工资改革的实施过程中有哪些地方值得改
进？ 
15. 从政府角度来看，新的义务教育绩效工资制度有哪些地方值得改进？ 
16. 对此次义务教育教师工资改革和新的绩效工资的实行您有什么其他的
建议或看法？ 
17. 对今后在其他事业单位推行绩效工资改革，您有什么建议或看法？ 
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Part II: 访谈问题——校长及教师部分（半结构式访谈）  
1. 您如何看待在义务教育学校中把老师的薪酬和绩效挂钩？ 
2. 此次义务教育教师绩效工资改革前后您所在的学校的工资制度发生了
什么样的变化？（a. 工资水平; b. 工资分配结构） 
3. 此次义务教育教师绩效工资改革前后您本人的工资收入发生了什么样
的变化？（a. 工资水平; b. 工资收入结构） 
4. 您所在的学校是如何实行此次绩效工资改革的？ 
5. 在您所在学校的改革实施过程中，最困难的环节是什么？ 
6. 在您所在学校绩效工资改革实行的过程中，相关的绩效衡量指标是如
何确定的？ 
7. 在实行绩效工资改革的过程中，绩效衡量指标的确定对学校的工作目
标有什么样的影响？ 
8. 在实行绩效工资改革的过程中，绩效衡量指标的确定对各个员工的工
作目标有什么样的影响？ 
9. 新的绩效工资的实行能够帮助协调教师和学校之间的工作目标吗？ 
10. 在绩效工资的实行过程中，不同员工的工作表现是如何被评估的？ 
11. 作为任课老师 （或者学校管理人员），您如何看待您所在的学校改
革后工资制度的改变？ 
a. 您能通过努力改进工作表现吗？ 
b. 如果您更努力工作，您的工资报酬会相应的提高吗？ 
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c. 您如何看待通过更努力工作后工资报酬的改变？ 
12. 作为学校校长，您如何看待您所在的学校改革后工资制度的改变？ 
a. 学校的员工能通过努力改进工作表现吗？ 
b. 如果员工更努力工作，他们的工资报酬会相应的提高吗？ 
c. 学校的员工如何看待通过更努力工作后工资报酬的改变？ 
13. 在实施绩效工资改革前后，您所在的学校优秀员工和普通员工之间的
工资差异有什么样的变化？ 
14. 在实施绩效工资改革前后，您所在的学校管理人员和任课教师之间的
工资差异有什么样的变化？ 
15. 作为学校校长，您觉得新的绩效工资的实行有助于您管理学校吗？ 
16. 新的绩效工资的实行有促进您所在的学校相关管理人员的工作吗？ 
17. 新的绩效工资的实行能够激励您所在学校的教师争取更好的绩效吗？ 
18. 您觉得金钱报酬是激励义务教务教师认真工作的重要动力吗？ 
19. 薪酬因素对您本人的工作有多大的影响作用？ 
20. 作为学校校长，您觉得薪酬因素对您所在学校的员工来说有多大的影
响作用？ 
21. 作为一名义务教育教师（或工作人员），您觉得什么是鼓励你努力工
作的最重要因素？ 
22. 实行新的绩效工资后，有帮助减少您所在学校学校管理中的一些不良
行为吗？ 
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23. 实行新的绩效工资后，有帮助减少您所在的学校员工工作中的一些不
良行为吗？ 
24. 实行新的绩效工资后对您所在的学校不同员工间的合作关系有造成影
响吗？ 
25. 实行新的绩效工资后对您所在的学校教师间的竞争情况有影响吗？ 
26. 您本人（或者您学校的员工）是如何参与此次的绩效工资改革过程？ 
27. 在此次绩效工资的改革过程中，您觉得公平和平均哪个因素比较重要？ 
28. 您如何看待您所在的学校此次绩效工资改革过程的公平性？ 
29. 您如何看待您所在的学校新的绩效工资制度的公平性？ 
30. 绩效工资改革前后您所在学校的工作氛围有什么变化吗？ 
31. 您觉得此次义务教育绩效工资改革前后，义务教育教师的社会地位有
什么变化吗？ 
32. 您觉得此次义务教育教师绩效工资改革过程中，政府起到了什么样的
作用？ 
33. 从您个人角度出发，您怎么看待您所在的学校此次的工资制度改革和
新的绩效工资的利与弊？ 
34. 从您个人的角度出发，您怎么看次此次义务教育教师绩效工资改革对
全区范围内不同学校的影响？ 
35. 从您个人的角度出发，您觉得您所在的学校此次义务教育绩效工资改
革的整体过程和新的绩效工资的实行中有哪些地方可以改进？ 
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36. 从您个人的角度出发，全区范围内此次义务教育绩效工资改革的整体
过程和新的绩效工资的实行中有哪些地方可以改进？ 
37. 您有任何其他的建议与看法吗？ 
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Appendix 3   Interview Questions in Case Study B 
 
 
Interview Questions for Staff in the HR Department in Organization M (Semi-
Structured Interviews) 
 
1. Why was the pay system reform carried out in Organization M? 
2. How was the pay system reform implemented in Organization M?  
3. What changes were made to the pay system in Organization M in the 
reform? (a. pay level; b. components of the pay system) 
4. What were the most difficult parts of implementing the pay system 
reform in the organization? 
5. How were the criteria for the performance appraisals decided upon 
during the pay system reform? 
6. How is the performance of employees in different departments evaluated 
in the new PRP system? 
7. How has the implementation of the new PRP system affected the goals of 
the organization? 
8. How has the implementation of the new PRP system affected the goals of 
employees in different departments? 
9. Has the implementation of the new PRP system helped to align the goals 
of the employees with those of the organization? 
10. What do you think of the changes made to the pay system in the 
organization during the pay system reform?  
a. Can employees in different departments improve their 
performance by working harder? 
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b. If employees work harder, will they receive higher pay? 
c. How do employees in different departments perceive the 
additional pay they can receive through working harder?  
11. How have the pay gaps between employees in different departments 
changed in the pay system reform? 
12. How have the pay gaps between employees at different position levels in 
the organization changed in the pay system reform? 
13. How have the pay gaps between high-performing and average employees 
in the organization changed in the pay system reform? 
14. Has the implementation of the new PRP system helped to encourage 
employees to achieve higher performance? 
15. How did the HR department evaluate the implementation of the new PRP 
system after the reform? 
16. Do you think money is an important factor in motivating employees to 
work harder? 
17. What do you think is the most important factor that makes employees 
work harder? 
18. Has the implementation of the new PRP system helped to reduce any 
unwanted behaviour among the internal management of the 
organization? 
19. Has the implementation of the new PRP system helped to reduce any 
unwanted behaviour among employees in the organization? 
20. Has the implementation of the new PRP system affected cooperation 
among employees in the organization? 
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21. Has the implementation of the new PRP system affected the competition 
among employees in the organization? 
22. How were employees in different departments involved in the pay 
system reform? 
23. What impact have the pay system reform and the implementation of the 
new PRP system had on different employees in the organization? (a. 
employees in production departments; b. employees in administration 
departments; c. employees in management positions; d. others) 
24. “Equity” or “equality”, which philosophy played a more important role 
in the pay system reform in the organization? 
25. How fair do you think the pay system reform in your organization was? 
26. How fair do you think the new PRP system implemented in your 
organization is? 
27. Has there been any change in workplace relations since the pay system 
reform? 
28. Did the government policy have any impact on the pay system reform in 
the organization? 
29. What do you think have been the achievements and what problems have 
occurred in the pay system reform and the implementation of the new 
PRP system in your organization? 
30. How do you think the implementation of the pay system reform in your 
organization could have been improved? 
31. How do you think the current PRP system in your organization could be 
improved? 
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Appendix 4   Interview Questions in Case Study B   
                                                                  (Chinese Version) 
 
 
访谈问题——某出版社绩效工资制度改革访谈问题  （人力资源办公
室，半结构式访谈）  
1. 出版社此次工资制度改革实行的原因？ 
2. 工资制度改革的具体实施过程？ 
3. 工资制度改革前后出版社整体工资水平和工资收入结构的变化？ 
4. 工资制度改革过程中，最困难的环节是什么？ 
5. 工资制度改革过程中，相关的绩效衡量指标是如何确定的？ 
6. 实行新的绩效工资制度后，各部门员工的工作表现如何评估？ 
7. 工资制度改革的过程中，绩效衡量指标的确定对单位的工作目标有什
么样的影响？ 
8. 工资制度改革的过程中，绩效衡量指标的确定对各个员工的工作目标
有什么样的影响？ 
9. 新的绩效工资的实行能够帮助协调员工和出版社之间的工作目标吗？ 
10. 您如何看待出版社绩效工资改革实行后工资制度的改变？ 
a. 各部门员工能通过努力改进工作表现吗？ 
b. 如果员工更努力工作，他们的工资报酬会相应的提高吗？ 
c. 各部门员工如何看待通过更努力工作后工资报酬的改变？ 
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11. 在实施绩效工资改革前后，不同部门间员工的工资差异有什么样的变
化？ 
12. 在实施绩效工资改革前后，不同职位等级的员工间的工资差异有什么
样的变化？ 
13. 在实施绩效工资改革前后，高绩效员工和普通员工之间的工资差异有
什么样的变化？ 
14. 新的绩效工资的实行有促进各部门员工的工作绩效吗？ 
15. 人力资源部门如何衡量新的绩效工资的实施效果？ 
16. 您觉得金钱报酬是激励员工认真工作的重要动力吗？ 
17. 您觉得什么是激励员工努力工作最重要的因素？ 
18. 实行新的绩效工资改革后，有帮助减少单位管理中的一些不良行为吗？ 
19. 实行新的绩效工资后，有帮助减少员工工作中的一些不良行为吗？ 
20. 实行新的绩效工资后，员工间的合作关系有影响吗？ 
21. 实行新的绩效工资后，员工间的竞争关系有影响吗？ 
22. 各部门员工如何参与此次的工资制度改革？ 
23. 此次薪酬制度改革和新的绩效工资的实施对不同员工的影响？（a.生
产部门员工；b. 行政部门员工；c. 管理人员；d. 其他） 
24. 在此次工资制度改革过程中，公平和平均哪个因素更重要？ 
25. 您如何看待此次绩效工资改革过程的公平性？ 
26. 您如何看待新的绩效工资制度的公平性？ 
27. 绩效工资改革前后出版社内部工作氛围有什么变化吗？ 
	   255 
28. 改革过程中，政府的相关政策有任何影响作用吗？ 
29. 您如何评估此次薪酬制度改革和实行新的绩效工资制度的利与弊？ 
30. 您觉得整个薪酬制度改革的过程中有哪里可以改进吗？ 
31. 您觉得现在实施的绩效工资制度哪里可以改进 吗？ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   256 
Appendix 5   Sample Pay Systems in Case Study A 
 
 
Sample A: Summary of the system for distributing encouraging performance 
pay24 in Primary School C (December 2009) 
 
 
Part I. Composition of individual employees’ encouraging performance pay  
 
           
Employee’s 
encouraging 
performance 
pay 
= Annual 
performance 
appraisal 
award 
+ Allowance for 
teaching 
hours 
+ Position 
appraisal 
allowance 
+ Bonuses 
for 
teaching/ 
research 
awards 
+ Other 
allowance 
           
  (40 per cent)  (20 per cent)  (30 per 
cent) 
 (<5 per 
cent) 
 (about 5 
per cent) 
 
Notes:  
1. Each employee is evaluated and placed into one of four categories: 
“excellence”, “eligibility”, “just qualified”, and “fail”. 
2. For employees who fail the performance appraisal, all of their 
encouraging performance pay is deducted.  
3. The total amount of “allowance for teaching hours”, “position 
allowance” and “allowance for teaching/research awards” should be 
controlled within the 60 per cent of the total encouraging performance 
pay within the school  
4. The bonuses for teaching/research awards should be less than 5 per cent 
of the total encouraging performance pay in the school. After distributing 
each component of the individual employees’ encouraging performance 
pay, if there is any encouraging performance pay left within the school, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Seventy percent of employees’ pay is allocated by the county government, so the pay 
system determined within the school concerns the distribution of the remaining thirty 
percent of employees’ pay, which is called “encouraging performance pay”, according to the 
government policy. 	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the rest will be allocated to all employees who passed their performance 
appraisal, as an “other allowance”, using weights of 50 per cent for those 
in the “just qualified” category and 100 per cent for those in the 
“eligibility” and “excellence” categories. 
Part II. Explanations of each component of the employees’ pay 
(A) Annual performance appraisal award (40 per cent) 
According to the performance appraisal results, all employees in School C are 
allocated into one of four categories: “excellence”, “eligibility”, “just qualified” 
and “failed”. No more than 15 per cent of the employees should be categorized 
under “excellence”, but there are no quotas set for the number of employees in 
the other categories. Employees whose annual performances are evaluated as 
“just qualified” do not receive the “performance appraisal award” (40 per cent of 
the individual’s “encouraging performance pay”), and employees who fail their 
performance appraisals do not receive any “encouraging performance pay”. The 
“performance appraisal award” for individual employees is determined as 
follows: 
Performance appraisal award for an individual employee = A (the average 
individual performance appraisal award across School C) ×B (the index 
benchmark of School C) ×C (the individual’s index according to his/her 
performance evaluation result) – D (deduction of bonus due to leave for 
sickness/personal reasons)  
Notes:  
A (the average individual performance appraisal award across School C) =   
(the total amount of encouraging performance pay allocated to School C) ×40 
per cent ÷ (the total number of employees in School C) 
B (the index benchmark of the school) =  
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(total number of the employees involved in the PRP reform) ÷  
[(number of management staff ranked under “excellence”) ×150 per cent +  
(number of management staff ranked under “eligibility”) ×130 per cent +  
(number of employees ranked under “excellence”) ×120 per cent + 
(number of employees ranked under “eligibility”) ×100 per cent] 
C (the individual’s index according to his/her performance evaluation 
result): For employees in senior management positions (including the chief 
secretary, the deputy head teacher and the head teacher’s assistant), the indices 
for the different performance appraisal results are 140 per cent for excellence 
and 130 per cent for eligibility. For all other employees, the indices are 110 per 
cent for excellence and 100 per cent for eligibility. 
D (deduction of bonus due to leave for sickness/personal reasons): For 
employees who are absent for personal reasons more than three days within a 
month, or for illness on more than six days within a month, or who are absent on 
more than eight days within a month in total, the monthly performance appraisal 
award is canceled; for employees who miss more than 15 days within a year for 
personal reasons, or more than 30 days for illness, or more than 40 days in total, 
the annual performance appraisal award is halved; employees who are absent for 
personal reasons on more than 30 days within a year, or for illness on more than 
60 days within a year, or in total on more than 75 days within a year have their 
annual performance appraisal award canceled. 
(B) Allowance for teaching hours (20 per cent) 
1) Basic allowance: all employees who have fulfilled their allocated tasks 
receive the basic allowance of 2,000 yuan/year.  
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2) Substitute allowance: teachers who were allocated temporary teaching 
tasks are given an allowance of 6 yuan/class25. If these tasks last for 
longer than 2 weeks, the allowance is 10 yuan/class.  
3) The weekly workload for employees in different positions: 
3a. The standard teaching load for all full-time teachers is 14-20 
classes per week. 
3b. Conversion rates between full-time teachers and employees in 
other positions: 
Positions Conversion rate ( per 
cent) 
Head teacher and chief secretary  80 
Deputy head teacher, assistant to the 
head teacher, deputy chief secretary and 
other senior managers at an equivalent 
level 
65 
Middle managers 50 
Middle managers (deputy level) 40 
Note: For employees holding more than one position, only the 
highest position will be counted.  
3c. Conversion rates between the teaching loads of teachers of 
different subjects 
Subject(s)  Conversion rate ( per 
cent) 
Music, Arts, Sports, Social behaviour etc. 1 
English & Science  1.1 
Chinese & Mathematics 1.25 
3d. Conversion rates for other tasks: morning reading (0.4 
class/section); lunch supervision (0.6 class/section) etc. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  Each class in compulsory education schools in County H usually lasts for 40 or 45 minutes. 
The class time is 40 minutes in the case of School C. 	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4) Allowance for working overtime: tasks within the individual’s job 
responsibilities are not counted towards the overtime allowance. For 
tasks outside of a person’s job requirements, the overtime allowance is 8 
yuan/hour, upto a maximum of 30 yuan per half day, and 60 yuan per 
day. 
(C) Position appraisal allowance (30 per cent) 
Attendance allowance (10 per cent): For employees who fulfill the attendance 
requirement, the attendance allowance is 200 yuan/month, with a total of 10 
months per year.  
Note:  
All employees have to request leave by following the appropriate procedure. For 
employees who are absent without reason for more than half a day, the 
attendance allowance for the month is canceled. If an employee is absent without 
reason for longer than half a day, their encouraging performance pay is reduced 
at a rate of 300 yuan per half day. If an employee is absent without reason for 
more than 5 days, all encouraging performance pay will be suspended. If they 
are absent for more than 10 days, all pay will be suspended. If they are absent 
without reason for 15 days in succession, or absent without reason on more than 
30 days within a single year, their employment contract will be suspended. In the 
case of employees who request sickness, business, or maternity leave, their 
encouraging performance pay will be adjusted according to further instruction.  
Position allowance (20 per cent): Employees who fulfill the tasks allocated to 
their position receive a corresponding allowance according to their position 
level. If any accidents occur that are related to their position, deductions will be 
made (e.g., a student being injured at school, teachers who use corporal 
punishment, etc.). The position allowance includes: 
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a. Allowance for employees who are regularly on-duty: 200 yuan/term. The 
on-duty position allowance is reduced by 25 yuan every time the 
employee is late to arrive or leaves early; 50 yuan is deducted each time 
the employee fails to arrive altogether.  
b. Management position allowance: class teachers receive an allowance of 
300 yuan/month (already included in the 70 per cent of pay allocated by 
the government); deputy class teachers receive an allowance of 100 
yuan/month; research tutors receive 150 yuan/month; employees in 
middle management positions receive 40 yuan/month; employees in 
senior management positions receive 50 yuan/month. 
(D) Bonuses for teaching/research awards (5 per cent) 
The bonuses for employees who win awards different levels are listed below 
(unit: yuan). 
 Awards at 
provincial level 
or above 
Awards at the 
city level 
Awards at the 
county level 
Awards at the 
local district 
level 
 I II III I II III I II III I II III 
General awards 200 100 60 30 
Teaching competitions 100 80 60 60 50 40 40 30 20 20 15 10 
Arts, speech or technical 
competitions 
100 80 60 60 50 40 40 30 20 20 15 10 
Case study competitions 100 80 60 60 50 40 40 30 20 20 15 10 
Published papers 60 30 20 N/A 
Public class 
demonstration 
50 40 30 20 
Outstanding teacher 
awards 
100 80 60 40 
Research project awards 200 150 100 30 
Supervision of students 
awards (double for team 
awards) 
100 80 60 50 40 30 30 25 15 20 15 10 
Special achievements Bonuses will be decided at school meetings 
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(E) Other allowance 
The remainder of the total encouraging performance pay allocated to the school 
is distributed among all employees who pass their performance appraisals, using 
a weight of 50 per cent for those who are classed as “just qualified” and 100 per 
cent for those classed under “eligibility” or “excellence”. 
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Sample B: Summary of the system for distributing encouraging performance 
pay in Junior High School D (December 2009) 
 
 
Composition of individual employees’ encouraging performance pay in 
Junior High School D 
 
The employee's encouraging performance pay is made up of the following 
components: 
 
         
Annual 
performance 
appraisal 
award 
 Allowance for 
attendance 
 Allowance 
for 
working 
overtime 
 Bonuses for 
teaching 
achievemen
ts 
 Any 
adjustments 
         
(40 per cent)  (10 per cent)  (20 per 
cent) 
 (30 per 
cent) 
 (N/A) 
 
Part I: The performance appraisal scheme  
Categories of performance criteria 
The performance of each employee in School D is evaluated according to six 
categories of performance criteria, and their final performance appraisal result is 
based on the total number of points received during the evaluation. Details of the 
performance criteria are as follows:  
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F) 
Political 
ethics 
 Professional 
knowledge 
 Teaching 
skill 
 Work 
achieveme
nts 
 Fulfillment of 
responsibilities 
 Extra 
achievements 
           
(Maximum 
 25 points) 
 (Maximum 
10 points) 
 (Maximum 
10 points) 
 (Maximum 
30 points) 
 (Maximum 
25 points) 
 (Optional, 
maximum 5 
points) 
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(A) Political ethics (25 points) 
Three rounds of appraisal are used in this category: peer appraisal, supervisor 
appraisal and appraisal by the performance evaluation team at the school. The 
total points awarded in each round are weighted as follows: peer appraisal 50 per 
cent, supervisor appraisal 20 per cent and appraisal by the performance 
evaluation team 30 per cent. All employees are then allocated into one of four 
categories: “excellence” (21-25 points), “good” (16-20 points), “qualified” (11-
15 points), or “poor” (6-10 points).  
 
(B) Professional knowledge (10 points) 
Basic requirements (6 points): For all employees with an education degree who 
participate in the teaching or research activities of the school, 6 points are 
awarded, which enables the employee to pass the appraisal in this category. If 
the employee does not fulfill these requirements, some points will be deducted. 
Employees who fulfill certain extra criteria are awarded extra points (upto a 
maximum of 10 points in total) as follows: 
(1) Employees with a higher graduate degree (2 points). (The basic 
education requirement is a college degree, but employees with a higher 
degree and those who are older than 45 years old are awarded extra 
points.) 
(2) Employees who participate in group teaching/research projects (1 point). 
(3) Employees who attend and pass the required training programmes (1 
point). 
(4) Employees who are participating in further education (1 point). 
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(C) Teaching skill (10 points) 
Basic requirements (6 points): for all employees who fulfill their allocated 
teaching tasks, 6 points are awarded, which enables the employee to pass the 
appraisal in this category. If the employee does not fulfill their requirements, 
points are deducted. Extra points are awarded for certain extra achievements (up 
to a maximum of 10 points in total) as follows: 
(1) Employees who fulfill the teaching requirement successfully (2 points). 
(2) Employees whose classes are chosen as sample demonstration classes (1 
point). 
(3) Employees who have demonstrated at public classes or lectures (1 point). 
 
(D) Work achievements (30 points) 
Basic requirements (18 points): for all employees who fulfill their allocated 
teaching tasks, and whose teaching and research results meet the required 
standard, 18 points are awarded, meaning the employee passes their appraisal in 
this category. If the employee does not fulfill the requirements, points are 
deducted. Extra points are awarded as follows (up to a maximum of 30 points in 
total): 
(1) Teachers who achieve good teaching results are awarded extra points 
based on their students’ performance in examinations. The benchmark 
standard is 3.8. The teachers are awarded 1 extra point if their students 
receive   3.9, 2 extra points for 4.0, 3 extra points for 4.1, 4 extra points 
for 4.2, and 5 points for 4.3 or above. 
(2) Teachers are awarded extra points if one of their students wins an 
academic competition (e.g., 4-5 points for national competitions, 3-4 
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points for provincial competitions, 2-3 points for city-wide competitions, 
1-2 points for district competitions) (only the highest competition result 
qualifies). 
(3) Employees are awarded extra points if their research projects win any 
public awards (4-5 points for national awards; 3-4 for provincial awards; 
2-3 for city awards; 1-2 for district awards), based on the highest award 
the employee receives. 
(4) Employees are awarded extra points if have research papers published in 
journals/books (4-5 points for national publications; 3-4 for provincial; 2-
3 for city-level; 1-2 for district), based on the highest level publication. 
 (E) Fulfillment of responsibilities (25 points) 
Basic requirements (15 points): teachers who teach 12-16 classes per week, 
employees in senior management positions who teach 2-4 classes per week, 
employees in middle management positions who teach 4-6 classes per week. If 
the employee does not fulfill the requirements, points are deducted. Extra points 
are awarded (upto a maximum of 25 points in total) as follows: 
(1) Overtime (2 points for those whose extra teaching load is more than 50 
per cent of a standard unit; 1 point for those whose extra teaching load is 
less than 50 per cent of a standard unit) 
(2) The class teacher whose class is judged the best class in the school (2 
points). 
(3) Class teachers are awarded 1 extra point if none of their students break 
the school rules within the year. 
(4) Teachers who fulfil the family visiting requirement with a full record (1 
point). 
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 (F) Extra achievements (optional) 
Employees are awarded extra points if they achieve any further public 
achievements not included in the list above (4-5 points for national-level 
achievements; 3-4 for province-level; 2-3 for city-level; 1-2 for district-level).  
 
Part II: The performance appraisal results 
According to the total points received across all of the above categories, each 
employee is evaluated and placed into one of the following four categories: 
(1) “Excellence”: above 90 points 
(2) “Eligibility”: 70-89 points 
(3) “Just qualified”: 60-69 points 
(4) “Fail”: 59 points or less 
Any employee exhibiting any of the following behaviours is automatically 
evaluated as “Just qualified”:  
(1) absent for more than 3 consecutive days for no reason, or for more than 
10 days without reason within a year; 
(2) arrive late or leave early for 10 days in a row for no reason, or on more 
than 30 occasions within a year; 
(3)  fail to attend further training without providing a reason; 
(4) break school regulations but it does not have a negative impact on the 
school. 
Any employee exhibiting any of the following behaviours is automatically 
evaluated as “failed”: 
(1) absent for more than 10 consecutive days for no reason, or for more than 
20 days without reason within a year; 
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(2) arrive late or leave early very regularly without providing a reason, and 
do not improve after receiving an official reminder; 
(3) responsible for a major accidents; 
(4) break school regulations in a way that has a negative impact on the 
school 
(5) evaluated as “just qualified” in the previous term, but have shown no 
sign of improvement; 
(6) break the law. 
Part III: Proportion of employees awarded to each category 
There are four categories to which employees can be allocated following their 
performance appraisals: “excellence”, “eligibility”, “just qualified”, and “fail”. 
Employees placed in the “excellence” category should make up no more than 15 
per cent of all employees in the school. The proportions allocated to the other 
three categories are flexible.  
Part IV: The distribution of the annual performance appraisal award 
The sum of the individual annual performance appraisal awards accounts for 40 
per cent of the total encouraging performance pay distributed within the school. 
The distribution of the annual performance appraisal award is as follows:  
(1) Only employees placed in the “excellence” or “eligibility” categories 
receive performance appraisal awards. Employees placed in the “fail” 
category do not receive any encouraging performance pay. 
(2) The index for “excellence” is 120 per cent and that for “eligibility” is 100 
per cent. For senior managers (deputy head teacher, assistant to the head 
teacher, deputy chief secretary and other senior managers at an equivalent 
level), the indices are 150 per cent and 130 per cent, respectively. For 
middle managers they are 130 per cent and 110 per cent, respectively. 
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(3) Employees exhibiting the following behaviours have their annual 
performance appraisal award reduced: annual absence for personal 
reasons for more than 30 days, annual sick leave for more than 60 days, 
or annual total absence for more than 75 days (annual award canceled); 
monthly absence for personal reasons of more than 3 days, monthly sick 
leave of more than 6 days, or monthly total absence of more than 8 days 
(monthly award canceled); annual absence for personal reasons of more 
than 15 days, annual sick leave of more than 30 days, or annual total 
absence of more than 40 days (annual award halved).  
Part V: Teaching loads and overtime allowances 
(A)  Benchmark workload 
a. Full-time teachers  
Subject  Standard Teaching Load 
Chinese, Maths, English and Science 12 classes/week  
Social science & Politics 14 classes/week 
PE, Arts, Music and IT skills 16 classes/week 
Extra  Morning classes, supervision or further 
activities count towards the individual’s 
performance 
b. Management positions 
Subject Position  Conversion 
rate 
Converted teaching 
load (per week) 
Management 
positions 
Head teacher 80 10 
Deputy head teacher 60 7 
Middle management positions 50 6 
Deputy middle management 
positions 
30 4 
Director of Communist Party 12 1.5 
Others Director of teaching and 
research 
8 1 
Director of teaching preparation 4 0.5 
Director of trade union 2 0.25 
Notes If a position is shared by two people working part time, the workload is 
calculated as half of the full-time load. 
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c. Teaching support positions and back office staff 
Employees in 
teaching 
support 
positions 
• Document administration and conference organizer (1) 
• Students’ file administration (1) 
• Laboratory administration (1.5) 
• Librarian (3) 
• IT service (1) 
• School doctor (1.5) 
Employees in 
back offices 
• Canteen administration (1) 
• Accountant for canteen service (0.5) 
• Accountant (1) 
• Statistician (0.75) 
• Storage administration (0.5) 
• Equipment fixing and maintenance (1) 
• PE equipment and gymnasium administration (1) 
(B) The setting of overtime allowances 
1. Overtime teaching or substitute teaching  
a. Main subjects (Chinese, Maths, English, Science, Social science 
and Political science): 15 yuan/class 
b. Other subjects (PE, Music, Arts, and IT skills): 12 yuan/class 
c. Others: 8 yuan/class 
2. Evening self-study supervision: 25 yuan/section 
3. Weekly on-duty staff: 30 yuan/day 
4. On-duty at night: 50 yuan/night 
5. Overtime work during holidays: 40 yuan/day 
6. Overtime work during weekends: 30 yuan/day 
7. Morning sports administration: 8 yuan/section 
8. Supervision for military training: 50 yuan/day 
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9. Supervision for academic competition 
a. Main subjects (Chinese, Maths, English, Science, Social science 
and Political science): 45 minutes per class, counted towards 
teaching load 
b. Other subjects (PE, Music, Arts, and IT skills): 1.5 hours per 
class, counted towards teaching load 
 
Questions regarding any situation not included above have to be referred to the 
school performance appraisal team. 
